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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive overview of international environmental law as it relates 
to plants. In doing so, it offers new perspectives on some of the key debates in the law, as well 
as on humanity’s relationship with the natural world. 
The first part of the thesis looks at the philosophical rationales for giving legal protection to 
plants. Drawing on the literature relating to value, different interpretations of the value of plants 
are identified, including instrumental, intrinsic and ecological. Each interpretation is then 
tracked in international conservation law and policy. An almost exclusively anthropocentric 
picture is revealed, and the implications of this for conservation policy and practice are 
discussed. 
Attention then turns to global and regional approaches to protecting plants. First, the 
construction and content of key legal agreements are assessed against a range of criteria for 
effectiveness. Second, an analysis of the design and form of conservation mechanisms is 
conducted, focussing on the extent to which protected areas reflect the ecological needs of 
plants and the representativeness of lists of protected and endangered species. In each case the 
law is found to fall short, and proposals on how to address this are given. 
In the third part of the thesis, how the law responds to some of the main threats to plants, 
namely climate change, international trade and alien/invasive species, is considered. Each 
impacts on plants in different ways and has been subject to very different legal responses. In 
each case, however, weaknesses can be identified that undermine the law’s ability to adequately 
protect plants.  
Finally, the extent to which the law supports and frustrates the work of conservation 
practitioners is examined. As well as offering practical reforms to make the law a better tool for 
practitioners, consideration is given to wider governance reforms to international 
environmental law. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL AND ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF PLANT CONSERVATION 
 
Why a Thesis about Plants? 
Growing in the Giant Forest of Sequoia National Park, California, is General Sherman. Named 
after a general who fought for the Union in the American Civil War, this giant sequoia 
(Sequoiadendron giganteum) is one of the oldest and largest beings in the world. General 
Sherman began growing more than 2,500 years ago, predating Julius Caesar’s march across the 
Rubicon by several centuries, and at around 275 feet from base to tip is nearly three times the 
length of a fully-grown blue whale. Elsewhere, there are microbiotic plants regulating and 
feeding the oceans. Hybrids are created by nature, scientists and amateur horticulturalists every 
day. These plants, in evolutionary terms, are the youngest organisms alive. 
Plants are the most diverse beings on the planet. They have colonised some of the most 
inhospitable habitats, including the heights of the Himalayas and the most arid of deserts. Some 
lie dormant beneath the ground waiting for the necessary ecological trigger before growing, be 
this rainfall that may only occur once every few decades or a wildfire. Others have sophisticated 
means of acquiring their essential nutrients, including parasitic relationships with other plants 
and the trapping and digesting of insects. Plants are not just ‘objects’ in the environment, 
incapable of responding to external factors. Contrary to public perceptions, they are intuitively 
aware of their surroundings, possessing a greater capacity to ‘sense’ what is going on around 
them and to react accordingly.1 Plants are also central to all aspects of human life. They are the 
first link in every food chain, they provide primitive shelter and sophisticated building materials,2 
are the basis of traditional and modern medicine and are embedded in the art and culture of 
human civilisation.3 
Yet the world’s plants are in danger. A recent study suggests that over a fifth of all species are 
at risk of extinction and the conservation status of many more remains unclear or unassessed.4 
Despite being the ecological foundations of all life on Earth, plants receive little attention in law. 
                                                          
1 A 2014 study, for example, found that one species, Arabidopsis thaliana, can effectively ‘hear’ when it is 
being eaten by sensing the acoustic vibrations caused by insects and will respond to the threat through 
chemical defences: H.M. Appel and R.B. Cocroft, ‘Plants respond to leaf vibrations caused by insect 
herbivore chewing’ (2014) 175 Oecologia 1257-1266. 
2 Scientists are currently exploring the potential of bamboo as a low-carbon construction material - 
https://structuralbamboo.wordpress.com/ (last accessed 01/04/2017).  
3 For example, see M. Denney and B. Mathew, ‘A celebration of cyclamen in art’, in B. Mathew (ed), Genus 
Cyclamen: Science, Cultivation, Art and Culture (Kew Publishing, 2012). 
4 RBG Kew, ‘The State of the World’s Plants Report – 2016’ (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 2016), p. 59. 
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Often, plants are treated as a side issue to the conservation of animals, and in other cases are 
almost completely ignored. The last comprehensive review of plant conservation law was de 
Klemm’s Wild Plant Conservation and the Law.5 Whilst an important resource when published, 
the present-day value of this work is debatable. De Klemm predates the 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention.6 His work also came before the major scientific advances that have enhanced our 
knowledge about some of the key drivers of plant diversity loss, and therefore the legal 
responses as well.  
There are also important differences between de Klemm’s work and the approach I adopt in this 
thesis. Most obviously, de Klemm offers insight into plant protection law at the national level.7 
Due to the limitations of a thesis this has not been possible here, although, where relevant, 
examples have been provided of how international obligations have been implemented at the 
national level. Secondly, I link legal issues with conservation scholarship in a more 
comprehensive manner than de Klemm. Although primarily an investigation into the current 
state of plant conservation law, this work also explores the relationship between conservation 
law and conservation practice, with reforms proposed about how the former can be reformed 
for the benefit of the latter. 
In this thesis, I intend to redress the bias against plants seen in legal literature by providing a 
contemporary appraisal of how international law seeks to protect plants. In doing so, I offer new 
perspectives on some of the key debates in international law, as well as on humanity’s 
relationship with the natural world. International law has been chosen for two reasons. First, 
the conservation of biodiversity has been recognised as an issue of ‘common concern of 
humankind’ by the international community.8 It is therefore legitimate to ask what collective 
action is being and should be taken to protect an important component of that biodiversity. 
Second, many of the drivers of plant diversity loss, including climate change and the spread of 
alien species, require coordinated global responses if they are to be effectively addressed. 
Unilateral actions by States may deliver some short-term local gains, but will be insufficient to 
ensure the ecological integrity of the planet. 
 
                                                          
5 C. de Klemm, Wild Plant Conservation and the Law (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper Number 
24, IUCN, 1990). 
6 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 
(1992) 
7 De Klemm, (n 5) chapters 1.1-1.4. 
8 Preamble to the Biodiversity Convention. 
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A Brief Introduction to the Ecology of Plants: 
Plants are one of the five kingdoms of the natural world (Plantae), the others being Animalia, 
Fungi,9 Protoctista10 and Prokaryotae.11 They are typically multicellular autotrophic organisms 
capable of photosynthesis. Plants have evolved a myriad of adaptations enabling them to thrive 
in and support every ecosystem on the planet, but they all share the same basic requirements.  
One essential need is water, although different plants require different types of water. Cacti, for 
example, survive on rainfall that may only fall once a year. Other species need their roots to be 
constantly and consistently moist, and others, particularly bulbous species, need water during 
their growing season but benefit from a dry summer rest. Water scarcity is becoming an 
increasing issue in plant conservation. Many areas are suffering periods of drought for longer 
and more often due to the impacts of climate change, adding further pressure to diminishing 
fresh water supplies.  
Plants also need sunlight to fuel photosynthesis, the process through which water and carbon 
dioxide are converted into glucose, the plant’s food. It might be assumed that all plants will 
always have access to sunlight, but this is not the case. Some plants, especially alien/invasive 
species, may dominate an ecosystem, limiting others’ exposure to the sun.  
Finally, all plants need pollinators to aid in their reproductive cycle, and it is here where the 
importance of adopting what has been classed an ‘ecosystem approach’12 to the legal protection 
of plants becomes clear. Many plants have evolved symbiotic links with their pollinators. 
Cyclamen seeds, for example, are coated in a sweet substance that attracts ants. Ants collect 
the seeds, transport them to their nests where they eat the sugary substance and leave the seed 
                                                          
9 Fungi receive even less attention in international law than plants, and, whether by ignorance or design, 
are explicitly excluded from many international conservation agreements. The 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) (Washington, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 
UNTS 243), for example, is only concerned with trade in fauna and flora. Fungi are, however, arguably 
included within the remit of the Biodiversity Convention, as Article 2 refers to ‘living organisms’ rather 
than plants and animals. 
10 Many species of algae are technically classified as belonging to the Protoctista kingdom, which include 
single- and simple multi-cellular species that typically live in water. However, the classification of algae is 
complicated, as some species closely resemble plants whilst other have more in common with animals. 
For the purposes of this thesis it is not strictly necessary to differentiate between the different types of 
algae, as laws that protect one type of marine organism can benefit the others.  
11 Single-celled primitive species that contain no nucleus, i.e. bacteria. Given the obvious practical 
difficulties in protecting species that are invisible to the naked eye, Prokaryotae are not protected by the 
law. They are however subject to some form of regulation, for example where the bacteria in question 
causes disease and its potential pathways and carriers are therefore monitored. 
12 Consensus has yet to be reached over what exactly an ecosystem approach should entail, however. See 
V. de Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in International 
Environmental Law’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 91-117. 
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untouched. These relationships are one reason why plant conservation is particularly 
challenging. It is not the case that a plant can simply be moved to a new location if its previous 
habitat is lost or damaged, as there are no guarantees that its pollinators will follow. The new 
location, assuming it also provides the nutrients and water necessary for the plant to survive, 
may not be suitable for the pollinator. There may, for example, be another species that preys 
on the pollinator, suppressing its numbers to the extent that too few individuals are pollinated 
for the plant species to be sustainable.  
From a governance perspective, however, it is unnecessary to formulate a scientifically-accurate 
definition of ‘a plant’. There are certain preconceptions of what a plant is that suffice for the 
purposes of conservation law, evidenced by the absence of scientific definitions of plants in 
international instruments. What is more relevant in the context of law and policy is how our 
understanding of plants’ roles in different ecosystems has evolved. As I discuss in the next 
section, conservation science, driven by our growing understanding of ecology and ecosystemic 
relationships, has undergone a paradigm shift in recent decades. This has not, however, been 
matched by a similar transformation in the design and application of international conservation 
instruments, which is arguably one of the reasons why the law is unable to effectively address 
current ecological challenges. 
 
Core Themes and Thesis Structure: 
An analysis of how international environmental law protects plants could encompass the 
entirety of international environmental law, as well as other important areas of public 
international law. To focus the analysis, this thesis therefore concentrates on three core themes. 
The first relates to the tensions between anthropocentrism and ecological values. It is argued 
throughout this work that the near-constant prioritisation of how plants can be used for the 
benefit of humans prevents a more ecologically-sound approach to their protection being 
adopted in international law. This is linked with the second core theme: the prevalence and 
dominance of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in international 
environmental law. In nearly every international instrument discussed in this work, there is a 
reference to this customary norm of international law, qualifying the obligations of States set 
out in these instruments and limiting the extent to which international law can compel States to 
exploit their natural resources in a sustainable, and ecologically-sensitive, manner. 
Combined, these two factors – anthropocentric values and permanent sovereignty – have 
resulted in a body of law fundamentally incapable of providing effective protection to plants. 
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The objectives of the law are framed in anthropocentric terms, and States are afforded 
considerable discretion when deciding how to achieve these. The law’s ability to protect plants 
is also undermined by its failure to keep pace with the rapidly developing fields of ecology and 
conservation science, the third theme in this work. The evolution of ecology has been traced by 
Mace. During the 1960s a ‘conservation for itself’ paradigm prevailed, and emphasis was on 
preserving seemingly untouched areas of wilderness.13 The 1940 Western Hemisphere 
Convention,14 and its emphasis on national parks and strict wilderness reserves, is an example 
of a ‘conservation for itself’ instrument. In the 1970s and 80s, as awareness of the impact human 
activities were having on nature increased, ‘nature despite people’ conservation emerged. 
‘Here, the focus is on threats to species and habitats from humans, and on strategies to reverse 
and reduce them. Ideas concerning minimum viable population sizes and sustainable harvesting 
levels, as well as intense debates about community-based management and the sustainable use 
of wildlife stem from this period and persist to the present’.15 Such concerns are reflected in the 
debates over what direction the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling16 
should take during the same period.17 A major shift in thinking occurred in the 1990s and rather 
than individual habitats and species, ecosystems became the object of conservation action, ‘with 
the goal of providing sustainable benefits for people in the form of ecosystem goods and services 
– “nature for people”’.18 The Biodiversity Convention was the international legislative response 
to this,19 but that the Contracting Parties have found it necessary to develop habitat- and issue-
specific thematic programmes suggests that integrated conservation thinking cannot be easily 
translated into integrated conservation law and policy. Finally, the past decade has seen the 
emergence of ‘people and nature’, which ‘emphasizes the importance of cultural structures and 
institutions for developing sustainable and resilient interactions between human societies and 
the natural environment’.20 In other words, conservation policy should not focus on protecting 
ecosystem services per se, but the broader framework of interactions within and between 
people and nature so as to enhance the capacity of nature as a whole to deliver these services. 
                                                          
13 G. Mace, ‘Whose conservation?’ (2014) 345 Science 1558-1560. 
14 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Washington, 
12 October 1940, in force 1 May 1942, 161 UNTS 193. 
15 Mace, (n 13) 1558. 
16 Washington, 2 December 1946, in force 19 November 1948, 161 UNTS 72 (as amended 19 November 
1956, 338 UNTS 336). 
17 P. Birnie, ‘International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale: A Review of Four 
Decades of Experience’ (1989) 29 Natural Resources Law 903-934. 
18 Mace, (n 13). 
19 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) p. 594. 
20 Mace, (n 13) 1559. 
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International environmental law, however, largely remains stuck between the first and second 
phases. This failure to evolve can be linked to the practical and political difficulties in reopening 
negotiations on international agreements as well as the dominance of anthropocentricy and 
State sovereignty. The consequences of this outdated perception of the rationales behind 
conservation action will become apparent during the course of this work. 
The thesis is structured in four parts, which at the very beginning of this work were presented 
through the image of a tree. From its philosophical roots the law has grown through a series of 
global and regional conservation instruments. Branching out from this core have been responses 
to specific issues and challenges, which have required bespoke legal instruments. All of this 
supports and may be included within the broader canopy of conservation practice. Meanwhile, 
alongside mainstream law and policy we see the seeds of ecocentric reforms, as 
environmentalists seek alternatives to the broken status quo. 
 I begin by considering why it is that international law should protect plants, focussing on how 
different interpretations of the value of plants are expressed in international law and policy. The 
picture that is revealed is overwhelmingly anthropocentric, and it is argued that this impedes 
the development of a more ecologically-conscious body of law.  
Part two of the thesis sets out the core international legal framework for plant conservation. In 
chapter two, the usual critiques of the Biodiversity Convention are re-examined as to how they 
impact on plants. Unsurprisingly, the frequent use of soft language and targets, coupled with 
significant State discretion, make it very difficult for adequate legal protection for plants to be 
achieved at the global level. The weaknesses of the Biodiversity Convention, both generally and 
in relation to plants specifically, would not be as significant an issue if they were supplemented 
by a comprehensive and robust regional system of conservation instruments. However, in 
chapter three regional treaties are tested against a number of measures of effectiveness and 
are found to fall short.  
Chapters four and five deal with regions of the world that are not automatically associated with 
a diverse flora: the polar regions and marine and other aquatic environments. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, plants in these areas have not received as much attention as their temperate and 
terrestrial counterparts, with early attempts at environmental regulation being of no practical 
relevance. Yet there are signs that the law in these regions is becoming increasingly aware of 
the need to protect polar and marine flora. 
In part three, attention turns to how international law responds to some of the main threats to 
plants. Chapter six deals with climate change, which poses an existential threat to many plants. 
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The law’s response is analysed both in terms of the capacity of conservation law to respond to 
the impacts of climate change and how, using mountain flora as a case study, the law protects 
some of the most vulnerable plant species from climate change. At the same time, plants have 
been given a key role in helping humans to tackle and reverse climate change. The extent to 
which the law supports plants in this role is also considered in chapter six. 
Climate change can be described as an issue that has a general and indiscriminate impact. 
International trade, in comparison, has a more limited but potentially just as devastating effect 
on individual species. In chapter seven, how two trade regimes approach the conservation of 
plants is examined. First, the environmental jurisprudence of the World Trade Organisation is 
traced to identify its implications for trade-restricting national policies intended to protect 
plants. The second part of chapter seven is concerned with CITES, arguably one of the strongest 
plant conservation instruments due to the intelligent responses it has developed to particular 
challenges. This chapter also offers interesting insights on the relationship between 
environmental protection and State sovereignty. In most of the regimes discussed in this work, 
the principle of State sovereignty is being used as a shield to prevent international 
environmental obligations infringing on States’ ability to develop freely. In the World Trade 
Organisation disputes, however, State sovereignty is generally being asserted to enable States 
to pursue national environmental agenda that are not necessarily compatible with international 
trade rules. Equally, through CITES States have agreed to suspend their sovereignty in a very 
specific context – trade in endangered species. This has led to some tensions between importing 
States, which tend to be rich developed States, and exporter States, which are often developing 
States reliant on the exploitation of their natural resources for their economies. 
One threat to plants that is growing in significance is alien/invasive species. Climatic changes 
and other anthropogenic activities, including trade, make it easier for alien species to spread. At 
the same time, other destabilising impacts, such as the over-exploitation of certain species, has 
removed biological controls on other species, allowing them to dominate their ecosystem. How 
the law responds to these challenges, and the appropriateness of these responses in terms of 
the protection of plants, varies according to the regulatory context. This is addressed in chapter 
eight, which also considers how international law addresses plant disease. Here, inconsistencies 
between conservation practice and the law are particularly acute, as disease is not even 
identified in the main conservation instruments as a driver of biodiversity loss. 
In the final part of the thesis, chapter nine considers how international law impacts on the work 
of conservation practitioners. Consideration is given to what reforms are necessary, both to 
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specific aspects of international law and also its broader governance framework, to better 
enable the law to facilitate on-the-ground conservation. The theory of resilience thinking, which 
focusses on how promoting collaboration between actors in a given network can allow for a 
more responsive and experientially-led model of governance,21 will be used to frame these 
proposals. One of the critiques that emerges during the course of this work is that traditional 
top-down regulation seen throughout international environmental law can result in a greater 
focus on conservation outputs, such as inventories of species and targets, rather than positive 
conservation outcomes. By emphasising what different actors, including States, local 
communities and conservation practitioners, can contribute to conservation projects, resilience 
thinking could potentially address some of the weaknesses in traditional regulatory approaches 
and deliver genuine improvements in the conservation status of plants. Examples will be 
identified throughout the thesis highlighting where there is space for such an approach to 
emerge. By way of conclusion, I offer some thoughts on how more ecocentric reforms could be 
introduced into international law, and what the consequences could be if humanity’s 
relationship with plants does not fundamentally change. 
As the research progressed, it became clear that it encompassed more issues than were possible 
to cover within the limits of a thesis. Consequently, it was necessary to omit discussion of several 
points, which although academically interesting and relevant in the broader context of the links 
between conservation law and conservation practice, were not as pertinent to a study about 
plants. For example, chapter nine initially included a section on de-extinction, i.e. the scientific 
process of bringing a species back from extinction. However, this practice is still in its infancy, 
and has yet to be applied to plants,22 and so was excluded from the final draft of this work. In 
other cases, a choice had to be made between different regimes for use as case studies. Both 
the 1997 International Plant Protection Convention23 and the 2004 Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships’ Ballast Waters,24 for example, provide insights into the regulation of 
alien/invasive species in international law. As there was only space for discussion of one, the 
1997 Convention was selected because of its more direct relevance to plants. 
The conclusions of the excluded sections were similar to those reached throughout this thesis. 
Specifically, emphasis on the anthropocentric values of nature, coupled with the prioritisation 
                                                          
21 D. Chandler, Resilience: The Governance of Complexity (Routledge, 2014). 
22 H. Pilcher, Bring Back the King: The New Science of De-Extinction (Bloomsbury, 2016). 
23 In force 2 October 2005, amending the 1951 Convention (Rome, 6 December 1951, in force 3 April 1952, 
150 UNTS 67, as revised by the FAO Conference in 1979). Text available at: https://www.ippc.int/en/core-
activities/governance/convention-text/. 
24 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 
(London) 13 February 2004, to enter into force on 8 September 2017, IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36. 
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of State sovereignty, frustrates the development of a more ecologically-sound body of 
international conservation law. 
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PART 1: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION 
OF PLANTS 
 
I 
THE VALUE OF PLANTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Nature in Society: 
In 1988 Ehrenfeld observed: ‘That it was considered necessary to have a section in this volume 
devoted to the value of biological diversity tells us a great deal about why biological diversity is 
in trouble’.1 That conservationists feel compelled to justify their actions over twenty-five years 
later partly explains why efforts to halt the continuing loss of biodiversity have failed.2 Despite 
the growing evidence linking the ecological health of the planet with humanity’s ability to survive 
and prosper, the natural world is simply not valued by society in the same way as other, arguably 
less existentially-vital, assets and entities. Rather than as the foundation of all life on Earth, the 
flora, fauna and natural entities that comprise the natural world are considered as mere 
resources to be exploited for anthropocentric purposes. 
At the international level, the law’s apparent inability to engage with the deeper values of nature 
can be explained by charting the development of the modern legal order and the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Schrijver links the rise of permanent sovereignty 
to a range of factors prevalent in the 1940s which, when taken together, left little room for 
environmental considerations. These include the critical need for energy and food supplies 
during the Second World War, the rise of multinational corporations and the desire of newly 
formed and independent States to exert their economic self-determination.3 That permanent 
sovereignty initially found expression in General Assembly Resolutions4 rather than any formal 
treaty instrument has not precluded it from being recognised as customary international law,5 
                                                          
1 D. Ehrenfeld, ‘Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?’, in E.O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity (National Academy 
Press, 1988), p. 212. 
2 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Montreal, 2014). 
3 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), in particular chapters 2 and 3. 
4 Resolution 1803(XVII) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 3201(S-VI) Declaration 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and Resolution 3281(XXIX) Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
5 Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic (1978) 17 ILM 3, para. 59. 
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and it has since been given effect in various binding and non-binding instruments.6 Given this 
overwhelming international consensus on the need to secure sovereignty for States over the 
natural environment within their borders, and a sovereign right to continue to exploit resources 
outside national jurisdiction, it is not surprising that the natural world, including all living and 
non-living, tangible and intangible things, has been reduced to ‘resources’.7 
Recent developments in international law, however, suggest that it is possible to reinterpret 
permanent sovereignty in light of an emerging principle of sustainable use. An early indication 
of this was seen in Judge Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros,8 in which 
he suggested that the right to development was constrained by environmental limitations.9 
More recently, in 2011 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that States are 
under certain positive duties when conducting activities in the Area.10 These include obligations 
of due diligence, the need to adopt a precautionary approach, the use of best environmental 
practices and the completion of an environmental impact assessment.11 Combined, these 
indicate that States cannot operate freely in the Area without taking into account the 
environmental impacts of their activities and adopting measures to mitigate these.  
Similarly, in the 2013 Kishenganga Arbitration,12 which concerned a dispute between India and 
Pakistan about India’s Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Project and its possible impacts on flow of the 
Indus River, it was stated that principles of international environmental law must be taken into 
account when interpreting legal instruments, including instruments that predate developments 
in environmental law. Reaffirming their earlier ruling that ‘States have “a duty to prevent, or at 
least mitigate” significant harm to the environment’, the Court of Arbitration read a requirement 
of ensuring an ‘environmental flow’ of the river into the Indus Waters Treaty, which governed 
                                                          
6 For example, see Article 193 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 
December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 21 ILM 1261 (1982)) and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (31 ILM 874 (1992)). 
7 There are few definitions of ‘natural resources’ in multilateral environmental agreements, but an 
example can be found in Article V of the 2003 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (Revised Version, not in force): ‘“Natural Resources” means renewable resources, 
tangible and non-tangible, including soil, water, flora and fauna and non-renewable resources’. Text 
available at: http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-convention-conservation-nature-and-natural-
resources-revised-version (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
8 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Reports 7. 
9 ibid, p. 92-95. 
10 Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 
February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10. 
11 ibid, para. 131-137 and 141-150. 
12 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v India), Final Award of the Court of Arbitration, 20th 
December 2013. 
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the two States’ use of the watercourse.13 A further interesting point in the decision was that the 
Court, whilst accepting that there is no single method for assessing the potential environmental 
impacts of a particular project, determined that the more in-depth and holistic ecosystem 
analysis conducted by Pakistan was in principle a more appropriate tool than the more limited 
assessment undertaken by India, which focussed on a single factor, i.e. the habitat available for 
certain species of fish.14 This suggests not only that sustainable use is becoming increasingly 
important in the interpretation of international law, but so too is the use of ecosystem 
approaches when assessing possible environmental impacts. 
Finally, in his Separate Opinion to the Whaling in Antarctica Case, Judge Cançado Trindade 
highlighted the increasing importance attached to ideas of intergenerational equity seen in both 
international environmental law and public international law more broadly.15 Thus, sustainable 
use may be seen as applying not only to current generations, but future generations as well. 
Whilst such developments are welcome, and support Schrijver’s assertion that the principle of 
permanent sovereignty has evolved to reflect ideas of sustainable use,16 their practical value in 
the context of plant conservation is limited. First, these are relatively recent judicial decisions 
and much of the law discussed in the work evolved at a time when a more nuanced 
interpretation of permanent sovereignty was not possible. Whilst developments in international 
environmental law will be taken into account in contemporary interpretations of dated regimes, 
there remain structural flaws within specific treaty provisions that may in part be attributed to 
States’ desire protect their rights of permanent sovereignty.17 Second, given the continued 
importance the international community places on economic growth, it is debatable whether 
these specific cases are enough to instigate the scale of reforms needed across all areas of law 
and policy in a timely manner if the ecological deterioration of the planet is to be slowed or 
reversed. That the nationally determined contributions for emission reductions put forward by 
                                                          
13 ibid, para. 111-112. 
14 ibid, para. 99. 
15 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (2014) ICJ Reports 226, paras. 41-
45 of the Separate Opinion. Note that whilst the majority of the Court found that Japan’s scientific whaling 
programme fell outside the scope of Article VIII of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling (Washington, 2 December 1946, in force 10 November 1948, 161 UNTS 72 (as amended 19 
November 1956, 338 UNTS 336)) and therefore constituted commercial whaling in violation of the 
Convention’s Schedule, they did so after analysing the design and implementation of the programme in 
light of its stated scientific objectives, rather than on grounds relating to intra and intergenerational equity 
(see para. 223-233 of the judgment). 
16 Schrijver, (n 3) chapter 4. 
17 See, in particular, the discussions in chapters 2 and 3. 
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States under the 2015 Paris Agreement18 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change19 
fall short of what is believed necessary to limit the global temperature rise to what is considered 
ecologically safe suggests that they are not.20 
It is not enough to say that society needs to reassess how it values the natural world however. 
There must first be consensus about what the value of nature actually is, and what value(s) we 
wish to protect through international law. In this chapter I explore the nature of value and some 
of the reasons why it has proven difficult to establish a clear and concise understanding of the 
concept. I then look at why reaching this understanding is essential. It is argued that for there 
to be long-term, targeted conservation strategies, society, both at national and international 
levels, must reach a consensus on how the natural world is to be valued. In setting out what is 
discussed in this chapter, it is important to note what is not. In particular, it does not attempt to 
measure or quantify value. There is a substantial body of scholarship on the various approaches 
to measuring value,21 but for my purposes it is more important to establish the type of value 
that we assign to plants, rather than the degree of value, as it is this which will determine what 
conservation strategies are most likely to succeed.  
The main part of the discussion focusses on what I consider to be the five principal 
interpretations of value: instrumental, inherent, intrinsic, ecological and negative.22 This is by no 
means an exhaustive list. Korsgaard, for example, identifies four types of value: final, 
instrumental, intrinsic and extrinsic.23 There are also other sub-categories of value that I include 
in my five broader titles. Taking a restrictive approach to defining value is not to criticise the way 
others have interpreted the value of nature. One of the failings of conservation law to date is 
the failure of policy makers, conservationists and the wider public to form a consensus on what 
value we as a society, both globally and within States, wish to assign to nature. Constantly 
changing understandings of what the value of nature is leads to constantly changing shifts in 
                                                          
18 FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, in force 4 November 2016. 
19 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 March 1994, 
1771 UNTS 107). 
20 UNFCCC, ‘Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions, Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/CP/2015/7. 
21 For example see C. Bruni, R. Chance and P. Shultz, ‘Measuring Values-Based Environmental Concerns in 
Children: An Environmental Motives Scale’ (2012) 43 The Journal of Environmental Education 1-15, P. 
Weesie and J. van Andel, ‘An Integrated Framework for the Instrumental Valuation of Nature’ (2008) 16 
Restoration Ecology 1-4 and J Clark, ‘Corncrakes and Cornflakes: The Question of Valuing Nature’ in Y. 
Guerrier, N. Alexander, J. Chase and M. O’Brien (eds), Values and the Environment: A Social Science 
Perspective (Wiley, 1995). 
22 My starting point for the definitions of value is the discussion of the nature of value in M. Bowman, P. 
Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
chapter 3. 
23 C. Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’ (1983) XCII The Philosophical Review 169-195. 
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policies, which prevents the long-term strategies that are required for effective conservation.24 
Limiting this discussion to five definitions of value is intended to provide a clear template within 
which we can begin to find this consensus. 
Finally, attention turns to how the different interpretations of value are expressed in key 
conservation instruments and the Outcome Report of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development, ‘The Future We Want’.25 It is argued that if the values that underpin international 
environmental law and policy are primarily anthropocentric, ecocentric goals of protecting all of 
nature for its own sake26 and advocating laws that are based on ecological rather than 
anthropocentric criteria27 are less likely to be achieved. 
 
The Nature of Value: 
The concept of ‘value’ is a nebulous one, but for the purposes of this discussion a useful 
definition is provided by Harrison, Burgess and Clark: 
[E]nvironmental values engender conflicts over choices and demand the rationalisation 
of courses of action. Values are the reasons given for actions. They are invoked to 
account for, and to make judgements about, the actions of individuals and institutions 
whilst, at the same time, finding embodiment in social organisation.28  
In short, they are the reasons, justifications and objectives of law, policy and actions. From this 
definition, a number of key elements can be drawn. Firstly, they inform the choices we make. 
When actions are taken, either by individuals or collectively, they are influenced by our values. 
Context is one of the key factors determining the relative weight we afford particular values at 
any given time. As Chase and Panagopoulos put it, ‘When driving one wants good roads, when 
picnicking good views’.29 The writers also highlight the relevance of identity: ‘a communist 
identity is necessarily associated with collective rather than individualistic values; religious 
identities are associated with spiritual values, business identities with financial values and so 
                                                          
24 Ehrenfeld, (n 1) p. 214. 
25 A/RES/66/288, 11 September 2012. 
26 A. Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary’ (1973) 16 Inquiry 
95-100. 
27 C. Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (2nd edition, Green Books, 2011). 
28 C. Harrison, J. Burgess and J. Clark, ‘Capturing Values for Nature: Ecological, Economic and Cultural 
Perspectives’, in J. Holder and D. McGillivray (eds), Locality and Identity: Environmental Issues in Law and 
Society (Ashgate Publishing, 1999), p. 87. 
29 J. Chase and I. Panagopoulos, ‘Environmental Values and Social Psychology: A European Common 
Market or Common’s Dilemma? ‘, in Guerrier, Alexander, Chase and O’Brien (eds), (n 21) p. 71. 
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on’. Context again takes on an important role where, as in Chase and Panagopoulos’ example, 
an individual is both religious and a businessman. 
Secondly, not only do they inform our choices but values are the justifications for those choices 
as well. This is particularly true of public policy relating to the environment, with Parker noting 
that ‘Democratic values are often used as foundational in discussion of values in policy’.30 
Although the premise is relatively uncontroversial, finding a sufficiently democratic process in 
which to identify those values that should inform public policy has proven difficult.31 
The locus of value is just as complex as the nature of value, and will depend on the interpretation 
of value that is being applied.32 It has been located in, inter alia, ecosystems,33 habitats and 
landscapes,34 species,35 individual organisms36 and genes.37 There are contrasting views about 
this. Some argue that nature is devoid of internal value, and any value it has is what has been 
attributed to it by humans.38 There is a degree of truth in such arguments, but again 
understanding the context is crucial. English, for example, discusses the value of ancient 
places.39 Although such places might represent scientifically interesting phenomena, or 
particularly rich areas of biodiversity, any cultural or spiritual value they might have stems from 
human disciplines, traditions and beliefs.40 Others, in comparison, such as advocates of deep 
ecology, reject this idea and instead see nature as having intrinsic value regardless of its worth 
or use to humanity.41 
 
 
                                                          
30 J. Parker, ‘Enabling Morally Reflective Communities: Towards a Resolution of the Democratic Dilemma 
of Environmental Values in Policy’, in Guerrier, Alexander, Chase and O’Brien (eds), (n 21) p. 36. 
31 ibid, p. 37 et seq. 
32 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 22) p. 68. 
33 Weesie and van Andel, (n 21). 
34 C. Winter, ‘The Intrinsic, Instrumental and Spiritual Values of Natural Area Visitors and the General 
Public: A Comparative Study’ (2007) 15 Journal of Sustainable Tourism 599-614. 
35 For example, the spiritual value of whales to indigenous tribes: S. Harrop, ‘Impressions: Whales and 
Human Relationships in Myth, Tradition and Law’, in P. Brakes and M. Peter Simmonds (eds), Whales and 
Dolphins: Cognition, Culture, Conservation and Human Perceptions (Earthscan, 2011). 
36 F. Mathews, The Ecological Self (Routledge, 1991). 
37 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (30th anniversary edition, Oxford University Press, 2006). 
38 H. Rolston III, ‘Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?’, in R. Elliot and A. Gare (eds), 
Environmental Philosophy (Open University Press, 1983) p. 135-136. 
39 P. English, ‘Space and Time: The Genus Loci of Ancient Places’, in J. Holder and C. Harrison (eds), Law 
and Geography (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
40 ibid. 
41 Naess, (n 26). 
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Why is Understanding Value Important? 
It has been persuasively argued that it is our collective failure to appreciate the non-
anthropocentric value of nature that is one of the causes of the decline in biodiversity, or as 
Rolston puts it: ‘Something gone sour at the fact/value distinction is one of the roots of the 
ecological crisis’.42 
Rolston’s comments are, in my view, too simplistic. A more nuanced approach to simply 
attributing the decline of biodiversity in part to anthropocentrically-focussed conservation 
policies is to say that it is society’s failure, at both national and international levels, to agree on 
a set of environmental values on which long-term conservation efforts can be based, be these 
anthropocentric or otherwise. Commentators argue that what is required is consistency in our 
view on the value of nature in order to provide a solid basis for long-term conservation 
strategies.43 Successive governments have argued the need for a long-term strategy, with 
support from across the political and social spectrum, for developing their country’s 
infrastructure. The same approach needs to be adopted in relation to the infrastructure of the 
natural world. Including as many stakeholders as possible will be crucial to enabling universal 
adoption of any values that are agreed,44 although Parker makes the valid point that ‘It is 
important to aim for values we can respect rather than values which we can agree with’.45 
Equally important, these values must be such that the ecological integrity of the planet is 
protected.46 The difficulty, as Redclift argues, is that finding a new set of values to underpin 
society would mean abandoning the values which have enabled humanity to thrive. This 
problem is compounded because ‘many of those who espouse environmental concerns refuse 
to acknowledge that it is the way in which human societies are organised, and structured, which 
determines environmental problems’.47  
This is not to say that changes in values will always undermine environmental protection. Harrop 
has traced how changes in the way in which we value whales has driven the evolution of the 
                                                          
42 Rolston III, (n 38) p. 136. 
43 P. Angermeier, ‘The Natural Imperative for Biological Conservation’ (2000) 14 Conservation Biology 373-
381; I. Brook, ‘Restoring landscapes: the authenticity problem’ (2006) 31 Earth Surface Processes and 
Landforms 1600-1605 and Ehrenfeld, (n 1). 
44 Harrison, Burgess and Clark, (n 28) p. 88. 
45 Parker, (n 30) p. 45. 
46 A. Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 
32-54. See also K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance (2nd 
edition, Routledge, 2017), particularly chapter 2. 
47 M. Redclift, ‘Values and Global Environmental Change’, in Guerrier, Alexander, Chase and O’Brien (eds), 
(n 21) p. 9. 
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International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling48 from a regime primarily concerned 
with supporting the whaling industry to one that is focussed on the conservation and even 
welfare of whales.49 However, such changes in value are not conducive to long-term 
conservation policies. Ehrenfeld goes as far as to say that ‘This is the opposite of the value 
system needed to conserve biological diversity over the course of decades and centuries’,50 and 
it is debatable whether the Whaling Convention would have been more successful at ensuring 
either the absolute protection of whales or their sustainable exploitation had it committed itself 
to just one of these goals.51  
A further reason why understanding the values that underpin conservation law and policy is 
important is that if nature is viewed as having purely anthropocentric value, trade-offs with 
other anthropocentric considerations completely divorced from the ecological importance of 
nature could be facilitated. The incommensurable values of ecological health on the one hand 
and economic growth on the other becomes commensurable through economic expression. 
That is to say that whilst ideals such as ‘ecological health’ and ‘economic growth’ will remain 
incommensurable, purely anthropocentric valuations of the natural world enables such things 
to be weighed against each other. For example, although the value of a clean and healthy river 
cannot be measured against the value of the jobs created by building a chemical works next to 
it, by ignoring its ecological value and only focussing on its anthropocentric value trade-offs 
become possible. In this case, local residents could decide that the river is of greater value as a 
place for the chemical works to dump its waste than as a safe place to go swimming. The river 
has been damaged without any consideration given to its role as part of the ecosystem because 
its ecological value was not acknowledged. 
Finally, approaching the issue from a more pragmatic position, understanding what values are 
attached to certain entities and places enables those responsible for their management and 
conservation to better target their plans and strategies. In a 2007 study, Winter found that the 
environmental values of visitors to natural areas varied considerably.52 Some held a spiritual 
connection with nature, whilst others saw it merely as a place for recreation. Winter concludes: 
The knowledge of these values increases the capacity of tourism planners, managers 
and marketers to [provide benefits for the tourism industry, tourists and the natural 
                                                          
48 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington, 2 December 1946, in force 10 
November 1948, 161 UNTS 72 (as amended 19 November 1956, 338 UNTS 336). 
49 S. Harrop, ‘From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the International 
Whaling Commission’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 79-104. 
50 Ehrenfeld, (n 1) p. 214. 
51 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 22) p. 196-197. 
52 Winter, (n 34). 
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world] through education and through more sophisticated marketing and product 
design.53 
It is not just in relation to the management of specific sites where values play a role in shaping 
decision-making and management practices. Values can also inform broader policies and 
strategies, including highly complex and contentious issues. Drawing on the work of Meadows,54 
Mosimane et al argue that ‘understanding the mental models in use by various stakeholders in 
a particular social-ecological system provides an opportunity to change policy and 
management’.55 In their case mental models were established in relation to human-wildlife 
conflict in Namibia. The writers argue that this understanding will be ‘fundamental to developing 
effective responses’.56 Although the study uses the terminology of ‘mental model’, the definition 
of this adopted from Senge shows clear links with the definition of value outlined above, namely 
a relationship with an individual’s perceptions of the world, and a framework for their actions 
and decisions.57 
Thus it is clear that finding a consensus on what we mean by ‘value’ when discussing nature is 
crucial in establishing targeted long-term conservation strategies. In reality, seemingly 
contradictory yet equally valid valuations of nature will need to be reconciled, taking into 
account the interests of the actors involved and the specific context.58 This, however, is by no 
means straightforward, as the following overview of different interpretations of value 
demonstrates.  
 
Interpretations of Value: 
 Instrumental Value: 
A discussion of instrumental value, i.e. direct value to humans, brings the highly complex nature 
of different value types into focus. In the first instance, it is possible to distinguish between 
                                                          
53 ibid, 612. 
54 D. Meadows, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System (The Sustainability Institute, 1999). 
55 A. Mosimane et al, ‘Using mental models in the analysis of human-wildlife conflict from the perspective 
of a social-ecological system in Namibia’ (2013) 48 Oryx 64-70.  
56 ibid. 
57 P. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (Doubleday-Currency, 
1990), p. 163, cited in Mosimane et al, (n 55). 
58 M. Fosci and T. West, ‘In whose interest? Instrumental and intrinsic value in biodiversity law’, in M. 
Bowman, P. Davies and E. Goodwin (eds), Research Handbook on Biodiversity and Law (Research 
Handbook in Environmental Law Series, Edward Elgar, 2016). 
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commodity59 and utility60 instrumental value. With regard to the former, something can be said 
to have commodity value ‘if it can be made into a product that can be bought or sold in the 
marketplace’.61 Utility value refers to a direct use to which a natural resource may be put. In this 
regard, Murphy highlights the utility of plants in urban environments:  
Benefits include amelioration of climate, because foliage in cities contribute to the 
reduction of ambient temperatures. Large trees and shrubs reduce wind velocity and 
reduce evaporation of soil moisture. Plants are also useful in architecture, erosion 
control, watershed protection, wastewater management, noise abatement, and air 
pollution control.62 
In international environmental law both forms of instrumental value are readily identifiable. The 
1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture63 is an obvious example. 
Similarly, the utility value of the genetic resources of plants and animals forms the basis of the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing64 to the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity.65 
Beyond these immediate or direct forms of instrumental value is the indirect instrumental value 
a species might have. For example, although a farmer may have no direct use of the grass 
growing in his fields, it holds indirect instrumental value as it provides grazing for his sheep. In 
international environmental law, indirect instrumental value is recognised in provisions that call 
for the protection of habitats that are crucial for species with direct commodity or utility value. 
The 1979 Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuna,66 for example, is 
concerned with conserving vicuna for primarily instrumental purposes,67 but the Contracting 
Parties are required to establish protected areas that support vicuna populations.68 The habitat 
of the vicuna thus has indirect instrumental value. 
                                                          
59 B. Norton, ‘Commodity, Amenity and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiversity’, in 
Wilson (ed), (n 1). 
60 D. Murphy, ‘Challenges to Biodiversity in Urban Areas’, in Wilson (ed), (n 1). 
61 Norton, (n 59) p. 201. 
62 Murphy, (n 60) p. 73. 
63 Paris, 19 March 1902, in force 20 April 1908, 4 IPE 1615. 
64 Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
Their Utilization, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, in force 12 October 2014, C.N.782.2010.TREATIES-1. 
65 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 
(1992). 
66 Lima, 20 December 1979, in force 19 March 1982, IELMT 979:94. 
67 Article 1 states: ‘The Signatory Governments agree that conservation of the vicuna provides an 
economic production alternative for the benefit of the Andean population and commit themselves to its 
gradual use…’ 
68 Article 5. 
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Assigning instrumental value to nature is further complicated because virtually everything has 
potential instrumental value. This assigns value according to what uses a particular species might 
be put if future research uncovers a new use or attribute that could be exploited for the benefit 
of humanity. This so-called ‘option value’ is defined by Norton as ‘the present benefit of holding 
open the possibility that some species we might eradicate today may prove valuable in the 
future’.69 It is easy to dismiss this as pure conjecture, but the recent studies into the possibility 
of new cancer treatments derived from Colchicum autumnale highlight exactly what we might 
be losing as we allow species to go extinct.70 It is the importance of potential discoveries such as 
this that lead many commentators to advocate policies that ensure flexibility for future decision-
makers. Goodin discusses the merits of a ‘reversibility’ principle as an alternative basis for 
environmental decision-making to the cost/benefit analyses that tend to predominate.71 This 
principle demands that no decision is taken if it entails irreversible consequences or closes off 
other possible options. He does not say that other options should be readily available if 
circumstances change, for example that they all be reasonably affordable, merely that they 
remain a potential alternative. To demonstrate his point, he refers to Rochlin’s example72 of 
putting radioactive waste somewhere from which it can be retrieved should an incident occur, 
rather than in a location where it would be impossible to address any issues.73 Whilst this 
approach has obvious advantages, there is a risk that it be used to justify an environmentally 
harmful status quo. For example, renewable energy sources remain technically viable even as 
both developed and developing countries continue to invest in fossil fuels. 
Brown Weiss identifies the conservation of options as one element of intergenerational equity, 
believing that ‘Conserving the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base is designed to 
give our descendants a robust and flexible heritage with which to try and achieve a decent and 
healthy life’.74 She goes on to argue: 
The principle of conserving options rests on the premise that diversity, like quality, 
contributes to robustness. This can be seen in the contribution of biological diversity to 
the robustness in ecosystems. If diverse strains and species are present in an ecosystem 
and the system is perturbed, some strains and species will survive and multiply. While 
                                                          
69 Norton, (n 59) p. 202. 
70 G. Sivakumar, ‘Colchicine semisynthetics: Chemotherapeutics for cancer? (2013) 20 Current Medicinal 
Chemistry 892-898. 
71 R.E. Goodin, ‘Ethical Principles for Environmental Protection’, in Elliot and Gare (eds), (n 38). 
72 ibid, p. 7. 
73 For Rochlin’s full discussion see G. Rochlin, ‘Nuclear Waste Disposal: Two Social Criteria’, (1978) 195 
Science 23-31. 
74 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational equity: A legal framework for global environmental change’, in E. 
Brown Weiss (ed), Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (United 
Nations University Press, 1992), p. 402. 
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the distribution of the biological population may change, the ecosystem remains 
viable.75 
Protecting plants on the basis of their potential or option value thus not only ensures they are 
available for possible future exploitation for the benefit of humanity, but strengthens the 
resilience of natural systems. A connection is made with contemporary economic theory in 
which ‘diversity is primarily viewed as a means of spreading risks to avoid reliance on only one 
investment or industry’.76 However, the potential utility and commodity value of nature forms 
the basis of key criticisms of economists’ attempts to reduce the entirety of nature to a single 
monetary figure.77 Carleton Ray is also critical of using potential instrumental value as a reason 
for conserving biodiversity: 
[T]he point is often made that since the potential medical or economic value of a species 
cannot often be predicted, we must save them all. This is clearly impossible, and it may 
also be illogical.78 
It is illogical because, as Norton demonstrates, assessments of potential value are inevitably 
founded on guesswork and unknown unknowns: 
Calculations of [potential] value can only be begun after we identify a species, guess 
what uses that species might have, place some dollar value on those uses, and estimate 
the likelihood of such discoveries occurring at any future date.79 
This is based on an even more basic assumption that we know what it is that we are looking at. 
There are numerous examples of plants that are the subject of disagreements over which 
species they belong to, or which have been reclassified following genetic research. To give just 
one example, in 2004 a study was published in which a number of species of Leucojum were 
reclassified as Acis.80 
Despite the difficulties in assigning potential instrumental value, international environmental 
law has shown itself willing to recognise it. Numerous examples can be found in the preambles 
                                                          
75 ibid. 
76 ibid, p. 403. A similar belief underpins the theory of agroecology, i.e. agricultural systems, both in terms 
of individual farms but also the agricultural sector as a whole, should be designed so as to promote 
diversity. This will help to safeguard agricultural production against, for example, extreme climatic 
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M. Monteduro et al (eds), Law and Agroecology: A Transdisciplinary Dialogue (Springer, 2015). 
77 Ehrenfeld, (n 1) p. 214-215. 
78 G. Carleton Ray, ‘Ecological Diversity in Coastal Zones and Oceans’, in Wilson (ed), (n 1) p. 47. Note 
Carleton Ray is not suggesting that we should not protect all species, only that we should not justify efforts 
to save them all on the basis of their potential instrumental value. 
79 Norton, (n 59) p. 202. 
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of conservation agreements, such as the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources,81 in which the Contracting Parties say they are ‘fully conscious of the 
ever-growing importance of natural resources from an economic, nutritional, scientific, 
educational, cultural and aesthetic point of view’ (emphasis added). 
 
Inherent Value: 
Like instrumental value, inherent value is wholly anthropocentric. However rather than being 
based on what a species can be used or sold for, inherent value is more esoteric in nature. This 
makes it conceptually harder to define. Inherent value has been linked to, inter alia, cultural and 
religious beliefs,82 spiritualism,83 psychological benefits,84 educational benefits,85 appreciation of 
wild and natural places,86 personal discovery and improvement,87 recreation,88 aesthetic 
enjoyment and amenity89 and morality.90 In international law, the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention91 is the manifestation of inherent value, as the definition of ‘natural heritage’ in 
Article 2 demonstrates. 
Clearly inherent value can be many things to many people, and this is partly the reason why it 
has proven difficult to set out a clear, unified definition of value on which conservation law and 
policy can be based. For my purposes the defining characteristics of inherent value are firstly, 
that the natural entity in question is valued for an anthropocentric reason and, secondly, there 
is no direct exploitation of the entity, such as removing it from the environment or as the result 
of a commercial transaction.  
Whilst differing in the source of the perceptions of value, what inherent value shares with 
instrumental value is an unmitigated anthropocentric focus. That these two interpretations of 
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value are prevalent in international environmental instruments is therefore unsurprising.92 
Questions, however, have been raised over the adequacy of such approaches in providing a 
sound basis for conservation law, in part because they are at the root of our exploitation of 
nature. Ehrenfeld is particularly critical, suggesting that by reducing nature to an 
anthropocentric measure of value ‘we merely legitimize the process that is wiping it out’.93 In 
the more specific context of efforts to satisfy anthropocentric values of nature in urban spaces 
through city parks and other green spaces, instrumental and inherent values have also been 
challenged on ecological grounds. Whilst the artificial selection and planting of trees and plants 
may ‘fulfil many of the aesthetic and utilitarian roles that natural habitats offer… their 
establishment and maintenance costs tend to be high, since few of the self-regenerating 
functions of natural ecosystems are available’.94  
On the other hand, instrumental and inherent values clearly have a role to play in promoting the 
conservation of plants and biodiversity generally. In an international legal context it has been 
suggested that anthropocentric values of nature have been ‘deliberately accentuated with a 
view to persuading developing countries in particular that their own long-term interests are best 
served by a commitment to conservation, rather than unrestrained exploitation’.95 
Nevertheless, given the concerns expressed above over linking nature with purely 
anthropocentric meanings of value, it is legitimate to ask whether there are alternative 
interpretations of value on which legal provisions for the protection of plants and nature can be 
based. 
 
Intrinsic Value: 
One such alternative is intrinsic value. This is based on the mere fact of something’s existence 
and that fact alone. As Ehrenfeld describes, 
[I]t does not depend on the properties of the species in question, the uses to which 
particular species may or may not be put, or their alleged role in the balance of global 
ecosystems. For biological diversity, value is. Nothing more and nothing less.96 
This makes intrinsic value a powerful tool for environmentalists, as it changes the nature of the 
debate: 
                                                          
92 See ‘Anthropocentricity in International Environmental Law and Policy’ below. 
93 Ehrenfeld, (n 1) p. 213. 
94 Murphy, (n 60) p. 73. 
95 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 22) p. 66. 
96 Ehrenfeld, (n 1) p. 214. 
24 
 
 
 
The onus of justification is no longer with those who wish to protect the environment, 
but rather it is shifted onto those who wish to exploit nature. This is clearly the strength 
of the intrinsic value approach: the recognition of such values places a break on the 
wanton destruction and exploitation of human nature. The isolation of a value that 
resides in nature challenges the attitude that nature is valuable only in so far as it is 
directly useful to humanity.97 
A further advantage of intrinsic value is that it treats all parts of the natural world equally, 
without applying anthropocentric prejudices. This is illustrated by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature’s Red List, ‘where entry of each species has equivalence, i.e. each 
threatened species receives equal coverage without prejudice to its taxonomic status’.98 Beyond 
the listing of species in instruments such as the Red List, however, it is clear that the different 
aspects of the natural world are not viewed equally. As Dawkins observes:  
[T]hink of the furore if Jane Goodall returned from Gombe stream with photographs of 
wild chimpanzees building their own houses, well roofed and insulated, of painstakingly 
selected stones neatly bonded and mortared! Yet caddis larvae, who do precisely that, 
command only passing interest. It is sometimes said, as though in defence of this double 
standard, that spiders and caddis larvae achieve their feats of architecture by “instinct”. 
But so what? In a way this makes them all the more impressive.99 
These differing public perceptions, which are based largely on inherent value, specifically 
appreciation and awe of more charismatic species, point conservationists towards particular 
species. This reflects the work by Winter on using values to aid in marketing efforts,100 and 
therefore could be considered good practice. However, the targeting of species which will 
attract the most public support will often result in the neglect of other species that are equally 
important from an intrinsic perspective, and possibly more important from an ecological one.101 
This is not to say that such species should not be the subject of conservation action, as many of 
the world’s most treasured species are facing extinction.102 The point is that using criteria based 
on inherent value to determine which species receive most attention from conservationists 
introduces a bias that cannot be justified on intrinsic or ecological grounds. 
One interpretation of intrinsic value that is increasingly popular is linked to autopoiesism,103 
which focusses on an entity’s capacity for ‘self-production or self-renewal’.104 ‘These are 
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accordingly seen as ends in themselves, rendering them worthy of moral consideration in their 
own right’, 105 which is in line with Korsgaard’s definition of ‘final value’.106 Grounding intrinsic 
value in autopoiesis is open to criticism however. Firstly, it may be read as excluding some non-
living entities from its application. Whilst a river may be seen as having a capacity for self-
renewal through its hydrological cycle, it is difficult to apply this trait to other non-living natural 
features, such as rock formations. This limited application is contrary to the tenets of many 
ecocentric theories.107 These theories also more readily accept the intrinsic value of ecological 
categorisations higher than that of individual members of particular species,108 but this is not 
possible if intrinsic value is based strictly on autopoiesism: 
Certainly everything which is of value… is located within the biosphere, and the systems 
of the biosphere are necessary for the protection of all these creatures. But that does 
not give the biosphere or its systems intrinsic value. Rather, it shows them to have 
instrumental value, since what is of value in its own right is causally dependent on 
them.109 
Turning to the other end of the biological scale, this limitation of autopoietic intrinsic value also 
means it cannot be reconciled with the views of those who advocate the intrinsic value of genes. 
Dawkins argues that organisms merely represent ‘vehicles’ for collections of gene, each one 
vying to ensure it is passed on to future organisms.110 Such views have not gone unchallenged 
however.111 
An alternative way to view intrinsic value is to equate it with moral value.112 Again this is flawed. 
It reintroduces an anthropocentric measure because morality is a purely human concept. The 
difference between moral and intrinsic value is subtle, but nevertheless important. To say that 
something has moral value is to say that I, as a human who understands the concept of morality, 
deem a tree, for example, to be worthy of moral consideration and I will therefore not cut it 
down. Recognising the intrinsic value of that tree however is to say that I will not cut it down 
because it has value in and of itself independent of my personal valuation of it. My reason for 
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not cutting down the tree is not because I believe it has some moral worth on the basis of an 
anthropocentric measure of morality, but the mere fact of its existence. A more straightforward 
distinction between moral and intrinsic value can be drawn from Norton’s work. He believes 
that, like instrumental and inherent value, moral value can change with times and 
circumstances.113 The ongoing debate about refugees demonstrates this, with judgements 
about whether it is ‘right’ for the West to accept refugees and in what numbers being 
reconsidered in light of the pressures on national infrastructure and concerns over security. 
Intrinsic value, on the other hand, will remain constant for as long as the ‘thing’ in question 
exists. 
In addition to the theoretical difficulties associated with defining ‘intrinsic value’, there are also 
practical difficulties in relying on it as the justification for conservation. Firstly, when discussing 
the preamble of the 1983 World Charter for Nature,114 which states ‘Every form of life is unique, 
warranting respect regardless of its worth to man’, Harrop points out that this ‘ostensibly 
suggests that we should embrace the Anopheles mosquito and other forms of life that are an 
anathema to humans’.115 Notwithstanding the ethical questions of actively conserving a species 
that spreads malaria, there would be obvious practical difficulties for conservation organisations 
to raise public support for such a cause. 
Secondly, adhering to a code of practice founded on intrinsic value would undermine the 
conservation of ecosystems, as it would preclude the use of important management practices. 
To use Harrop’s example: 
Culling may be part of a strategy to defeat disease transmission, to prevent hybridization 
or to control burgeoning populations of a species. In these cases, culling may be the only 
effective conservation strategy to preserve either genetic integrity in wild species or 
ecological balance.116 
Harrop is discussing the divergence of views between conservation scientists on the one hand 
and advocates of animal welfare on the other, noting that ‘the welfarist considers the goal of 
maintaining genetic diversity to be subordinate to securing freedom from suffering’.117 It is also 
equally true that intrinsic value would place paramountcy on the protection of individual animals 
and plants, in some cases to the detriment of the wider ecosystem. Some commentators have 
argued that the reason humanity pursues conservation is because of the intrinsic value of 
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nature, including natural processes and ecological interrelations.118 This is perhaps true of those 
directly involved in conservation work,119 and certainly, as already noted, a number of ecocentric 
theories are grounded on non-anthropocentric perceptions of the value of nature.120 However, 
intrinsic value, if interpreted to mean value independent of worth to anything else, requires each 
individual plant, animal, habitat and natural entity to be viewed in isolation. Thus, it would not 
be necessary for any in situ conservation efforts to be made for the intrinsic value of nature to 
be respected.121 We could instead rely on institutions such as zoos, botanic gardens and artificial 
ecosystems, such as those at the Eden Project,122 to ensure the continued survival of species. 
Limiting the conservation of plants to such places, however, would be to fatally undermine the 
Earth’s capacity to support life. Modern conservation law now recognises the importance of 
adopting a holistic approach, focussing on habitats and ecosystems rather than just species, and 
it seems perverse that the philosophical rationale of such developments still very much appears 
to be targeted at parts rather than wholes.  
A possible explanation for this can be found by looking at the development of modern 
environmental law. Early international conservation treaties were primarily issue-, species- or 
habitat-specific. To take one example, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species123 is only concerned with the impacts of international trade on the 
conservation status of species. It was not until the Biodiversity Convention that an intentionally 
holistic approach to conservation was adopted at an international level, a point which is 
emphasised by the Convention’s broad definition of ‘biological diversity’.124 It is ironic, then, that 
in order to give effect to the more integrated approach envisaged by the Biodiversity Convention 
the Parties have found it necessary to adopt working programmes specific to different regions, 
habitats and species.125 What is instead required is an understanding of value which is neither 
formulated on purely anthropocentric criteria, nor divorced from the interconnections within 
the natural world. My answer to this is ecological value. 
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Ecological Value: 
Ecological value is assessed in terms of the role something plays in supporting the health and 
functioning of its ecosystem. ‘Here, “proper functioning” reflects the functioning of (subsets of) 
living nature or ecosystems according to their ecological or evolutionary optimum… Any (set of) 
living species has ecological value through its contribution to the functioning of the ecosystem 
it is part of, by means of ecological processes such as food-web interactions, competition, 
predation and facilitation’.126 
Our understanding of this value will be founded on scientific research, and this research will be 
subject to human priorities, interpretations and faults. Crucially, however, ecological value ‘must 
be informed by the biological sciences and cannot be asserted by an anthropocentric 
discipline’.127 Equally, whilst it is true to say that much will ‘depend on the state of the art of the 
relevant disciplines’,128 this does not detract from the central premise that ecological science is 
a better basis for attributing value than anthropocentric priorities of commodity or use. To put 
it another way, a distinction is drawn between the process by which something’s ecological value 
is assessed, which is inherently anthropocentric, and the acceptance that this value stands 
regardless of any anthropocentrically-informed perceptions of the value of the natural entity in 
question. Despite this, a true reading of the ecological value of nature itself provides an 
anthropocentric reason to compel humanity to conserve as much of it as possible. As Ehrlich 
observes: ‘the most important anthropocentric reason for preserving diversity is the role that 
microorganisms, plants, and animals play in providing free ecosystem services, without which 
society in its present form could not persist’.129 
Arguably there are no examples in international environmental law of instruments that are 
founded on a purely ecological understanding of the value of nature. When read in the wider 
context of the instrument in question, statements that purport to acknowledge the ecological 
value of nature are grounded in a desire to meet anthropocentric ends. For example, although 
the Preamble of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance130 acknowledges 
‘the fundamental ecological functions of wetlands as regulators of water regimes and as habitats 
supporting a characteristic flora and fauna’, it also states that ‘wetlands constitute a resource of 
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great economic, cultural, scientific, and recreational value’, and that waterfowl ‘should be 
regarded as an international resource’.  
Grounding our efforts to conserve plants and the rest of nature in ecological value overcomes 
some of the weaknesses of other interpretations of value identified above. For example, there 
is no need for the same degree of scientific certainty that is assumed when assessing potential 
instrumental value, as a distinction can be drawn between understanding the role a species or 
habitat plays in its ecosystem, for which we must turn to biologists and other experts, and 
acknowledging that species and habitats have a role to play. Ecological value mandates that all 
of nature performs a specific function, some more critical than others, and it is for this reason 
that we must seek to conserve every species and habitat.  
More importantly from a conservation perspective, ecological value will be free from the 
problems caused by constantly changing policies, which are vulnerable to shifts in public mood 
and economic fortunes. In addition to the more practical problems to which this gives rise, there 
is a more significant, and not necessarily inconceivable, danger posed by basing our conservation 
efforts on social perceptions of nature: 
If the value derived is to rest on preferences, rather than being something the 
conservationist is able to disclose as a source of value regardless of any human 
preferences, there might (with a change in fashion) be no reason to preserve, conserve 
or restore anything of nature.131 
Admittedly the biological science on which the ecological value of something is based will be 
subject to change as well, but such changes will be the result of new evidence following scientific 
research, not the changing priorities of a population and its governments. 
 
 Negative Value: 
So far, the discussion has focussed on positive values that nature has, both for people and for 
itself. However negative values are equally commonplace, and just as important for 
understanding the law’s relationship with the natural world. Something that detracts or 
undermines a positive value, either for humans in the case of instrumental and inherent value 
or the natural world in terms of ecological value, can be said to have negative value. By definition 
it is impossible for something to have negative intrinsic value. If the definition of intrinsic value 
outlined above is accepted, i.e. that it is based solely on the simple fact of something’s existence, 
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then whatever traits or activities something has or takes will be part of what defines its intrinsic 
value. Even monocarpic species of plants such as Saxifraga longifolia, which dies after setting 
seed132 and could therefore be said to undermine its own existence, does not have negative 
intrinsic value. Despite being the precursor to its death, this natural process is part of what the 
plant is and therefore contributes to its intrinsic value. 
Historically, international environmental law readily applied negative instrumental value to 
certain species. Article II of the 1900 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and 
Fish in Africa133 called for the reduction in population sizes of animals such as lions, otters, many 
large birds of prey and poisonous snakes, which were classified as ‘harmful animals’,134 and not 
worthy of protection.135 Although international environmental law has moved on from 
ecologically incoherent concepts such as ‘harmful animals’, it is still possible to identify 
contemporary examples of negative instrumental value. Alien/invasive species which damage 
crops, for example, have negative instrumental value. 
Negative inherent value is conceptually harder to define. An animal or plant that is feared in a 
certain culture, for instance if it is associated with death or misfortune, nevertheless has 
inherent value because of its place in that culture. To have negative value it would have to be 
seen as detracting from that culture, rather than simply being associated with negative ideas, 
aspects or events. The easiest way to define negative inherent value is by reference to alien 
species. In the United Kingdom, the native red squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris) went into sharp decline 
following the introduction of grey squirrels (Sciurus carolinensis) from North America. This is 
mainly due to the reds’ vulnerability to the squirrel pox virus carried by the greys.136 In areas 
where red squirrels are still found, aggressive conservation measures are taken to preserve 
them, in part because of the inherent value people find in seeing the native squirrel. In 
comparison, where red squirrels have long since been driven out, grey squirrels have taken on 
an inherent value of their own. As such, it is possible to argue that negative inherent value is in 
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some cases only a short-term phenomenon. As society comes to accept the new species in the 
place of the old one it takes on an inherent value of its own.137 
Negative ecological value may be attributed to species that undermine the functioning of an 
ecosystem. This is also best explained in relation to alien and invasive species. Studies have 
shown that an established population of Japanese Knotweed (Fallopia japonica) can severely 
reduce water flow in streams, thereby undermining the health and functioning of the 
ecosystem.138 Following this line of thought to its logical conclusion, humanity has arguably the 
greatest level of negative ecological value, given the massive ecological effects we have had 
around the globe. On the other hand, there are also examples of where we are attempting to 
undo some of this damage, and take on ecological value of our own. In the United Kingdom, by 
annually culling deer herds in Scotland we have adopted the role of now extinct native 
predators, although such activities should be carried out only with careful preparation and 
continuous monitoring.139 
 
Anthropocentricity in International Environmental Law and Policy: 
Having identified five overarching categories of value – instrumental, inherent, intrinsic, 
ecological and negative – I now look at how these values are reflected in international 
environmental law and policy. 
That a particular provision in a treaty says that States are conscious of or respect a particular 
type of value in nature does not necessarily mean that the rest of the instrument will reflect it. 
The preamble to the Biodiversity Convention opens with a recognition of ‘the intrinsic value of 
biodiversity’ and continues by noting ‘the importance of biological diversity for evolution and 
for maintaining life sustaining systems of the biosphere’, i.e. the ecological value of nature. 
However, the rest of the Preamble, as well as the operational part of the Convention, mainly 
focus on the instrumental value of nature. The Preamble states that biodiversity ‘is of critical 
importance for meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing world population’. 
Similarly, Article 1 of the Convention states that its objectives are: ‘the conservation of biological 
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diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable utilization of genetic 
resources’. 
References to the importance of conservation do not per se tell us anything of the value being 
attached to the ‘thing’ being conserved. In the Biodiversity Convention, frequent use is made of 
the phrase ‘conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity’. ‘Sustainable use’ clearly relates to 
the instrumental value of biodiversity. In comparison, ‘conservation’ by itself does not imply any 
recognition of the ecological or intrinsic value of nature. Indeed, that it is nearly always coupled 
with ‘sustainable use’ could be read to mean that the purpose of conservation is to enable the 
continual exploitation of biodiversity. The same can be said of the ‘indicative list of categories’140 
of important biodiversity contained in Annex I. Ecological and arguably even intrinsic value, if 
‘unique’ is read in this way, are recognised, but the categories listed in the Annex are primarily 
anthropocentric in nature. 
The suggestion that for the Biodiversity Convention conservation is a means for perpetuating 
sustainable use is also supported by the absence of any definition of ‘conservation’ in the treaty 
text, even though ‘sustainable use’ is defined: 
“Sustainable use” means the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a 
rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby 
maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future 
generations.141 
This is a sound definition of ‘sustainable use’ and one that places clear emphasis on the need for 
any exploitation of the natural world to not undermine its long-term survival. The lack of 
definition of ‘conservation’ however means that there is no counter-balance to this. This issue 
is further compounded by the use of soft language, rendering the provisions in the treaty 
virtually unenforceable.142 
One instrument that is primarily concerned with the inherent value of nature is the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention. This provides for the listing of particular cultural and natural sites as world 
heritage if they are considered to be of ‘outstanding universal value’.143 Brook makes the point 
that values are ‘relational’.144 What one person considers to be of significant value may be 
meaningless to another. This raises the question of whose value counts? Under the World 
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Heritage Convention it is, firstly, the States’, through their submission of candidate sites,145 
secondly either the IUCN for natural sites or ICOMOS for cultural ones, as these organisations 
determine whether a proposed site has ‘outstanding universal value’,146 and lastly the World 
Heritage Committee, which has the final say on what sites are listed as World Heritage.147 No 
role is provided for the public in this process, either in the Operational Guidelines or the 
Convention itself, which suggests that for the purposes of the Convention the values they place 
on particular sites are irrelevant.148 This is important as it relates to one of the objectives of the 
Convention, namely ‘the transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural 
heritage’,149 the explicit reference to which marks the World Convention out from other 
multilateral conservation instruments.150 If by ‘future generations’ the Convention refers to the 
descendants of a certain group in society who value a specific site, it could be a powerful means 
of protecting deeply held inherent values founded on the culture and traditions that are located 
in those sites. However, the lack of role for the public in the listing process suggests this is not 
the case. Instead a more accurate reading of the Convention is to say that ‘future generations’ 
is merely a generic term that goes no further than to say that future human beings should have 
the opportunity to appreciate certain sites that have met particular criteria set by experts at a 
particular point in history. As such, the Convention is merely sustainable development in 
another guise, but rather than resources that can be exploited for material gain it is resources 
that provide less tangible benefits that are being bequeathed to future generations. 
Some treaties, such as the 1997 International Plant Protection Convention,151 are founded on 
the negative value of other entities. In this case, it is the negative value of ‘pests of plants and 
plant products’.152 The reference to plant products clearly shows that one of the goals of the 
Convention is to protect the instrumental value of plants. On reading the Preamble of the 
Convention it might be thought that it is also concerned with safeguarding the ecological value 
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1952, 150 UNTS 67, as revised by the FAO Conference in 1979). Text available at: 
https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/governance/convention-text/. For detailed discussion of the 
International Plant Protection Convention see chapter 8. 
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of plants, as it stresses the need to prevent the introduction of pests into endangered areas.153 
However the definition of ‘endangered area’ contained in Article II shows that such a reading 
would be false:  
an area where ecological factors favour the establishment of a pest whose presence in 
the area will result in economically important loss; (emphasis added) 
Another instrument concerned with the negative value of a non-human entity is the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.154 This seeks to regulate the risks of the transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms (LMOs), which, if released, ‘may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’.155 If the interpretation of ‘conservation 
and sustainable use’ outlined above is accepted, i.e. that for the purposes of the Biodiversity 
Convention conservation is a means of facilitating sustainable use, this must be considered to 
be a reflection of negative instrumental value, as it refers to the risk LMOs pose to the ability of 
humans to continue to exploit species that might be endangered by their release. If, on the other 
hand, conservation for conservation’s sake was the purpose of the Biodiversity Convention, the 
Cartagena Protocol could be read as a response to the negative ecological value of LMOs, for 
example if their release risked undermining the health and functioning of an ecosystem by 
outcompeting indigenous flora. Once again this highlights the importance of understanding the 
context in which expressions of value operate, and for the Cartagena Protocol this context is the 
human desire to continue to exploit the natural world, albeit in a manner that is equitable to 
States and communities of origin. 
All of the instruments discussed so far have been in the form of legally binding agreements. Non-
binding instruments are, however, an equally important part of international environmental 
law. What can be concluded from a comparison of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment156 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is that 
in the intervening twenty years the international community had not developed any greater 
appreciation of the non-anthropocentric value of nature. Both instruments place human 
interests above those of nature, with Stockholm making the erroneous declaration: ‘Of all things 
in the world, people are the most precious’,157 and Rio stating ‘Human beings are at the centre 
of concerns for sustainable development’.158 Both instruments also highlight the importance of 
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‘resources’. Principle 2 of Rio reiterates the principle of permanent sovereignty, and Principle 2 
of Stockholm states: 
The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and 
especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the 
benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as 
appropriate. 
It might be presumed that, unlike the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, the 1982 World Charter 
for Nature is not wholly anthropocentric, and one provision in the Preamble of the Charter 
certainly indicates this: 
 Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man… 
However, this is an anomaly in an otherwise wholly anthropocentric document. As Harrop 
observes, ‘the body of its substantive text is practically qualified by many propositions that 
support the mainstream institutional agenda and traditional conservation approaches 
describing, among other things, optimal sustainable use and the need to conserve natural 
resources for the purposes of maintaining generational equity’.159 
The instruments examined above, as well as many others, may be forgiven for only reflecting 
the anthropocentric values of nature because they were largely negotiated at a time when our 
understanding of the ecological crises of the Earth was in its infancy. The same cannot be said 
of the ‘The Future We Want’,160 the outcome report of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development. The underlying theme of the conference was a need to develop a new 
understanding of the concept of sustainable development,161 and this manifested itself as ‘the 
green economy’. As Morrow observes, however, ‘the green economy’ was merely a new 
formulation of sustainable development, i.e. a concept that enabled the constant prioritisation 
of development over environmental concerns. ‘Given that this conception of the “green 
economy” nailed its colours even more firmly to this mast, there was little reason for optimism 
in its ability to deliver the necessary paradigm shift in the relationship between humanity and 
the environment’.162 
                                                          
159 S. Harrop, ‘Climate Change, Conservation and the Place for Wild Animal Welfare in International Law’ 
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160 (n 25). Unless otherwise stated, all paragraph references in this section refer to this document. 
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The first point to note in relation to ‘The Future We Want’ is that humans are still afforded 
paramountcy.163 However, ‘The Future We Want’ is notable because of its recognition that some 
States and cultures do not view the natural resources simply as something to be exploited, but 
as Mother Nature: 
We recognize that planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home and that “Mother 
Earth” is a common expression in a number of countries and regions, and we note that 
some countries recognize the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of 
sustainable development.164 
Morrow cites the inclusion of this reference to Mother Earth as cause for optimism, as ‘At the 
very least it will open up debate and allow space to challenge hegemonic orthodox scientific, 
political, social and economic views of the human/nature relationship’.165 Whilst Morrow’s 
comments are valid, the impact this single reference will have on future international 
environmental law and policy, which, as demonstrated above, has to date been driven by 
predominately anthropocentric concerns, is debatable. Further, a number of statements in the 
report have the effect of separating human concerns from the realities of the natural world. A 
distinction is often made between the use of natural resources and the conservation of 
ecosystems, with no acknowledgement that in reality they refer to the same thing.166 
Evidence of this is found in paragraphs 39 and 40 of ‘The Future We Want’. Language such as 
harmony with nature, rather than harmony in nature maintains the separation of humanity from 
the natural world: 
39. …We are convinced that in order to achieve a just balance among the economic, 
social and environmental needs of present and future generations, it is necessary to 
promote harmony with nature. 
40. We call for holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development that will 
guide humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health 
and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. 
While these are laudable goals it is doubtful they will ever be achieved. The reason for this is not 
a lack of willingness to take action, but because States have primarily acted on the basis of the 
instrumental value of the natural world. This becomes clear when we turn to the relatively brief 
section in ‘The Future We Want’ on the environmental element of sustainable development. 
Here expressions of ecological and intrinsic value are conspicuous by their absence. Instead 
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much of the discussion is focussed on the role of the UN Environment Programme and how its 
operations can become more efficient.167  
Similar observations can be made in relation to the biodiversity section of ‘The Future We Want’. 
Paragraph 197 states: 
We reaffirm the intrinsic value of biological diversity, as well as the ecological, genetic, 
social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of 
biological diversity and its critical role in maintaining ecosystems that provide essential 
services, which are critical foundations for sustainable development and human well-
being. 
Both intrinsic and ecological value are mentioned, but given the overwhelming focus on the 
instrumental value of nature in the report, a similar conclusion to that of Harrop in relation to 
the World Charter for Nature can be reached.168 The anthropocentricity of paragraph 197 is 
further underlined by its emphasis on the negative instrumental value of declining biodiversity: 
We recognize the severity of the global loss of biodiversity and the degradation of 
ecosystems and emphasize that these undermine global development, affecting food 
security and nutrition, the provision of and access to water and the health of the rural 
poor and of people worldwide, including present and future generations. 
It appears that the negative ecological value of the consequences of the degradation of 
ecosystems is of no importance in ‘The Future We Want’. 
In summary, it is clear that international environmental policy, as expressed in ‘The Future We 
Want’, is just as anthropocentric as international environmental law. Analysis of the Report 
suggests this is in no small part due to the way in which sustainable development has been 
interpreted. Whilst in theory it mandates equality between environmental protection, economic 
development and social equity, in practice it is human preoccupations with development that 
dominate. Further, the concept of sustainable development not only permits but encourages, 
even demands, the prioritisation of anthropocentric concerns. This is manifested in ‘The Future 
We Want’, which grounds international environmental policy in the instrumental value of 
nature. ‘Taken as a whole, the [Future We Want] seems to advocate its further objectification 
and commodification of the environment, reaffirming its subservience to human 
development’.169 
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Conclusions: 
Values are unique and subject to various influences, most notably context. A lion may have 
inherent value as the ‘King of the Jungle’ to a young child in the United Kingdom, but negative 
instrumental value to an African farmer as a threat to his livestock. As such, it is not surprising 
that the value of nature has taken on many guises. From an anthropocentric perspective nature 
has both instrumental and inherent value, and it is expressions of these values that are most 
commonly found in international environmental law. In comparison, the intrinsic value of nature 
has largely been limited to discussion by ecocentrists, albeit with one or two exceptions.  
All three of these value types should be considered flawed as the defining interpretation of value 
for the purposes of conservation. Instead, the ecological value of nature must be recognised. 
Every aspect of nature has a role to play in supporting the ecological systems that have enabled 
humanity to flourish, and our lack of understanding of what these roles are means we put these 
systems at risk. ‘The guessing game is really Russian Roulette. Each species lost without serious 
consequences has been a blank in the chamber. But how can we know before we pull the 
trigger?’170 
Although only a relatively small number of sources have been discussed in this work, it is clear 
that there is a definite and dominate anthropocentric trend in international environmental law 
and policy, and this is primarily founded on the instrumental value of nature. This has manifested 
itself in two ways. In environmental agreements, it is through an emphasis on a State’s right and 
desire to exploit the natural resources found both within and beyond its jurisdiction. Even in soft 
law instruments, which have no binding legal effect, States have highlighted the instrumental 
value of the exploitation of nature. The second way anthropocentric values of nature are given 
effect is through sustainable development. As it is currently conceived, environmental 
protection does not provide an effective counter-weight to economic development, and instead 
the benefits of acting on the instrumental value of nature both legitimise and encourage the 
status quo. 
The dominance of anthropocentric interests in the text of international environmental law and 
policy does not preclude ecological and intrinsic values being respected. The evolution of the 
international whaling regime is evidence of this, and it is therefore not impossible that over time 
other conventions will evolve into more ecological, or at least less anthropocentric, regimes. In 
the short-term however, the dominance of instrumental values indicates that conservationists 
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need to adjust their priorities if the decline in biodiversity is to be halted, or even slowed. Studies 
have shown that knowing the values of a particular section of society enables more targeted 
public awareness and education strategies to be developed.171 Winter’s study focussed on 
visitors to natural areas, but it could legitimately be applied to the negotiations of international 
conservation instruments. This might mean that, rather than strict protection, conservationists 
argue for the sustainable management of natural resources in binding treaties with stringent 
controls put in place to avoid over-exploitation. This would no doubt be met with criticism by 
those who advocate the absolute protection of nature. However, in the long-term if States are 
willing to accept the stronger controls on sustainable use argued for by conservationists because 
this is in accordance with their values, it might prove to be of greater benefit to the natural world 
than measures that purport to provide strict protection but are in practice undermined because 
States act on values that are contrary to such measures.
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PART 2: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
CONSERVATION OF PLANTS 
 
II 
GLOBAL APPROACHES TO THE CONSERVATION OF PLANTS 
 
Biodiversity as an Issue of Common Concern: 
International law refers to biodiversity by a number of terms, and these have varying degrees of 
legal significance.1 It has already been demonstrated how it is the instrumental value of nature, 
expressed through the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, that 
underpins the majority of international conservation law and policy. Framing nature in terms of 
State sovereignty implies that conservation is primarily an issue for individual States, as central 
to the principle of permanent sovereignty is that States are free to ‘exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies’.2 Yet a number of environmental instruments also 
recognise, at least in preambular statements, that biodiversity conservation is an issue that can 
transcend the limitations of States’ borders and is a legitimate area of common concern.3 
Inevitably, this causes some tension in international conservation policies, with the desire of 
States to safeguard their sovereignty having to be reconciled with the growing assertiveness of 
the wider international community in environmental matters.4 
This tension is manifested in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. In this chapter, I argue 
that the design and direction of the treaty’s regime, including the system of thematic 
programmes, cross-cutting issues and major groups that have been developed to supplement 
the broad provisions of the Convention’s text,5 frustrate its ability to effectively conserve plants. 
Any collective concern in the conservation of biodiversity has been subordinated to the 
apparently inviolable principle of permanent sovereignty. 
                                                          
1 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law & the Environment (3rd edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 657-662. 
2 Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993, 31 ILM 822 (1992). 
3 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, (n 1) p. 657. 
4 M. Bowman, ‘The Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity Concept in 
International Law’, in M. Bowman and C. Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity (International Environmental Law & Policy Series, Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
5 https://www.cbd.int/programmes/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
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The second part of the chapter focusses on a key plant biome: forests. The instruments that 
have been put in place to guide international action in the conservation of forests highlight the 
extent to which environmental imperatives give way to the sovereignty of States. Ultimately, I 
conclude that the narrow interests of States, based primarily on the short-term considerations 
of the instrumental value of nature, have left global conservation instruments fundamentally 
incapable of protecting plants and the natural world. 
 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: 
The Biodiversity Convention is the only global instrument that attempts to take a holistic, cross-
sectoral approach to the conservation of nature. It constitutes ‘an attempt to internationalise, 
in a more comprehensive and inclusive way, the conservation and sustainable use of nature, 
based on the concept of biological diversity’.6 The definition of ‘biological diversity’ in Article 2 
of the Convention is sufficiently broad to include individual specimens and species of plants, 
their genetic material and their wider place in habitats and ecosystems.7 This all-encompassing 
approach contrasts with earlier conservation instruments, which primarily apply to species and 
habitats. However despite its noted potential,8 the Convention has not lived up to expectations. 
‘The Convention on Biological Diversity fails to address the problems it was meant to remedy. It 
declined to institutionalise the common responsibility of humanity to protect biodiversity, 
rejected the extension of state responsibility for damage to the global commons, and effectively 
spurned the concept of sustainable development’.9  Guruswamy puts forward three arguments 
in support of these criticisms. First, the Convention abandons the concept of sustainable 
development as defined in the Brundtland Commission Report10 by prioritising economic 
concerns over environmental protection.11 Second, it fails to impose any real obligations on 
States, and those obligations that might be enforceable do not contribute towards the goal of 
reducing biodiversity loss. Third, and an issue that links the first two, the approach to 
conservation envisaged by the Convention is one that favours national sovereignty over global 
responsibility.12 This is most notable through the assertion of permanent sovereignty over 
                                                          
6 A. Boyle, ‘The Rio Convention on Biological Diversity’, in Bowman and Redgwell (eds), (n 4) p. 33. 
7 R. Rayfuse, ‘Biological Resources’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 366. 
8 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, (n 1) p. 612. 
9 L. Guruswamy, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Polemic’, in L. Guruswamy and J. McNeely 
(eds), Protection of Global Biodiversity: Converging Strategies (Duke University Press, 1998), p. 351. 
10 WCED, Our Common Future (Brundtland Report) (Oxford University Press, 1987) 43. 
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natural resources in both the Preamble and Article 3. These are recurring themes in the following 
analysis of the Convention.  
 
Conservation in the Convention: 
Conservation in the Biodiversity Convention is primarily governed by Articles 8 and 9, which deal 
with in situ and ex situ conservation respectively, and the provisions on sustainable use in Article 
10. The merits of these have been extensively discussed elsewhere13 and so only a brief overview 
is provided here.  
In chapter one I argued that for the Biodiversity Convention conservation is a means to the end 
of perpetuating the exploitation of nature. Article 10 supports this position. This contains 
sensible provisions designed to regulate the sustainable use of biological resources. For 
example, Article 10(a) requires States, ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’, to integrate 
conservation and sustainable use considerations into national decision-making. But nothing in 
this Article, nor indeed the whole Convention, accepts the possibility that use of a species might 
not be sustainable. This can be seen in the environmental assessment provisions in Article 14.14 
Where adverse environmental impacts of a particular project are identified States are only 
required, again ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’, to take these into account.15 These very 
broad provisions afford States significant discretion in their implementation of the Convention, 
and do not, therefore, constitute a substantive norm to restrain the excesses of exploitation.16 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Convention has been unable to halt the global decline of 
biodiversity loss.17 
Article 8 outlines the in situ conservation measures that States should take. These include 
establishing protected areas, regulating the exploitation of biodiversity both within and outside 
protected areas, rehabilitating and restoring damaged ecosystems, controlling the spread of 
                                                          
13 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2010), chapter 17; P. Le Pestre, ‘Studying the effectiveness of the CBD’, in P. Le Pestre 
(ed), Governing Global Biodiversity: The Evolution and Implementation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Ashgate, 2002); A. Boyle, (n 6) and L. Warren, ‘The Role of Ex Situ Measures in the Conservation 
of Biodiversity’, in Bowman and Redgwell (eds), (n 4). 
14 N. Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), chapter 4. 
15 Article 14(b). 
16 S. Johnston, ‘Sustainability, Biodiversity and International Law’, in Bowman and Redgwell (eds), (n 4) p 
53-56. 
17 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Montreal, 2014). 
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43 
 
 
 
invasive species, protecting indigenous knowledge of biodiversity and legislating to protect 
endangered species. At first glance these constitute a comprehensive regime for the 
conservation of wild flora and fauna. However, the Convention is now infamous for the 
qualifications and weak language used in its provisions, most notably ‘as far as possible and as 
appropriate’, which afford States significant discretion when implementing the Convention and 
render it unenforceable.18 To give effect to these provisions the Contracting Parties have 
developed a number of programmes of work on the principal biomes and key issues, such as the 
ecosystem concept and threats to biodiversity. Whilst considerable work is being taken under 
these initiatives, it is ironic that to take action under a Convention designed to represent a new 
holistic approach to conservation States have found it necessary to revert to the traditional 
sectoral approach, albeit one with unifying themes and concepts. 
A list of actions to be taken for the ex situ conservation of nature is contained in Article 9, 
including the creation of seedbanks, and measures to facilitate the reintroduction of species into 
the wild. Again, these are conditioned by the phrase ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’. 
Importantly, Article 9 makes it clear that the ex situ measures are to ‘complement’ the in situ 
measures in Article 8. Whether the Biodiversity Convention is right to prioritise in situ 
conservation over ex situ measures is debatable, not least because implementation of Article 8 
has been inadequate. Herkenrath observes that often the location of protected areas is 
determined by the absence of a human population to avoid conflict, rather than the presence 
of endangered species or habitats. Further, failure to properly manage these areas once they 
are established can result in their loss or damage due to incompatible land-uses.19 A better 
approach would be to give in situ and ex situ conservation parity of esteem. This would not 
address the problems highlighted by Herkenrath, which relate to the implementation of the 
Convention.  However, it would reflect that in some cases ex situ measures may be the only way 
to guarantee a species survival.  
As noted above, the remit of the Biodiversity Convention extends to the conservation of 
ecosystems, and therefore requires consideration of the interactions within and between 
species and habitats. For Brooks, Jones and Virginia the concept of the ecosystem has been 
instrumental in the development of environmental law, believing that ‘Since 1970, there has 
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Perspective Ten Years On’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
29-37. 
44 
 
 
 
been an episodic coevolution of ecology and environmental law’.20 Tarlock is equally clear on the 
influence the ecosystem concept has had, noting that it has ‘profoundly influenced the 
development of domestic and international “nature” protection programmes, from the 
reduction of greenhouse gases to biodiversity conservation’.21 However, he notes that there is 
an absence of substantive legal norms relating to the protection of ecosystems, resulting from 
‘little formal recognition of ecosystems as distinct objects of legal protection’.22 On the one hand 
it could be argued that this does not apply to the Biodiversity Convention. Article 8 not only calls 
upon States to ‘promote’ the protection of ecosystems,23 but also their restoration.24 On the 
other hand, the value of this in terms of legal protection is doubtful given the weak nature of 
the provision.  
This all-encompassing approach to biodiversity conservation has been highlighted as one of the 
Convention’s main strengths.25 McGraw, however, suggests that its extensive remit undermines 
its ability to achieve real results.26 Studies showing that the status of the world’s biodiversity 
continues to decline support this position.27 In reality, the Biodiversity Convention is generating 
significant outputs through the development of national strategies and international targets, 
but few outcomes in the form of conservation success. Further, it is argued that the extensive 
scope of the Convention has made it difficult to communicate its message to the wider public. 
‘In essence, biodiversity does not offer an uncomplicated formula that advocates can explain to 
policy makers in straightforward terms and that journalists can encapsulate in headlines for 
public consumption’.28 I question whether this is accurate. Whilst true that the damage being 
caused to the complex relationships between all forms of life on Earth cannot be neatly 
summarised in a tabloid headline, the potential extinction of iconic species such as the tiger or 
polar bear is a clear and succinct message that indicates something has gone fundamentally 
wrong in our relationship with nature.  
Regardless, it is clear that the Convention is failing to achieve results in terms of conservation 
success, and this can be attributed to the absence of any direct reference to the drivers of 
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biodiversity loss, save for a brief preambular reference, in the Convention’s text. This omission 
from the Convention would not be as significant an issue had a series of protocols addressing 
these drivers been developed. As they have not, the Convention is impotent in the face of the 
ever-growing challenges of, amongst other factors, the impacts of climate change,29 trade30 and 
alien/invasive species and disease.31 It is little more than a forum for discussion, and the absence 
of binding, quantifiable targets does nothing to address this concern. 
 
The Aichi Biodiversity Targets and Setting Conservation Priorities: 
In the absence of meaningful obligations regarding the conservation of biodiversity, the 
Biodiversity Convention has instead relied upon a series of targets as a soft means of 
encouraging States to take action to protect biodiversity. The initial 2010 Target, ‘to achieve by 
2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss’,32 was considered 
unambitious and too vague to have any real effect.33 It came as no surprise, therefore, when the 
Third Global Biodiversity Outlook34 showed that not only had the target not been met, but 
pressures on biodiversity had continued to grow. Further, at a global level not one of the sub-
targets had been met.  
The response of the international community was to establish a new Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity, running from 2011-2020, and a new set of 2020 Targets (the Aichi Targets).35 These 
are global targets to which national action by States contribute, rather than specific targets for 
States themselves to achieve. The repeated use of targets has been associated with the need to 
gather quantitative data to guide conservation action.36 However, given the immediacy of the 
threat facing much of the world’s biodiversity, calls have been made to adopt a new approach 
that instead relies on existing data.37 Concerns raised above regarding the soft nature of the 
obligations in the Biodiversity Convention are highlighted by the Aichi Targets, which must be 
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seen as aspirations of States, not obligations on States. No legal consequences will result from a 
failure to meet the targets, and in the likely event of failure the global community will probably 
only produce yet another strategy for 2030.38 ‘This failure to create obligations may prove to be 
the greatest impediment to achieving the targets in that, by making implementation optional, 
the [2020 Strategic Plan] is capable of being overridden by competing state priorities generally 
driven by short-term political interests’.39 
Turning to progress towards specific targets, the Fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook reveals a 
mixed picture, although on balance it is one that suggests failure is more likely than success. To 
date, the international community has only been successful in meeting Target 16, which relates 
to the adoption and operation of the Nagoya Protocol.40 For most of the other targets, it is 
estimated that current progress is insufficient if they are to be met by their deadlines. Of 
particular concern are the assessments on Targets 5 (deforestation and habitat degradation) 
and 12 (preventing extinction). With regards to the former it is noted that ‘Habitats of all types, 
including forests, grasslands, wetlands and river systems, continue to be fragmented and 
degraded’, which casts doubt over the national implementation of the Biodiversity Convention 
regime. Similar comments are made in relation to extinction rates, with ‘no sign overall of 
reduced risk of extinction’.41  
The inability of the Aichi Targets to effect real change in the state of biodiversity is perhaps not 
surprising given the scientifically flawed basis on which they were set. To give just one example, 
the target to protect 17% of the terrestrial area42 was based on political expediency, as it was 
the figure that States could agree on, rather than a sound scientific analysis of what percentage 
of the Earth would constitute ecological representativeness.43 Furthermore, the use of targets 
can result in an ever more complicated and technical process, compounded by a need to develop 
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indicators to measure progress.44 Some work is being done in this regard, but the vague and 
open nature of many of the targets make establishing quantifiable standards against which 
progress can be measured difficult.45 Finally, the use of global, rather than national targets, 
creates a ‘free-rider’ problem. Whilst this is a recognition that some States have greater capacity 
to designate large areas of land for conservation than others, it also means that there is no 
objective national standard against which a State’s efforts can be assessed. 
There are a range of methodologies for setting conservation priorities. Several studies focus on 
the presence of endemic species. Myers et al identify biodiversity hotspots, where significant 
numbers of endemic species are facing severe habitat loss. Their findings reveal that 44% of 
vascular plant species are in twenty-five of these hotspots, comprising only 1.4% of land surface 
area of the Earth.46 Protecting these areas should therefore be a priority, particularly if the 
international community is serious about protecting 75% of the most important areas for plants 
in each ecological region.47 According to Myers et al, only 38% of the area representing these 
hotspots is designated as a protected area. In some cases these are little more than ‘paper 
parks’, and provide no real protection to the biodiversity within their borders.48 Joppa et al also 
use endemic species as a way of prioritising areas for protection. Their approach is based on the 
accumulation of the density of endemic species in gradually larger areas, leading to a very 
different list of priority areas.49 Pouget et al are critical of approaches based on the assessment 
of species, and instead highlight the importance of phylogeography. They argue that ‘Historically 
isolated sets of populations are likely to have distinct evolutionary potential: their existence is 
the consequence of past evolutionary processes that occurred within populations, shaping 
genome diversity and structuring genetic variation’.50 At the other end of the ecological scale, 
Benavent-González et al believe assessing the ecological viability and representativeness of 
plant communities can be used to complement species-orientated approaches to setting 
conservation priorities. ‘Plant communities reveal far more information than plant species alone 
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because they are a highly informative indicator of the status of other elements of biological and 
abiotic diversity’.51 
That there are multiple ways in which conservation priorities can be determined, each 
identifying very different targets for action, suggests that the arbitrary approach through which 
the Aichi Targets were set might be of some benefit. An arbitrary target reflecting political 
consensus does not have to justify itself based on scientific evidence. There is a valid debate 
over whether protecting 17% of the Earth’s terrestrial area is sufficient,52 but it is better that this 
target is set so that States can move onto consider how they wish to identify those areas to be 
protected, rather than be caught up in the interminable international negotiations that would 
result from an effort to try and find a scientific methodology that enjoys universal support. Given 
the sovereign interests at stake, there is a risk that each State would advocate whichever 
methodology resulted in the smallest burden for them. There are also more general 
considerations relating to due process. Conferences of the Parties are accountable only to the 
extent that they represent the governments accepted by each State’s population. Significant 
resentment would be caused if this distant decision-making body was to dictate which areas 
within a State were to be protected, especially if it impacted on local and national economies. 
Leaving the question of what areas should be protected to a national level of decision-making 
enables local concerns and priorities to be considered, at least to the extent that national rules 
on public participation allow. This, however, is predicated on the assumption that there is 
adequate implementation of the Biodiversity Convention at the national level, and the extent to 
which this is happening is questionable.  
 
Implementation, Compliance and Enforcement: 
UNEP has asserted that it is a lack of implementation of multilateral environmental agreements 
that is the leading cause for continuing biodiversity loss.53 The extent to which this is true in 
relation to the Biodiversity Convention, however, is debatable as it falsely assumes that 
compliance and effectiveness are the same thing. Mitchell draws a distinction between the two, 
noting that a State can comply with a specific provision, but this act of compliance will not be 
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effective if it is not related to the objective of the treaty.54 In the case of the Biodiversity 
Convention, the production of national strategies and reports in compliance with Article 6 does 
not address the key drivers of biodiversity loss, and so cannot directly contribute to the 
Convention’s overall goal of protecting biodiversity. The key factor undermining the Biodiversity 
Convention’s effectiveness in this regard is that it is doubtful that it was ever intended to be 
enforced at an international level.55 The provisions are drafted in such a way as to make 
compliance inevitable and enforcement virtually impossible. The inclusion of language such as 
‘as far as possible and as appropriate’ suggests that reconciling north/south tensions between 
States was more important during negotiations than concluding a workable agreement.56 It is 
certainly the case that the South took full advantage of the fact that much of the world’s 
biodiversity is under their jurisdiction.57 It also illustrates the success of States in concluding an 
agreement that facilitated compliance by legitimising the status quo. Mitchell highlights both of 
these issues, noting that ‘Ambiguity may reflect agreements reached despite sincere differences 
about a specific rule’s content – “papering over” – or efforts to accrue environmental praise by 
agreeing to terms that appear to require behavioural change but prove sufficiently vague to 
allow business as usual’.58 The Biodiversity Convention can, therefore, be seen as reinforcing the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, with global aspirations being made 
to conform to narrow national interests, rather than national interests being changed to meet 
global obligations. The use of global rather than national targets, discussed above, is just one 
example. This problem is compounded by the lack of a robust system of institutional oversight, 
which marks the Biodiversity Convention out as different from other environmental treaties, 
such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)59 and the World 
Heritage Convention.60  
Similarly, and again unlike other treaties, there is no specific provision in the Biodiversity 
Convention that deals with implementation. Instead Article 23 calls on the Conference of the 
Parties to keep the implementation of the Convention under review. No subsidiary bodies 
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permitted by this Article have been created. In contrast, detailed provisions on implementation 
can be found in Articles 10 and 13 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change61 and 
22 and 27 of the Desertification Convention.62  
This would not be as significant an issue had the Contracting States adopted a series of legally 
binding protocols setting out detailed provisions on key aspects of biodiversity conservation, but 
this has not happened. To date only two protocols have been adopted. Whilst this is a notable 
success given their politically sensitive subject matter, liability in the transboundary movement 
of living modified organisms and access to biological genetic resources and the benefits resulting 
from that access are hardly the most pressing issues covered by the Biodiversity Convention. 
This is partly due to the failure of States to agree binding rules, which has led to the proliferation 
of non-binding instruments under the regime. However, it is also attributable to the design of 
the regime itself.  
Susskind and Ozawa highlight a number of weaknesses in the convention-protocol approach in 
international environmental law. First, the negotiation process prevents rather than facilitates 
genuine debate of the problem and potential solutions. States often misrepresent their 
positions, either to gain greater benefits from the negotiations or reduce any burden that might 
be imposed. Further, there is a fear that discussion of an option constitutes commitment to it, 
and so there is rarely open discussion of all the options, something which was observed in the 
Biodiversity Convention negotiations.63 This shuts down the scope of debate and is exacerbated 
by States often fixing their positions before negotiations even begin. Second, the nature of the 
issues being addressed in environmental agreements mean that disagreement between States 
is highly likely. This might be because of scientific uncertainty, with States relying on conflicting, 
but perhaps equally valid, scientific data, or because uniform standards will impact on States 
differently, for example if regulations are imposed on a resource that is central to one State’s 
economic interests but not another’s. Third, the convention-protocol approach fails to 
adequately address the issue of enforcement. ‘Ad hoc negotiations sponsored by a less-than-
powerful agency of the United Nations will never be able to overcome the resistance to 
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instituting a comprehensive multilateral system for ensuring compliance’.64 In contrast to the 
Biodiversity Convention, for example, the World Trade Organisation has been afforded 
considerable non-compliance and dispute settlement powers,65 the difference being that these 
powers are there to protect States’ economic interests by ensuring other States do not gain a 
competitive trade advantage.66 
A number of reforms are proposed by Susskind and Ozawa to address these problems. In the 
pre-negotiation phase States are encouraged to hold informal talks with others that have similar 
interests, for example the States with large areas of rainforest under their jurisdiction, to agree 
a joint negotiating position. Changes to the negotiating process itself are also suggested. Rather 
than there being one formal negotiating text there could be several, with it being made clear 
that discussion of one did not mean that a State was committing to it. More ambitious is the 
suggestion that treaty provisions be made conditional on certain circumstances existing at either 
international or national levels.67 In a treaty concerned with protecting plants these might take 
the following form: 
States will establish a network of protected areas with the aim of conserving and 
ensuring the sustainable use of its native flora.  
At the end of a ten-year period States will compile a list of native plant species that have 
declined by more than 25%. All uses of those plants will be prohibited and the areas in 
which they are found will be made into strict reserves where all activities that contribute 
to those species’ decline will be prohibited. 
These provisions are obviously not perfect. The 25% threshold is purely arbitrary and would 
need clarifying. For example, would it mean 25% of the population, potential habitat, known 
range or something else? Also, exceptions on the prohibition of use could be allowed, such as 
to enable research into the species or to consider local needs, and guidance on what activities 
might contribute to a species’ decline would need to be provided. They would also require 
sufficient data to establish a baseline, and ongoing monitoring by an independent and 
authoritative body to determine whether the threshold had been met.68 However they illustrate 
the advantages of responsiveness and flexibility of this conditional approach to treaty-making. 
Further, such an approach might encourage greater levels of compliance as States would act to 
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avoid the imposition of more burdensome obligations should they fail to protect their native 
flora. 
Taking the above into account, it appears that UNEP’s suggestion that the reason biodiversity is 
continuing to decline is a result of poor implementation of environmental treaties is inaccurate. 
In terms of the Biodiversity Convention’s failure this is more likely to be due to a desire of States 
to reduce the burden of any obligations, and inherent design flaws. However, this might be being 
disingenuous to the Convention as its focus is on action at a national level to achieve biodiversity 
goals. Cynically, this is merely a reflection of States’ interests in protecting their sovereign rights 
to exploit the natural resources found in their territories. On the other hand, except in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, conservation action must be taken by States operating through 
domestic legal mechanisms and so the Convention’s approach is arguably correct. National 
implementation of the Biodiversity Convention is primarily achieved through National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAP), although it is for States to decide what form 
these take. Article 6 permits States to either develop specific plans for this purpose, or adapt 
pre-existing conservation strategies. 
The purpose of these national strategies and plans is to ensure the achievement of global 
conservation goals by each Contracting Party taking appropriate actions relevant to their specific 
fauna, flora and national priorities. However, Herkenrath’s assessment of the NBSAPs reveals 
several flaws in the Biodiversity Convention’s approach to implementation. First, as noted above 
there has been a failure to ensure effective implementation of the treaty’s substantive 
measures, most notably in relation to the creation of protected areas. Second, and by way of 
further explanation of the first point, there is a serious lack of sufficient data to guide positive 
conservation action, and efforts to address this are undermined by a lack of capacity. 
Consequently, much of the focus of national conservation action has been on assessing the 
status of biodiversity in the relevant jurisdiction, but assessment is not the same as protection, 
as the continuing decline of biodiversity illustrates. There is also a mismatch between the holistic 
approach envisaged by the Biodiversity Convention and political and administrative reality at a 
national level. Often the government department responsible for implementing the Convention 
will lack the political clout to influence policy in other relevant areas, particularly those 
concerning national economic interests.69  
To summarise, the Biodiversity Convention is plagued by vague obligations, weak language and 
a lack of robust compliance and enforcement mechanisms to ensure effective implementation 
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by States. The consequence is a regime incapable of addressing the very real threats to 
biodiversity. In 1996 Boyle wrote that ‘It will not be clear for some time whether the Convention 
provides a viable framework for real progress or is merely an exercise in political symbolism’.70 
As far as the Convention itself is concerned, the past twenty years indicate that ‘political 
symbolism’ is an accurate description. Arguably, the same conclusion can be reached over the 
treaty’s initiatives specifically concerned with the protection of plants.  
 
The Global Strategy for Plant Conservation: 
In 2010, the Conference of the Parties adopted the Updated Global Strategy for Plant 
Conservation,71 which is to run from 2011-2020 alongside the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. It 
comprises five objectives, each with a number of subsidiary targets. For many of these targets 
success is difficult to quantify. For example, Target 2 is that the conservation of all known plant 
species should be assessed ‘as far as possible’. The inclusion of this phrase renders the Target 
meaningless as it does not actually require any action be taken for it to be achieved. However 
far assessment efforts have gone by 2020 they will only have been what were ‘as far as possible’. 
The Strategy is interesting because unlike the other instruments discussed here and in the 
previous chapter, it implicitly allows for the possibility that a species of plant may be conserved 
regardless of any direct value to humans: 
Our vision is of a positive, sustainable future where human activities support the 
diversity of plant life (including the endurance of plant genetic diversity, survival of plant 
species and communities and their associated habitats and ecological associations), and 
where in turn the diversity of plants support and improve our livelihoods and well-
being’.72 
This vision is supported to an extent by the Strategy’s targets, although it is clear from the first 
paragraph of Decision X/17 that its primary focus remains anthropocentric in nature: 
Recognizing the critical role of plants in supporting ecosystem resilience, provision of 
ecosystem services; adapting to and mitigating environmental challenges inter alia, 
climate change, and for supporting human well-being. 
The level of detail concerning the implementation of the Strategy73 is minimal, especially when 
compared with that of the Forest Ecosystem Restoration Initiative discussed below. 
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Nevertheless, that a strategy dedicated to the conservation of plants exists is welcome. It calls 
for global, regional, national and subnational plans to be put in place in accordance with national 
biodiversity action plans, and acknowledges that national targets will vary depending on the 
flora and priorities of each State.  
A broad approach is taken by the Strategy. It includes targets relating to the gathering of 
scientific data concerning the conservation status of all plant species,74 habitat and species 
approaches to conservation,75 the sustainable exploitation of plants76 and public awareness and 
engagement.77 Like the Aichi Targets, progress on the Strategy’s targets is mixed, with those 
targets requiring multiple stakeholder action proving harder to accomplish than those that can 
be achieved through unilateral action by interested parties.78 This has been seen in the United 
Kingdom, where initial ‘gentleman’s agreements’ to take action to implement the Strategy have 
not been followed through,79 constituting further evidence of the weakness of a non-binding 
approach to biodiversity conservation. Botanical gardens are playing a leading role in 
implementing the Strategy,80 particularly those targets that relate to horticulture and public 
education.81 In comparison, targets relating to sustainable use, which is not a traditional area of 
concern for botanic gardens, suffer from poor levels of implementation.82 
Where implementation is being achieved, it is possible to question whether it is resulting in 
progress towards the Strategy’s targets, particularly the targets relating to in situ and ex situ 
conservation of flora under Objective II. With regards to in situ measures, studies have shown 
that many of the most important areas for plant diversity are not covered by protected area 
regimes.83 Research on the ex situ conservation of plants leads to similar conclusions. It is 
estimated that only half of plant species endemic to Greece are represented in ex situ 
conservation activities. Further, for those species that have been collected, in most cases all the 
material of a species is kept in the same place, leaving it vulnerable to freak events, such as 
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climatic control failures or human error. Even where a species is stored in a seedbank or botanic 
garden, for most species the material is not suitable for use in reintroduction programmes.84 
This is in some ways more concerning than the failure to ensure the botanical 
representativeness of protected areas. The assumption underpinning ex situ conservation is that 
the genetic material being stored in botanical gardens, seed banks and similar institutes is an 
accessible resource that can be used to restore a species if their wild populations are no longer 
viable. If this is not true, then urgent action must be taken to remedy this to ensure that any 
future reintroduction programmes are successful. 
Corollaries to both the in situ and ex situ conservation targets are the targets in Objective I of 
the Strategy: ‘Plant diversity is well understood, documented and recognised’. There is an online 
list of all known species of flora,85 but this is far from complete, with many areas, particularly in 
the tropics, still requiring assessment.86 Methodologies have been proposed that would enable 
States to develop online databases of all known flora within their territories.87 Even if this were 
to be achieved, however, such lists would not provide information on the conservation status 
required by Target 2, and is therefore of limited use in setting conservation priorities to achieve 
the targets under Objective II.88 For this, the most comprehensive data source is the IUCN Red 
List,89 but compared with other taxa the assessment of flora is relatively poor.90 As a result, 
‘many published analyses are making very strong assumptions based on very limited data’.91 
Failure to achieve Target 2 has had knock-on effects for other targets in the Strategy, particularly 
in the identification of priority species for Target 7: the in situ protection of at least 75% of 
known threatened species.92 Many endangered species are being found outside protected 
areas, as these have already been designated on the basis of the limited data that was available 
at the time. Broader conservation strategies are therefore required if Target 7 is to be 
                                                          
84 N. Krigas, V. Menteli and D. Vokou, ‘Analysis of the ex situ conservation of the Greek endemic flora at 
national, European and global scales and of its effectiveness in meeting STRATEGY Target 8’ (2014) 148 
Plant Biosystems DOI: 10.1080/11263504.2014.988194. 
85 http://www.theplantlist.org/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
86 G. Krupnick, ‘Conservation of Tropical Plant Diversity: What Have We Done, Where Are We Going?’ 
(2013) 45 Biotropica 693-708. 
87 J. Victor et al, ‘Creating an Online World Flora by 2020: a perspective from South Africa’ (2014) 23 
Biodiversity Conservation 251-263. For further discussion, see chapter 9. 
88 J. Miller et al, ‘Addressing target two of the Global Strategy for Plant Conservation by rapidly identifying 
plants at risk’ (2012) 21 Biodiversity Conservation 1877-1887. 
89 The merits and operation of the Red List are discussed in the next chapter. 
90 N. Brummitt, S Bachman and J. Moat, ‘Applications of the IUCN Red List: towards a global barometer 
for plant diversity’ (2008) 6 Endangered Species Research 127-135. 
91 Krupnick, (n 86). 
92 ibid. 
56 
 
 
 
achieved.93 Further, even if a species is identified as endangered, and its habitat is designated 
as a protected area, it will need to be actively managed to ensure its continued survival rather 
than be subject to a ‘benign neglect’ approach to conservation.94 
 
Forest Biodiversity: 
Responsibility for forest regulation is shared between a number of international organisations, 
including the Biodiversity Convention, the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation’s Committee 
on Forestry and the International Tropical Timber Organisation. There is little coordination 
between these organisations.95 Efforts to develop a more coherent regime for forest 
conservation have failed, not least because of the acute interest of States in protecting their 
sovereign rights to exploitation.96 This issue is compounded by the links between deforestation 
and other social problems, including poverty, unsustainable agricultural practices, lack of 
capacity to achieve environmental goals and foreign debt.97  
There were some hopes that the Biodiversity Convention would evolve to become the primary 
instrument concerned with forest conservation through the adoption of a forest protocol. This 
has not happened, and is unlikely to do so. This is in part due to the different perceptions of the 
value of forests, not just in terms of biodiversity but socioeconomic ones as well, which leads 
some to conclude that, ironically, the Biodiversity Convention is too narrow an instrument for it 
to effectively address all issues relating to forests.98 These values, however, according to 
Eikermann, are precisely why an international convention on forests is needed. They deliver 
significant benefits not just for the States in which they are found but for the entire planet and 
all States therefore have an interest in ensuring their protection and sustainable use.99 
Two instruments were adopted by States at the 1992 Rio Conference that are relevant to the 
conservation of forests. The first is the unfortunately named 1992 Non-Legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation 
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and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests (the 1992 Forest Principles).100 That ‘non-
binding’ is included in the title demonstrates the zealotry of States in ensuring the Principles 
would not have any legal effect whatsoever. In comparison to the approach taken in other 
instruments adopted in 1992, the 1992 Forest Principles do not identify forest conservation as 
a global concern, but instead present it as a national issue. Principle 2(a) says that ‘States have 
the sovereign and inalienable right to utilise, manage and develop their forests in accordance 
with their development needs’, and Principle 3(a) states that it is ‘national policies and 
strategies’ that should be the framework for conservation and management activities. The 
fifteen principles do little more than assert that national management of forests should 
contribute towards their sustainable development. The practical use of the 1992 Forest 
Principles in instigating and directing international action is therefore doubtful.101  
Chapter 11 of Agenda 21,102 the second instrument adopted at Rio relevant to forests, sets out 
four programme areas for forest conservation and management: 
A. Sustaining multiple roles and functions of all types of forests, forest lands and 
woodlands 
B. Enhancing the protection, sustainable management and conservation of all forests, and 
the greening of degraded areas, through forest rehabilitation, afforestation, 
reforestation and other rehabilitative means 
C. Promoting efficient utilisation and assessment to recover the full valuation of the goods 
and services provided by forests, forest lands and woodlands 
D. Establishing and/or strengthening capacities for the planning, assessment and 
systematic observations of forests and related programmes, projects and activities, 
including commercial trade and processes 
Objectives are outlined for each, as are activities and means of implementation. The means of 
implementation are similar across the four programme areas, concentrating on financial 
resources, scientific and technological capabilities, human resource development and capacity 
building. Evidently, a wide-ranging strategy is envisaged by Agenda 21 with regards to forests. 
Taking the human resource limb of the means of implementation for programme area B as an 
example, this includes both the training of specialists in all aspects of forest conservation as well 
as improving public awareness of the impacts and drivers of deforestation.103 However, as the 
above assessment of Aichi Target 5 shows, the global community has so far failed to take 
sufficient action to conserve forests and reverse the global rate of deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
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Instead of a protocol, at its sixth meeting in 2002 the Conference of the Parties to the 
Biodiversity Convention adopted its Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biological 
Diversity.104 This consists of Three Programme Elements, twelve goals, twenty-seven objectives 
and 130 activities. An in-depth review of the implementation of the Expanded Programme took 
place between March 2006 and May 2007. The key findings of this report include: 
• Information submitted by States and international organisations suggests that the 
Expanded Programme is a useful component of the range of instruments available to 
tackle biodiversity loss. 
• However, forest biodiversity continues to decline. Obstacles to implementation of the 
Expanded Programme include lack of data, lack of capacity and a lack of coordination. 
• Deforestation and forest degradation are the main causes of forest biodiversity loss, 
with rates either remaining the same or increasing. 
• National implementation strategies do not take adequate account of the need to 
address the impacts of climate change on forests. 
• The total area of protected forest has increased, but connectivity between protected 
areas is limited.105 
Despite the work that has been undertaken in this initiative, recent studies show that 
deforestation rates remain high,106 indicating that the international community has failed to take 
the necessary steps to reduce, and reverse, the decline in forest biodiversity. This is also 
highlighted in the Fourth Biodiversity Outlook.107 
In 2014 the Republic of Korea, through its Korea Forest Service, announced that it was 
establishing the Forest Ecosystem Restoration Initiative (FERI)108 to assist States in achieving 
Aichi Targets 5, 11 and 15.109 This was in response to both the Hyderabad Call for a Concerted 
Effort on Ecosystem Restoration110 and the Decision on Ecosystem Restoration adopted at the 
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106 For example, see N. Rodriguez et al ‘Patterns and Trends of Forest Loss in the Columbian Guyana’ 
(2012) 44 Biotropica 123-132 and C. Bianchi and S. Haig ‘Deforestation Trends of Tropical Dry Forests in 
Central Brazil’ (2013) 45 Biotropica 395-400. 
107 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, (n 17). 
108 Note by the Executive Secretary, ‘Forest Ecosystem Restoration Initiative’, UNEP/CBD/COP/12/INF/19, 
29 September 2014. 
109 ibid, para. 4. 
110 Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/restoration/Hyderabad-call-restoration-en.pdf (last accessed 
01/04/2017). 
59 
 
 
 
twelfth Conference of the Parties.111 FERI is a six-year initiative and is comprised of the following 
elements: 
1. Capacity-building 
- Workshops (driven by demand from Parties) 
- Learning exchanges at regional and subregional levels 
- Identification, translation, development and adaption tools for use by Parties 
- Technical clinics 
2. Implementation support 
- Direct support to countries to carry out assessments of degradation and restoration 
potential, in the framework of Aichi Targets 5, 11 and 15. This funding could be used 
by countries to leverage funding from other sources for implementation of 
restoration activities. 
3. Technical support and cooperation 
- International/global technical support networks – coordination mechanism among 
different regions and initiatives 
- Regional support hubs/“centres of excellence” – building on the technical and 
scientific cooperation networks envisaged under the [Biodiversity Convention] 
4. Expert process 
- Meetings of expert and scientific groups on issues related to forest ecosystem 
restoration112 
FERI, then, is a circular process, primarily based on learning from experiences that feedback into 
future forest restoration efforts.113 Technical and financial support is provided to developing 
States in both undertaking restoration activities, but also in accessing additional support from 
sources other than those backed by FERI. Ultimately it is hoped that FERI will achieve three 
outcomes: the capacity of developing States to undertake restoration activities will be 
enhanced, there is improved implementation of restoration activities, and these activities are 
profiled and supported.114 Whether FERI will succeed where other similar initiatives have failed 
remains to be seen. 
One of the primary intended outcomes of FERI is that ‘the capacity of developing countries to 
undertake restoration activities is raised’.115 It is therefore notable that no targets from Aichi 
Strategic Goal E, which relates to implementation, are included within the immediate scope of 
FERI. Fulfilling the three goals prioritised by FERI will arguably not be possible without acting to 
achieve a majority of them. All of the Aichi Targets, for example, will require action to be taken 
on Aichi Target 20, the target relating to the provision of funds and other resources. Similarly, 
                                                          
111 Decision XII/19, ‘Ecosystem conservation and restoration, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/19, 17 October 
2014. 
112 ibid, para. 9. 
113 By doing so, FERI supports the networks central to the resilience thinking model of governance that is 
explored further in chapter 9. 
114 ibid, para. 10. 
115 Note by the Executive Secretary, (n 108). 
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the three Targets under Strategic Goal A represent the broader social framework which is 
necessary for biodiversity protection to not only be successful, but to be seen as a legitimate 
concern for public bodies. In this case, the lack of specificity again becomes an issue. For 
example, what is meant by the word ‘people’ in Target 1?116 It would be fair to assume that the 
membership of a conservation organisation such as Fauna & Flora International117 is aware of 
the ‘values’ of biodiversity and how it could be used sustainably. Is this alone enough to consider 
Target 1 to have been achieved, or is it necessary to reach beyond an educated elite or 
committed support and ensure those that rely on biodiversity for their essential needs are 
informed? A recent assessment on progress towards achieving Target 1 shows some worrying 
trends. Whilst people consider biodiversity to be important for humanity’s well-being, they do 
not see how protecting biodiversity contributes to their own well-being. Similarly, biodiversity 
loss is recognised as a global problem but not a local concern,118 making it difficult to build public 
support and consensus in strategies designed to reduce deforestation. 
Operating alongside the forest initiatives overseen by the Biodiversity Convention is the 2007 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests, which was adopted by the parties to the 
UN Forum on Forests, a subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council. Whilst this 
instrument shares the same fundamental weaknesses of the 1992 Forest Principles, namely that 
it is non-binding and emphasises that forest conservation is a matter for individual States to 
decide, it ‘represent[s] a more clearly drafted reflection of the evolution of an international 
consensus in response to the challenge of sustainable forest management and arresting forest 
loss and degradation’.119 Paragraph 6, for example, addresses a number of issues, including 
promoting efficient use of forest products, protecting indigenous knowledge of forests, 
financing and other resources and integrating forest management plans with other national 
development plans. However, international consensus on how best to tackle the drivers of 
deforestation remains elusive. 
 
Conclusions: 
The Biodiversity Convention is an instrument plagued by internal contradictions. It supposedly 
‘internationalises’ conservation concerns, but relies on national action. It has one of the 
                                                          
116 ‘By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of the values of biodiversity and the steps they can take to 
conserve and use it sustainably’. 
117 http://www.fauna-flora.org/. 
118 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, (n 17) p. 33. 
119 Sands and Peel, (n 101) p. 499. 
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broadest remits of any multilateral environmental agreement, yet save for a brief preambular 
reference there is no mention of any of the drivers of biodiversity loss. It seeks to adopt a holistic 
approach to conservation, but the Contracting Parties have found it necessary to develop habitat 
and issue-specific programmes of work to direct action. There is no doubt that the Convention 
could evolve into a powerful regime, despite its inherent weaknesses. The mechanisms are there 
to develop legally-binding protocols on important conservation issues and to ensure the proper 
global oversight of these. However, at present there is no indication that the Contracting Parties 
are going to change their approach of non-binding programmes and targets. Guruswamy warns 
against idolising the Biodiversity Convention’s strengths while ignoring its flaws, although his 
suggestion for wholesale reforms to the Convention to re-orientate it as a forests instrument 
has its own problems.120 Not only would it risk undoing the action that has been taken under the 
Convention, but experience in global forestry regulation suggests the resulting instrument 
would be anything but binding. 
Whatever direction global conservation regulation takes in the future, the principal reform 
needed is to redefine the objectives to reflect actual conservation measures, rather than simply 
documenting the disappearance of nature. Compliance does not necessarily equate to 
effectiveness, and it has been noted by Harrop that the only real obligation in the Biodiversity 
Convention is the submission of annual reports in Article 26. His prediction that ‘the [Biodiversity 
Convention] may ultimately be remembered only for its efficiency in gathering information to 
simply observe – rather than prevent – the relentless decline of biodiversity’121 is in danger of 
becoming true. 
 
                                                          
120 Guruswamy, (n 9) p. 355-357. 
121 Harrop, (n 18) p. 49. 
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III 
REGIONAL APPROACHES TO PROTECTING PLANTS 
 
Regional Conservation Instruments and ‘Effectiveness’: 
International environmental law has seen the adoption of several regional conservation treaties. 
Taking a regional approach to conservation has the advantage of enabling a more tailor-made 
approach to regulation, one which is sympathetic to the ecological and geopolitical 
circumstances of the region.1 Accommodation of particular concerns, however, is not the same 
as offering effective protection. Indeed, where these concerns are economic in nature, giving 
too much weight to them may frustrate conservation efforts. In the previous chapter a number 
of issues with the global approach to plant conservation under the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity2 were raised, and an effective network of regional conservation instruments 
could go a long way to addressing these. However, as the following discussion shows, such a 
network does not exist and the law is flawed in many respects. 
For the purposes of this analysis ‘effectiveness’ is defined in three ways. First and most simply is 
the geographic scope of the law; is every plant covered by a regional agreement?3 Second is the 
construction of the conservation instruments. There is extensive literature on what makes a 
‘good’ environmental treaty and regional conservation instruments will be assessed against 
criteria drawn from this. Third, to what extent do the criticisms that have been levied against 
the listing of species and the designation of protected areas apply to these mechanisms as they 
have been conceived in the regional conservation instruments? The law will not be effective at 
protecting plants if the means through which this is to be achieved are flawed. 
The regional conservation instruments examined in this chapter4 are: 
• The 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western 
Hemisphere5 
                                                          
1 P. Sands and J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 479. 
2 Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 (1992). 
3 This chapter only addresses regional agreements that apply in temperate terrestrial areas. The 
protection of polar and marine flora is discussed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
4 These have been taken from the ‘Regional Wildlife Regulation’ section in M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. 
Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010). See Appendix 
1 for the ratification status of these instruments. 
5 Washington, 12 October 1940, in force 1 May 1942, 161 UNTS 193. 
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• The 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(Algiers)6 
• The 1976 Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific (Apia)7 
• The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 
(Bern)8 
• The 1985 Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (ASEAN)9 
 
The Geographic Scope of Regional Conservation Agreements: 
The following maps illustrate the potential and actual geographic scope of the conservation 
agreements listed above. The potential scope is based on the membership of the international 
organisations in which the instruments are deposited.10 Actual coverage has been determined 
by the ratifications of the conservation instruments by the member States of these 
organisations. States that have only signed the agreements have not been included as, according 
to general treaty law, they are not bound by the instruments’ specific obligations.11 States that 
are too small to appear on the map are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Algiers, 15 September 1968, in force 9 October 1969, 1001 UNTS 3. The 1968 Convention has been 
selected because it is the treaty that is currently in operation in Africa. The more recent 2003 African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources has only received thirteen of the 
required fifteen ratifications for it to enter into force. The text of the revised version is available at: 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-convention-conservation-nature-and-natural-resources-revised-
version. 
7 Apia, 12 June 1976, in force 28 June 1990, IELMT 976:45. Note the application of this treaty was 
suspended in 2006. 
8 Bern, 19 September 1979, in force 1 June 1982, UKTS 56 (1982). 
9 Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985, 15 EPL 64 (1985) (not in force). 
10 See Appendix 1. 
11 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (8th edition, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 
372. 
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Looking at these maps, the most obvious gaps in the regional protection of plants are the 
Middle-East and central Asia, in which no instruments exist. Geopolitical instability is the likely 
explanation for this. Both the deteriorating humanitarian and diplomatic situation in the Middle-
East and the growing tensions between some of the major States in central Asia, particularly 
India and China,12 mean that there is simply not the requisite political will to conclude a 
multilateral agreement on nature conservation. 
The failure of States to ratify the 1985 ASEAN Agreement and the suspension of the 1976 Apia 
Convention also means that plants in these areas are not protected at a regional level. Even if 
Apia had remained in force, its ratification by only five States means that it would have been of 
limited effect. One of the reasons behind the suspension was the universal participation of the 
potential Parties with the Convention of Biological Diversity,13 but as noted in the previous 
chapter, that is a flawed regime and so should not be seen as a reasonable alternative to regional 
action. 
There is a second instrument operating in the South Pacific that is relevant here: the Convention 
for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region.14 This 
is primarily concerned with reducing pollution but Article 14 also provides for the protection of 
flora and fauna: 
The Parties shall, individually or jointly, take all appropriate measures to protect and 
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems and depleted, threatened or endangered flora and 
fauna as well as their habitat in the Convention Area. To this end, the Parties shall, as 
appropriate, establish protected areas, such as parks and reserves, and prohibit or 
regulate any activity likely to have adverse effects on the species, ecosystems or 
biological processes that such areas are designated to protect. The establishment of 
such areas shall not affect the rights of other Parties or third States under international 
law. In addition, the Parties shall exchange information concerning the administration 
and management of such areas. 
This is a very general obligation and a poor substitute for a dedicated conservation instrument, 
but it has the notable advantage of being in a treaty that is actually in force. Twelve States have 
ratified the Noumea Convention.15 
With forty-five out of forty-seven States ratifying it, the 1979 Bern Convention benefits from the 
highest number of ratifications, and the highest percentage of ratifications. Only two members 
                                                          
12 T-S. Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
13 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 4) p. 386-387. 
14 Noumea, 25 November 1986, in force 22 August 1990, 26 ILM 38 (1987). 
15 Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and the United States. 
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of the Council of Europe, Russia and San Marino, have not ratified it. However, that Russia has 
not ratified the treaty is significant because it significantly reduces the Convention’s geographic 
range. This, coupled with Canada’s failure to ratify the Western Hemisphere Convention and the 
reservation that Denmark has to the European Convention precluding its application to 
Greenland, severely limits the regional protection given to Arctic flora.16  
The agreement that applies to the largest geographic area is the Western Hemisphere 
Convention. However, significant areas of rainforest, the most diverse biome in the world, in 
Bolivia and Columbia are not protected by the Convention. Neither is the majority of flora found 
on the Caribbean islands, as the only island State to ratify the Convention is Trinidad and Tobago. 
Similar comments can be made about the 1968 Algiers Convention. Although over half of the 
African Union States have ratified the treaty there are noticeable areas in which it does not 
apply, particularly in the southern, north and eastern parts of the continent. Importantly, 
however, much of the African rainforest, which is primarily located in the Congo river basin, is 
covered by that Convention. 
Taking all the above into account, the overall conclusion has to be that in terms of geographic 
scope there is no comprehensive system of conservation agreements operating at a regional 
level in international law. There are significant gaps where no instrument exists at all, and the 
failure of States to ratify those instruments that do exist has limited the protection they offer to 
plants. Given the weaknesses identified in the global regime in the previous chapter, it is unlikely 
that global conservation law will be able to compensate for this. 
 
The Construction of Regional Conservation Agreements: 
A number of characteristics have been identified as necessary if a multilateral environmental 
agreement is to be effective, i.e. achieve its stated objectives.17 The principal ones include: 
1. Obligations that are expressed in mandatory language.18 
2. Obligations concerning, and the facilitation of, implementation at the national level.19 
                                                          
16 There is however extensive international cooperation in the Arctic, which is examined in the next 
chapter. 
17 R. Mitchell, ‘Compliance Theory: Compliance, Effectiveness, Behaviour Change in International 
Environmental Law’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
18 G. Shaffer and M. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in 
International Governance’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 706-799. 
19 R. Stewart, ‘Instrument Choice’, C. Redgwell, ‘National Implementation’ and L. Boisson de Chazournes, 
‘Technical and Financial Assistance’, all in Bodansky, Brunnée and Heys (eds), (n 17). 
68 
 
 
 
3. A system of supranational oversight, enforcement and dispute settlement.20 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that the general nature of the provisions in the Biodiversity 
Convention, as well as the discretion it affords to States in deciding what action is to be taken, 
renders it virtually unenforceable. Similar weaknesses undermine the effectiveness of the 
regional conservation agreements, as the provisions set out below illustrate. As a result, the 
instruments being discussed here are examples of the ‘legal soft law’ described by Chinkin.21 
That the inclusion of ‘soft’ provisions is sometimes the only way that consensus can be reached 
by the negotiating States22 does not detract from the criticism of the unenforceability of the 
instrument. When evaluating the law a distinction must be drawn between compromises made 
to facilitate the negotiation process and the merits of the final agreement. Whilst the argument 
that an agreement, however flawed, is better than no agreement is valid, it has also been 
suggested that the weaknesses of the Biodiversity Convention has meant that it has done more 
harm than good to global conservation efforts.23 Indeed, that the States’ participation with the 
Biodiversity Convention was cited as a reason for suspending the operation of the Apia 
Convention suggests that more action would have been taken at the regional level had this 
global regime not existed. 
Related to the issue of the mandatory, or otherwise, nature of obligations contained in any 
conservation agreement is the position that it is afforded in the hierarchy of international 
regimes. One of the fundamental weaknesses of the Biodiversity Convention is that it does not, 
in most circumstances, affect the rights afforded to States by other regimes.24 Similar provisions 
exist in both the ASEAN Agreement25 and the Western Hemisphere Convention,26 and so the 
same observations can be made. These provisions legitimise inaction by subordinating 
conservation concerns to other interests, notably trade and economic ones. This is also further 
evidence of States’ desire to prevent the global conservation agenda from undermining their 
sovereign right to exploit natural resources. 
                                                          
20 T. Treves et al (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (Asser Press, 2009); M. Fitzmaurice and C. Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-
Compliance Procedures and International Law’ (2000) 31 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 35-
65. 
21 C. Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 850-855. 
22 P. Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 420-435. 
23 R. Adam, ‘Missing the 2010 Biodiversity Target: A Wake-up Call for the Convention on Biodiversity?’ 
(2010) 21 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 123-166. 
24 Article 22. 
25 Article 29. 
26 Article X(1). 
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There are two issues relevant to the implementation of international conservation law. First, 
there must be sufficient resources available to the States, particularly developing States and 
States with significant areas of biodiversity. Creating a protected area may involve the 
purchasing of land rights, work to restore degraded habitats, reintroducing previously common 
species and removing alien species, employing scientists to monitor the site, management and 
administrative staff, patrols and armed guards, and a public awareness campaign. It might also 
be necessary to provide training and other capacity-building components to local residents. 
There are significant resources available to developing States in fulfilling their obligations under 
the Biodiversity Convention,27 but none of the regional conservation agreements explicitly 
provide for the establishment of a specific fund to aid with their implementation. This is not a 
major issue, however, due to the near-universal participation of States in the Biodiversity 
Convention regime,28 although concerns have been raised over whether the Global Environment 
Facility, the financial mechanism that supports States in the implementation of a number of 
environmental treaties, has sufficient resources to meet growing environmental challenges.29 
Secondly, there must be obligations to implement the international instrument in national law. 
These can take many forms30 and for current purposes the most important are obligations 
regarding national policies and strategies, requirements to designate competent national 
authorities to oversee work done in pursuit of a treaty’s objectives, commitments to 
international minimum standards and duties to cooperate in certain activities.  
Obligations relating to national policies and strategies are commonly made in relation to land-
use and development planning. Article 4 of the Bern Convention states: 
The Contracting Parties in their planning and development policies shall have regard to 
the conservation requirements of the areas protected under [Article 4(1)], so as to avoid 
or minimise as far as possible any deterioration of such areas. 
Similar provisions are found in Articles IV and V of the 1968 Algiers Convention, and Article 2 of 
the ASEAN Agreement. The designation of a national authority is required by Article XV of the 
Algiers Convention and Article 23 of the ASEAN Agreement. No such requirement exists in the 
Apia or the Bern Conventions, but both require States to compile lists of either endangered or 
protected species.31 Likewise, States party to the Western Hemisphere Convention submit their 
                                                          
27 Boisson de Chazournes, (n 19). 
28 https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
29 A.S. Miller, ‘The Global Environment Facility and the Search for Financial Strategies to Foster Sustainable 
Development’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review 1229-1244. For further discussion of funding in 
international environmental law see chapter 9. 
30 Redgwell, (n 19) p. 939-940. 
31 See Articles V(2) and 11(3) respectively.  
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own lists of protected species for inclusion in the treaty’s Annex.32 This has a similar effect as 
requiring the designation of a competent national authority as it ensures that some action is 
taken, or at least considered, following ratification.  
International minimum standards are found in the definitions of protected areas.33 This is useful 
to the extent that it provides a template for States when establishing a protected area, although, 
as the discussion below illustrates, there are issues in the way in which protected areas have 
been implemented by States. 
The most significant way in which the regional conservation treaties mandate national 
implementation is by requiring cooperation in scientific and conservation activities. The most 
comprehensive provision in this regard is contained in Article 18 of the ASEAN Agreement: 
(1) The Contracting Parties shall cooperate together and with the competent 
international organizations with a view to coordinating their activities in the field of 
conservation of nature and management of natural resources and assisting each other 
in fulfilling their obligations under this Agreement. 
(2) To that effect, they shall endeavour 
(a) to collaborate in monitoring activities; 
(b) to the greatest extent possible, coordinate their research activities; 
(c) to use comparable or standardized research techniques and procedures 
with a view to obtaining comparable data; 
(d) to exchange appropriate scientific and technical data, information and 
experience, on a regular basis; 
(e) whenever appropriate, to consult and assist each other with regard to 
measures for the implementation of this Agreement.34 
This cooperation in scientific research and monitoring is crucial in enhancing the effectiveness 
of the regional conservation regimes at protecting plants. ‘Faced with broad consensus among 
competent experts on the description and diagnosis of a (severe) environmental problem, 
governments more often do, in fact, take some kind of collective action’.35 Whilst this has 
resulted in notable results in other environmental regimes, including ozone protection and the 
regulation of transboundary air pollution,36 the same cannot be said of the regional conservation 
agreements, as the discussions on designation and listing below illustrate. 
                                                          
32 Article VIII. 
33 Article I of the Western Hemisphere Convention, Article III of the 1968 Algiers Convention and Article I 
of the Apia Convention. 
34 See also Articles VI of the Western Hemisphere Convention, XVI of the 1968 Algiers Convention, VII of 
the Apia Convention and 11 of the Bern Convention. 
35 S. Andresen and J. Skjærseth, ‘Science and Technology: From Agenda Setting to Implementation’, in 
Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds), (n 17) p. 190. 
36 ibid, p. 191. 
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Even if the regional conservation agreements had mandatory obligations, they would remain 
ineffective without a robust system for non-compliance and enforcement. Enforcement is also 
a crucial stage of implementation; it can either give the stamp of approval to the way a State 
has chosen to implement a treaty, or highlight where implementation has been insufficient or 
incorrect.37 Sands identifies three factors that must inform any discussion of compliance with 
environmental treaties: the growing demands of States for an ever-diminishing supply of natural 
resources; that international environmental obligations affect national economic interests and 
to renege on the former is to gain a competitive advantage in the latter; and the changing nature 
of environmental obligations as States take on greater treaty commitments.38 The issue of 
compliance is significant because ‘non-compliance by States… limits the overall effectiveness of 
environmental treaties, undermines the international legal process and contributes to conflict 
and instability in the international system’.39 
Institutional frameworks to provide oversight of compliance with the regional conservation 
treaties are conspicuous by their absence. There are no institutions created by the Western 
Hemisphere Convention, and the South Pacific Commission referred to in the Apia Convention 
is little more than an information provider.40 The creation of an Organisation of National 
Conservation Services is permitted by Article XV of the 1968 Algiers Convention, but only if the 
Contracting States do not designate a national authority to oversee the implementation of the 
Convention. No such organisation has been established. Article 22 of the ASEAN Agreement 
outlines various functions to be performed by its Secretariat, including the convening of 
meetings and the communication of information, but not enforcement action. A similar set of 
functions is given to the Secretariat of the Bern Convention in Article 14. However, it is only 
responsible for ‘following the application’ of the Convention, not enforcing it, and it may only 
make recommendations to the Parties for measures to be taken to achieve the Convention’s 
objectives. The limited enforcement role given to international institutions has been attributed 
to the sovereign interests of States, which underlines ‘the fundamental tension between the 
juridical reality of States’ territorial sovereignty over their natural resources and the physical 
reality of ecological interdependence’.41  
                                                          
37 J. Wettestad, ‘Monitoring and Verification’, in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds), (n 17). 
38 P. Sands, ‘Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: Existing International Legal 
Arrangements’, in J. Cameron, J. Werksman and P. Roderick (eds), Improving Compliance with 
International Environmental Law (Law and Sustainable Development Series, Earthscan, 1996), p. 51. 
39 ibid, p. 52. 
40 Article VIII. 
41 Sands, (n 38) p. 55. 
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The question of enforcement by one State against another is more complex. Often the extent of 
a State’s right to take such action will be outlined in the text of the instrument in question but, 
and in contrast to regimes such as international human rights law, environmental treaties are 
rarely explicit on this.42 This is certainly true for regional conservation agreements, none of 
which contain clear provisions detailing when one State may take enforcement against another. 
Dispute settlement provisions are contained in Article XVIII of the 1968 Algiers Convention, 18 
of the Bern Convention and 30 of the ASEAN Agreement but these are largely limited to 
consultation and negotiation. Both the Western Hemisphere Convention and the Apia 
Convention are silent on dispute settlement. Only the Algiers Convention and the Bern 
Convention allow for the creation of ad hoc arbitration tribunals in the event of a dispute.  Sands 
argues, however, that a failure by a State to meet its treaty obligations will be grounds enough 
for another State to act, particular where the treaty addresses ‘issues of concern to all 
mankind’.43 Biodiversity protection arguably comes into this category, the preamble to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity saying as much. However, this comes into conflict with the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which has been recognised having 
customary status.44 Schrijver argues that permanent sovereignty has evolved to contain an 
element of sustainable use,45 but this is such a vague concept that it is unlikely to be regarded 
as solid grounds for unilateral enforcement action by one State against another. On the other 
hand, support for this proposition can be found in Judge Canҫado Trindade’s Separate Opinion 
to the recent International Court of Justice Antarctic Whaling Case, in which he highlights a trend 
in international environmental law that increasingly recognises the importance of conservation 
and sustainable use not only for current generations, but future generations as well.46 
To summarise, the regional conservation instruments discussed here fail to meet any of the 
criteria that have been identified as necessary for a regime to be effective. Very few of the 
obligations are expressed in mandatory terms, and States are afforded significant discretion in 
their interpretation and application. This issue is compounded by the implementation 
requirements being limited to the designation of a national authority to be responsible for the 
broad conservation remit of the instruments. Even if the agreements had mandatory obligations 
                                                          
42 ibid, p. 54. 
43 ibid, p. 54. 
44 Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 3, para. 59.  
45 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), chapter 4. 
46 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (2014) ICJ Reports 226, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Canҫado Trindade, para. 41-47.  
73 
 
 
 
the regimes as currently composed are toothless, lacking any explicit enforcement powers for 
either the relevant international institutions, where they exist, or the States themselves. 
 
The Relationship between Regional Conservation Agreements and Conservation Practice –  
Designating Protected Areas: 
The designation of protected areas in which nature is, theoretically at least, under less pressure 
has been the cornerstone of conservation since its modern-day conception in the nineteenth 
century.47 The first protected areas were game reserves in Africa, imposed to facilitate the 
colonial pastime of hunting following concerns that prized trophies were becoming harder to 
find.48 From the outset these were not without problems. ‘[I]n many areas they were no more 
than a palliative to the problem of loss of wildlife. They worked, but only while development 
pressures were slight: push them and their boundaries moved’.49 
Protected areas remain central to conservation efforts, and are found in all the regional 
conservation agreements. The 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention identifies different types 
of protected area, in which varying degrees of human interference and activity are permitted. A 
similar system of protected areas is found in the 1968 Algiers Convention. In strict nature 
reserves any activity involving the direct or indirect exploitation of nature is prohibited and 
access, including by air, is controlled.50 The Apia Convention distinguishes between national 
parks, which are open to the public, and national reserves, which afford ‘various degrees of 
protection to the natural and cultural heritage according to the purposes for which they were 
established’.51 Article 3(3) of the ASEAN Agreement merely says that States will ‘endeavour’ to 
create protected areas to protect endangered and endemic species. These rather open 
provisions do not represent the same international minimum standard as that found in the other 
instruments. The Bern Convention does not even expressly require the establishment of 
protected areas, except for habitats important to migratory species.52 Article 4(1) only requires 
‘appropriate and necessary legislative and administrative measures to ensure the conservation 
of the habitats of the wild flora and fauna species… and the endangered natural habitats’. This 
obligation could be met by simply incorporating a requirement to consider the conservation 
                                                          
47 W. Adams, Against Extinction: The Story of Conservation (Earthscan, 2004), p. 76-82. 
48 ibid, p. 22-25. 
49 ibid, p. 76. 
50 Article III(d)(1). This provision is replaced by Annex II in the 2003 African Convention. 
51 Article I(c). 
52 Article 4(3). 
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value of an area in land-use and planning procedures. Protected areas are mentioned in Article 
4(2), but this does not impose any obligation as to their creation and would have no effect if 
States opted not to use protected areas when implementing the Article.  
For plants, the size and number of protected areas is, to an extent, irrelevant.53 Instead what is 
more important is the ecological representativeness of the areas. It is here where there are the 
strongest grounds for challenging the effectiveness of the protected areas envisaged by the 
treaties at conserving plants. The international community is on course to meet its target of 
protecting 17% of land and inland waterways by 2020.54 However, it is estimated that no more 
than 23% of the areas identified as important for biodiversity are protected,55 again highlighting 
the arbitrary nature of the 17% target as it can be achieved without delivering any real benefit 
for biodiversity. Case studies from around the world illustrate this. In eastern Africa significant 
proportions of a range of natural vegetation types were found to be at risk from increasing 
human pressures.56 Similarly, in the United States a study found that the coverage of protected 
areas is almost the opposite of what is actually needed, with most protected areas being in the 
west but the species in need of that protection, including the majority of tree species, being in 
the south-east.57 Even where designated areas do cover important areas for biodiversity it is 
possible to question their effectiveness at protecting that biodiversity. In Indonesia, for example, 
it was found that protected areas were unable to reduce rates of deforestation. Increased 
monitoring and non-designation techniques, such as the granting of logging concessions, have 
been recommended as ways of trying to address this problem.58 
There are also problems with designation as a concept. It is possible that the dogmatic reliance 
on designation as the primary means of conservation is one of the reasons why the Biodiversity 
Convention has struggled to create a coherent and effective regime, as it implies that 
conservation is a distinct land use, comparable to the siting of a waste treatment plant. This in 
turn creates the impression that designation equates to conservation requirements being met, 
‘making it harder to achieve integrated policies that cut across economic sectors and make a 
                                                          
53 In comparison, for animals the size of protected areas is an important factor, particularly for migratory 
species and animals that require large territories in which to hunt. 
54 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Global Biodiversity Outlook 4’ (Montreal, 2014), 
p. 82-85. 
55 D. Juffe-Bignoli et al, ‘Protected Planet Report 2014: Tracking progress towards global targets for 
protected areas’ (UNEP-WCMC, 2014), p. iii. 
56 P. van Breugel et al, ‘Environmental Gap Analysis to Prioritize Conservation Efforts in Eastern Africa’ 
(2015) 10 Plos One e0121444. 
57 C. Jenkins et al, ‘US protected lands mismatch biodiversity priorities’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 5081-5086. 
58 C. Brun et al, ‘Analysis of deforestation and protected area effectiveness in Indonesia: A comparison of 
Bayesian spatial models’ (2015) 31 Global Environmental Change 285-295. 
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difference to… policies’.59 Going further, designation may actually lead to environmental 
degradation, as the protection of one area may be seen as legitimising the excessive exploitation 
of another.60 
An additional basis for criticising the designation of protected areas is ‘island theory’. In short, 
island theory argues that isolated patches of habitat – equated to islands – are less able to 
support a sufficiently diverse range of wildlife to enable the ecosystem to flourish.61 There are 
two elements to this. First is the often arbitrary process of determining what area should be 
protected, as these can be the result of financial and social considerations rather than ecological 
criteria.62 Second, the designation of ‘islands’ of habitat means that individual members of 
species are isolated, leading to a degeneration in genetic diversity and ultimately extinction, first 
at a local level but then globally.63 The European Union’s Natura 2000 network of protected 
areas is intended to overcome these issues, but this was by no means a novel feature of the 
Habitats Directive.64 A similar idea was mooted in relation to game reserves in Africa in the early 
twentieth century.65 However, despite its ecological advantages, no such approach can be seen 
in any of the regional conservation agreements. Furthermore, given the difficulties the European 
Union has had in creating a comprehensive ecological network66 it is debatable whether such 
requirements would be effectively implemented even if they did exist. 
Evidence on the ecological representativeness of the global network of protected areas varies. 
In terms of individual sites, there appears to be greater diversity inside protected sites compared 
to the surrounding area, although numbers of endemic species are largely equivalent.67 Overall, 
however, the ecological representativeness of protected sites has been questioned. The 2014 
Protected Planet Report concludes:  
Recent studies show that the additional areas required to achieve a fully representative 
global protected area network is substantial, especially in light of competing land (and 
                                                          
59 W. Adams, Future Nature: a vision for conservation (revised edition, Earthscan, 2003), p. 116. 
60 ibid. 
61 R.H. MacArthur and E.O. Wilson, The Theory of Island Biogeography (Princeton University Press, 1967). 
62 Adams, Future Nature, (n 59) p. 116. 
63 ibid, p. 118-119. 
64 Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora OJ L 206, 
22.7.1992, p. 7-50. 
65 Adams, (n 47) p. 5-6. 
66 N. de Sadeleer, ‘EC Law and Biodiversity’, in R. Macrory (ed), Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental 
Law: A High Level of Protection? (Europa Law Publishing, 2005), p. 363-364. 
67 C.L. Gray et al, ‘Local biodiversity is higher inside than outside terrestrial protected areas worldwide’ 
(2016) 7 Nature Communications DOI: 10.1038/ncomms12306. 
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sea) uses. It may not be possible to include all known gaps in protected areas, and 
therefore alternative approaches for conservation are also needed.68  
There are several alternatives that could be pursued, although these still have an element of 
designation at their core. The report gives a number of suggestions, one of the more interesting 
being the inclusion of areas managed by indigenous communities.69 However for this to work 
there must be an effective regime in place that protects both substantive indigenous rights to 
land, and their procedural rights to engage in decision-making procedures. The extent to which 
this exists is questionable.70 
With regards to the specific needs of plants, it is possible to question the appropriateness of 
those instruments that apply the same provisions to both fauna and flora. We see this in Article 
V of the Western Hemisphere Convention, Article V of the Apia Convention and Articles 3, 4 and 
5 of the ASEAN Agreement. Article 6 of the ASEAN Agreement, however, is dedicated to forests 
and vegetation cover. The Bern Convention has separate provisions for the protection of species 
of fauna71 and flora,72 but habitat protection for both is covered in Article 4. A similar approach 
can be seen in the 1968 Algiers Convention, with Article VI specifically addressing flora but more 
general provisions on species and habitat protection found in Articles VIII and X respectively. 
The provisions listed here do not require that the same measures be adopted for fauna and 
flora; instead States are called on to adopt measures appropriate for each. However, not 
separating them implies a degree of ignorance over the ecological functions of the two. This also 
risks institutionalising the belief that both can be effectively protected using the same design 
and form of protected areas. Cultural theories of environmental assessment suggest that by 
requiring those involved in decision-making procedures to systematically consider the 
environmental impacts of proposed projects and activities, this consideration gradually 
becomes second-nature and the procedures themselves become more environmentally-
focussed as a result.73 A cultural theory of conservation would suggest that by coupling fauna 
and flora together in the same provisions these regional agreements are encouraging ‘one size 
fits all’ conservation efforts. However, plants and animals occupy fundamentally different 
ecological niches, and therefore have very different requirements. As the designation of 
                                                          
68 Juffe-Bignoli et al, (n 55) p. 40. 
69 ibid, p. 48. 
70 B.J. Richardson and D. Craig, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Law and the Environment’, in B.J. Richardson and S. 
Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, 2006). 
71 Articles 6 and 7. 
72 Article 5. 
73 R. Bartlett, ‘Ecological Reason in Administration: Environmental Impact Assessment and Green Politics’, 
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protected areas has become the principal means of conservation, the obvious issue to examine 
is space: a plant does not need the same amount of space as an elephant. Much smaller areas 
can be set aside, which will be easier to monitor and less restrictive on other development 
priorities. Attention would of course have to be paid to the ecological connections between the 
protected site and the wider area, for example if it relies on a river for its water, but there are 
examples in the law of how this could be achieved.74  
The increased use of micro-reserves finds support in a study investigating the protected area 
coverage of arid zones of the Iberian Peninsula. It found that virtually all the areas of botanical 
interest were unprotected, and advocated the creation of a series of micro-reserves to remedy 
this.75 Not only would this network protect a larger number of species as it would cover lots of 
small areas with high biodiversity rather than one large area with relatively poor biodiversity, 
but it would also promote awareness of this otherwise neglected habitat.76 
 
The Relationship between Regional Conservation Agreements and Conservation Practice – 
Listing Species: 
Alongside the designation of protected areas, the designation of protected species through the 
compilation of lists is a principal mechanism for the conservation of nature.77 These lists may 
consist of species that warrant special protection either because they are at risk of extinction,78 
or could potentially be at risk of extinction if some form of protection is not put in place.79 One 
of their strengths is that they focus attention on particular species.80 Ideally this will be because 
they are at risk, but in other cases they might be of particular cultural significance. Listing proved 
particularly useful for conservation organisations lacking the financial resources and capacity to 
promote across-the-board conservation: ‘The most effective, and emotive, subjects for public 
conservation campaigns were individual species of animals’.81 However, focussing on flagship 
                                                          
74 For example, see Article 3 of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1-21, Article 3. 
75 These micro-reserves would, however, need to be sufficiently large to minimise ‘edge effects’ and close 
enough together to enable genetic exchange – P.S. Ashton, ‘Conservation of Biological Diversity in 
Botanical Gardens’, in E.O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity (National Academy Press, 1988), p. 269. 
76 A. Mendoza-Fernández et al, ‘Threatened plants of arid ecosystems in the Mediterranean Basin: a case 
study of the south-eastern Iberian Peninsula’ (2014) 48 Oryx 548-545. 
77 Adams, (n 47) p. 129-132. 
78 For example, the IUCN Red List: http://www.iucnredlist.org. 
79 Appendix II of CITES includes species that are not currently at risk of extinction, but may become extinct 
unless international trade in those species is controlled – see Article II(2)(a). 
80 N. Collar, ‘The reasons for Red Data Books’ (1996) 30 Oryx 121-130. 
81 Adams, (n 47) p. 131. 
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species is not without cost, and studies have found that the successful promotion of one species 
has resulted in a lack of support for others.82 
The only official list of endangered species that is globally accepted is the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature’s Red List (the IUCN Red List). This classifies species according to 
their conservation status, ranging from ‘extinct’ to ‘least concern’.83 Early versions of the Red 
List were beset with problems. In particular, the lack of any objective criteria meant that 
assessments were undermined by subjective and political considerations.84 These were 
addressed through extensive consultations and the IUCN Red List is now recognised as ‘one of 
the most effective sources of information for conservation planners’.85 There is evidence to 
suggest that use of the IUCN Red List is increasing, although the added practical value of it being 
referred to in a greater number of journal articles is questionable.86  
In 2004, the World Conservation Congress passed a resolution calling on States to make greater 
use of the Red List and its criteria in national conservation planning, but it is clear that this has 
not been widely followed.87 For the regional conservation agreements examined here, including 
the 2003 Algiers Convention, this resolution came too late. None of them refer to the Red List 
and instead there is a haphazard and inconsistent approach to listing. The Annex to the Western 
Hemisphere Convention is not a single list of endangered species, but separate lists submitted 
by the Contracting Parties. They vary considerably and the result has been described as 
‘particularly confusing’.88 There are no formal criteria for inclusion and as such the Annex 
constitutes a collection of unilateral statements of intent rather than a coherent conservation 
strategy. Article V(2) of the Apia Convention requires States to compile national lists of 
endangered species, but this is now meaningless following the suspension of the Convention. 
The 1968 Algiers Convention has an Annex containing a list of protected species, but its 
representativeness is highly doubtful. 89 The Annex only includes three plant species90 but there 
                                                          
82 L. Douglas and G. Winkel, ‘The flipside of the flagship’ (2014) 23 Biodiversity and Conservation 979-997. 
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85 J. Lamoreux et al, ‘Value of the IUCN Red List’ (2003) 18 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 214-215. 
86 Rodrigues et al, (n 84). 
87 For example, see the critique of Brazil’s listing process in M. Moraes et al ‘Categorizing threatened 
species: an analysis of the Red List of the flora of Brazil’ (2014) 48 Oryx 258-265. 
88 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 4) p. 250. 
89 Article X(2) of the 2003 African Convention provides for the creation of appendices listing species 
warranting protection. 
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are over 4,700 African species on the IUCN Red List, just over 2,500 of which are classified as 
vulnerable or above.91 The Appendices of the 1985 ASEAN Agreement are just as poor, with only 
one genus92 out of over 3,100 IUCN-listed species. Over 1,400 of these are at least vulnerable.93 
Whether the compilation of more accurate lists would result in better protection for plants in 
these areas is debatable however. An in-depth study of Appendix I of the Bern Convention, 
which lists the species of flora that warrant special protection according to Article 5 of the 
Convention, suggests listing has only a limited impact in terms of conservation success. This can 
be seen in the conservation status and population trends of European flora, as well as a 
correlation of the two. 
First, conservation status (charts 1 and 2).94 One of the Red List’s strengths is that it focusses 
attention on the key species that require urgent conservation action,95 and this is reflected in 
the Bern Convention in two ways. First, the majority of species on the Red List that have not 
been included in the Appendix are classified as ‘least concern’ or ‘lower risk / least concern’. The 
Convention has excluded many species which do not appear to require any dedicated 
conservation efforts. Second, nearly two-thirds of the species listed in Appendix I are classified 
as ‘vulnerable’ or worse by the IUCN. This should not be seen as a positive aspect of the 
Convention, but rather as a testament to the failure of the States party to it. The Convention has 
been in force for over thirty years but many of the plants it set out to protect remain at risk of 
extinction.  
Nearly 40% of species in the Appendix have not been assessed by the IUCN, and so it is unclear 
how at risk of extinction they are.96 This might be evidence of a very precautionary approach 
being taken but a comparison of the correlations between the population trends and 
conservation statuses of species included and excluded from the Appendix, discussed below, 
suggests otherwise.  
                                                          
91 http://www.iucnredlist.org, using the following criteria in the advanced search option: plantae; North 
Africa (excluding Morocco, which is not a member of the African Union); EX, EW, CR, EN and VU. 
92 Raflessia. 
93 http://www.iucnredlist.org, using the following criteria in the advanced search option: plantae; south 
and south-east Asia (refined to only include ASEAN Member States); EX, EW, CR, EN and VU. 
94 See Appendix 2 for the corresponding data tables of the charts in this chapter. 
95 Rodrigues et al, (n 84). 
96 For comparison purposes these are not included in chart 1 – see the data table in Appendix 2. 
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Turning to population trends (charts 3 and 4), it appears that being included in Appendix I has 
little positive impact. Less than 5% of species in Appendix I are increasing, and less than 25% are 
stable. In comparison, nearly 40% of species’ populations are decreasing, more than double that 
of the species that are not included in the Appendix. On the one hand this suggests that the 
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Appendix is targeting the right species, but on the other it demonstrates a lack of conservation 
success. Equally, the population trend of a similar proportion of species included and excluded 
from the Appendix is unknown, which suggests that being included in the Appendix is unlikely 
to result in any greater efforts to learn more of the status of a species. Should this comparison 
be repeated in ten years’ time the significant proportion of species that are declining suggests 
that charts 1 and 2 above would look very different, with many more species classified as 
‘endangered’, ‘critically endangered’ or ‘extinct’. 
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Finally, comparing the conservation status with the population trend of species gives a clear 
indication of the failure of the Bern Convention to effectively conserve Europe’s flora. Similar 
observations as those above can be made in relation to species with increasing and stable 
populations (charts 5a and 6a, 5b and 6b). The Bern Convention has excluded a large number of 
species not believed to be at risk, but little progress has been made in improving the 
conservation status of the species that are listed in the Appendix. For those species with an 
increasing population this is not a major concern, although there is little room for complacency 
as over 70% of species in this category are classified as vulnerable or worse. There is greater 
need for action for the species with a stable population, particularly the 18% classified as 
‘critically endangered’, to ensure they do not begin to decline. 
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The conservation status of species with a decreasing population is the clearest illustration of the 
failure of the Bern Convention (charts 5c and 6c). Nearly three-quarters of the species evaluated 
by the Red List that are not included in Appendix I are classified as either ‘data deficient’, or 
‘near threatened’ and worse. Whilst an argument can be made that it is unnecessary to include 
species that are only ‘near threatened’ in the Appendix when they have a stable or an increasing 
population, one cannot be made for species that are declining. That they are declining may 
suggest that they will soon be at risk of extinction. Whether including these species in the 
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Appendix would bring any benefit is doubtful however, as over 80% with a declining population 
listed in the Appendix are classified as vulnerable or worse. 
 
 
Around half of species with an unknown population trend not included in the Appendix are 
classified above ‘least concern’, indicating that many species which are considered to be at risk, 
but with uncertainty over whether that risk is increasing or decreasing, are not covered by the 
Convention (charts 5d and 6d). For species with a population trend that needs updating this 
figure rises to over 73% (charts 5e and 6e). Urgent action, therefore, is needed to clarify and 
update the conservation status of these species. The capacity for the Bern Convention to achieve 
this, however, is limited. The only provision addressing scientific research is Article 11(1)(b), 
under the Supplementary Provisions Chapter of the Convention: 
(1) In carrying out the provisions of this Convention, the Contracting Parties undertake: 
… 
(b) to encourage and co-ordinate research related to the purposes of this 
Convention. 
This is unlikely to fill any gaps in our understanding of the conservation status of endangered 
flora, as it does not even require States themselves to undertake research, only that they 
‘encourage’ it. However, an argument can be made that scientific evaluation of the conservation 
status of species falls under the obligation to take the ‘appropriate and necessary legislative and 
administrative measures’ required by Article 5. Positive and targeted conservation action cannot 
be undertaken without a proper, or at least better than current, understanding of the status of 
the species listed in Appendix I. 
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Overall, two conclusions can be drawn from this data. First, Appendix I is not an accurate 
representation of the conservation status of European flora, at least according to the IUCN Red 
List. Whilst it is true that a significant proportion of the species not included are not believed to 
be at risk of extinction, a large number, particularly of species with declining populations, are 
not covered by the Convention. Second, and arguably more importantly, the Bern Convention is 
not an effective conservation instrument for plants because it is failing to instigate the level of 
action needed to improve the conservation status of Europe’s flora. Any conservation success is 
in spite of inclusion in Appendix I, rather than because of it. Despite being in operation for over 
thirty years, more than half of the European flora included in both the Red List and the Appendix 
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are classified as ‘vulnerable’ or worse and less than a third have a population trend that is either 
increasing or stable. 
This can be attributed to the differing emphasis of the two lists. The criteria of the IUCN Red List 
make it clear that it is concerned with endangered species, whilst Appendix I has been described 
by the Convention’s Secretariat as a list of protected species.97 The difference is subtle but 
important and becomes apparent when comparing the listing criteria. For the IUCN Red List, 
detailed guidelines have been published outlining both the classifications and the criteria against 
which all species are assessed. This is primarily quantitative in nature and relates to, inter alia, 
changes in population size, actual population size and geographic range.98 In comparison, no 
official listing criteria exist for the Bern Convention. The original list was merely a reflection of 
the consensus that could be achieved at the time.99 Article 17 of the Convention outlines the 
procedure through which changes to all the Appendices can be made,100 and in 1997 guidelines 
were agreed for the amendment of the lists.101  These call on States to ‘take into account’ the 
ecological function of the species and the threats facing it, but do not impose any thresholds at 
which a species must be submitted for listing. This goes a long way to explaining how so many 
species identified as endangered by the IUCN Red List are not in Appendix I.  
A very simple reform which would address this would be to directly refer to the IUCN Red List in 
the instrument, although this could result in greater political pressure being placed on the 
IUCN’s listing decisions.102 The current Article 5 of the Bern Convention states: 
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate and necessary legislative and 
administrative measures to ensure the special protection of the wild flora species 
specified in Appendix I… 
A more responsive provision, which would not be hamstrung by the need to constantly revisit a 
document appended to the Convention through formal treaty procedures, would be as follows: 
                                                          
97 Report of the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee, T-PVS(2005) 20, para. 3.1. 
98 IUCN Red List Categories and Criteria, (n 83). 
99 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 4) p. 304. 
100 A proposal must be submitted at least two months before the next meeting of the Standing Committee, 
and must be approved by two-thirds of the Contracting Parties. 
101 Recommendation 56 (1997). 
102 G.M. Mace et al, ‘Quantification of Extinction Risk: IUCN’s System for Classifying Threatened Species’ 
(2008) 22 Conservation Biology 1424-1442. 
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Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate and necessary legislative and 
administrative measures to ensure the special protection of the wild flora species 
classified as “vulnerable” or above on the IUCN Red List.103  
This could be supported by a second provision that adopts a precautionary approach for those 
species not yet classified as endangered or for which there is a lack of data: 
Each Contracting Party shall monitor the conservation status of the wild flora species 
classified as “near threatened” or “data deficient” and take appropriate and necessary 
legislative and administrative measures to ensure their conservation status does not 
decline. 
Due to the substantial number of species classified as ‘data deficient’ that have an unknown 
population trend, precaution has a very important role to play. There is no mention of the 
precautionary principle in the Bern Convention, nor indeed in any of the regional conservation 
agreements reviewed in this chapter. The question of definition is key when discussing a 
practical application of the precautionary principle.104  Often the literature focusses on the 
differences between strong and weak interpretations.105 The former says that no action must be 
taken unless it can be proven to have zero risk, and the weak interpretation mandates that 
scientific uncertainty is not a justification for either potentially harmful action or delaying 
positive action. The principle is more nuanced than this simple strong/weak dichotomy however. 
Von Schomberg draws a distinction between the principle as a regulatory tool and the political 
decision to invoke the principle in relation to a particular issue.106 In the proposed provisions 
above the political decision would be to apply the principle in the field of conservation, and the 
regulatory aspect is the obligation to monitor and protect those species for which there is 
insufficient data to accurately assess their conservation status. In this way, the principle also 
constitutes a rationale for acting107 – here the lack of data is the reason for the monitoring and 
protection. 
The fundamental concept behind the precautionary principle is scientific uncertainty. It is 
therefore necessary to know exactly what level of uncertainty there must be, and over what, 
                                                          
103 This is reflective of the resilience thinking approach examined in chapter 9. By fostering links between 
different actors, in this case States and the IUCN, a provision such as this could allow for more targeted, 
and therefore possibly efficient and effective, conservation action. 
104 D. Dana, ‘The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle’ (2009) 35 Queen’s Law Journal 67-
96. 
105 N. Sachs, ‘Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics (2011) University of Illinois Law 
Review 1285-1338; C. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ (2003) 151 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1003-1058; and J. Applegate, ‘The Taming of the Precautionary Principle’ (2002) 
27 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 13-78. 
106 R. von Schomberg, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Its Use Within Hard and Soft Law’ (2012) 2 European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 147-156. 
107 ibid. 
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before it can be effectively used.108 In the current context this is relatively easy to determine: it 
is uncertainty over the conservation and population status of certain species. In other areas, 
notably climate change, deciding where to apply the precautionary principle is problematic. 
Should it be to anthropogenic contributions to climate change, the scale of the impacts of 
climate change, the rate these will manifest, the location of these impacts, their timescale or 
the costs of their mitigation? And what action should be taken when a precautionary threshold 
is met, and by who? The key point is that scientific uncertainty is not the same as scientific 
ignorance: the precautionary principle does not apply to the latter because the word 
‘uncertainty’ implies there is some base level of understanding.109 The precautionary principle 
then is more than just an abstract concept that is applied once to any given situation. It is instead 
an ongoing process that may operate in the context of conservation as follows: 
1. There is uncertainty over the conservation status of species X. 
2. The precautionary principle mandates action to monitor this species, research to 
determine its status and measures to protect the species to ensure that it does not go 
extinct whilst this is conducted. 
3. Data is collected and the level of uncertainty is reduced.  
4. There are three possible actions. Further protective measures are introduced because 
the evidence suggests species X is endangered, the measures are scaled back because 
the species is shown to be thriving, or further research is undertaken because 
uncertainty over its status remains.  
The principle should be applied with some caution. Moyle argues that in some scenarios 
applying the precautionary principle could have perverse consequences for biodiversity. The 
reason for this is that the rationale behind the principle is to avoid harm above a certain 
threshold, depending on how it is defined. Any potential gains are irrelevant. Moyle uses a case 
study of the Chatham Island black robin in New Zealand to illustrate this. The robin population 
had declined to only seven birds, which were moved to an island reserve where 120,000 trees 
were planted to provide suitable habitat. This was considered insufficient, however, and a 
decision was made to cross-foster the robin with another species, i.e. move the eggs laid by the 
robins to the nest of another species so that the robin would lay a second clutch, thereby 
doubling the robin’s rate of reproduction. The change in strategy was successful, but would not 
have happened had the precautionary principle been applied. As the reserves had proven 
successful in the past the precautionary principle would have demanded that no change in 
                                                          
108 ibid. 
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strategy was made until it could be shown that it would not increase the risk of extinction to the 
robin.110  
In reality, of course, the precautionary principle is rarely the only factor taken into consideration. 
Decisions often constitute some form of cost-benefit analysis,111 and in the case of the robin the 
possibility of doubling the rate of increase in the species outweighed the possible risks. Moyle’s 
central point is that the precautionary principle should be seen as part of broader strategies, for 
example based on adaptability, which allow changes to be made in the light of new knowledge 
and experience.112 This could be achieved if the principle was integrated into the conservation 
measures contained in conservation instruments. As noted above, however, there is no mention 
of the precautionary principle in any of the regional conservation agreements currently in 
operation. Recourse must therefore be made to other sources. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration113 states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
The reference to a ‘precautionary approach’ is not a representation of the process set out above 
but a result of the determination of the United States to not identify it as a principle.114 Neither 
is there a useful definition contained in customary international law. Whilst certain aspects of 
precaution, such as transboundary environmental assessment, are arguably custom,115 its 
various and contended definitions indicate that the principle per se is not customary law. In its 
2010 Pulp Mills judgment, the International Court of Justice only said that a precautionary 
approach might be relevant in the interpretation of the agreement between Argentina and 
Uruguay.116 
Despite the need for a clear and implementable precautionary principle no such concept exists, 
and it is unlikely that one will materialise soon. This does not however detract from the 
                                                          
110 B. Moyle, ‘Making the Precautionary Principle Work for Biodiversity: Avoiding Perverse Outcomes in 
Decision-Making Under Uncertainty’, in R. Cooney and B. Dickson (eds), Biodiversity & the Precautionary 
Principle: Risk and Uncertainty in Conservation and Sustainable Use (Earthscan, 2005), p. 164-166. The 
role of the precautionary principle in conservation is discussed further in chapter 10. 
111 B. Dickson, ‘Fairness and the Costs and Benefits of Precautionary Action’, in Cooney and Dickson (eds), 
ibid. 
112 Moyle, (n 110) p. 170. For further discussion on adaptive management in conservation see chapter 9. 
113 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
114 J. Wiener, ‘Precaution’, in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds), (n 17) p. 601. 
115 See Judge Weeramantry’s Separate Opinion in Gabćíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v Slovakia) (1997) ICJ 
Reports 7, at 111. 
116 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (2006) ICJ Reports 113, para. 164. 
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argument that a link should be made between Appendix I of the Bern Convention, and indeed 
all regional conservation agreements, and the IUCN Red List. The Red List provides the flexibility 
and (relatively) up-to-date information that is difficult to achieve in an international legal 
instrument. Unfortunately, due to the apparent difficulties in reaching political consensus on 
what species should and should not be included in Appendix I,117 this new approach, which takes 
political considerations out of the equation, is unlikely to be adopted. 
 
Conclusions: 
The effectiveness of regional conservation law at protecting plants has been tested in three 
ways: geographic scope, the construction of the conservation instruments, and the extent to 
which these instruments reflect and respond to the weaknesses of designation and listing as 
conservation techniques. In each case the law has been shown to be inadequate. Significant 
areas of the globe are not covered by a regional agreement, either because one does not exist 
or because it is not in force. The instruments also fail to meet the criteria of mandatory 
obligations, obligations regarding national implementation and provision for international 
oversight and enforcement. With regards to the conservation mechanisms, the agreements 
adopt a flawed model of designating protected areas, both in conceptual and practical terms. 
Finally, only the Bern Convention contains anything that approaches a comprehensive list of 
endangered plants, but a considerable number of endangered species have been excluded, and 
those that have been included are not showing any signs of improvement in terms of 
conservation status or population trend. In short, regional conservation law is not effective at 
protecting plants. To address this situation the law must become more flexible. Key reforms 
include direct references to both the IUCN Red List and the precautionary principle in the 
operational part of the instruments’ texts, with provisions mandating a more adaptable, 
information-driven approach to conservation. 
 
 
                                                          
117 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 4) p. 304. 
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IV 
THE PROTECTION OF PLANTS IN THE POLAR REGIONS 
 
Plants at the Poles: 
Unsurprisingly, the flora of the polar regions1 is comparatively poor in terms of diversity 
compared to more temperate zones. Nevertheless, plants grow in these extreme environments. 
It is estimated that there are around 900 vascular plants in the Arctic, 700 species of bryophytes 
and 2000 lichens. Fewer species are thought to exist in Antarctica. Only two flowering species 
have been found, around 120 bryophytes and 200 lichens.2 On the basis of their intrinsic value, 
these plants warrant the same protection as species found elsewhere. As the foundation of all 
life in the polar regions, they have significant ecological value as well.  
International law has adopted distinct approaches to the polar regions. For both regions, 
however, it is the inhospitable nature that makes sustained human habitation challenging, if not 
impossible, and the vulnerability of polar ecosystems that have rendered conventional 
international legal approaches inappropriate.  
 
Plants in the Antarctic Treaty System: 
The Antarctic Treaty System comprises the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,3 its 1991 Environment 
Protocol,4 the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR),5 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,6 the defunct 1988 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)7 and other 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of this chapter the polar regions are as defined by the Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna Working Group Designated Working Area (infra (n 27)), illustrated in the CAFF 2015-2017 Work 
Plan, and in Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty (infra (n 3)). Note that Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (infra (n 5)) extends as far north as the Antarctic Convergence, and 
therefore although the 1991 Environment Protocol (infra (n 4)) also only applies to 60° south, its reference 
to the need to protect associated ecosystems suggests that its application could be extended. See D. 
Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 22-23. 
2 R. Seppelt. ‘Phytogeography of Continental Antarctic Lichens’ (1995) 27 Lichenologist 417-431. 
3 Washington, 1 December 1959, in force 23 June 1961, 402 UNTS 71. 
4 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, in force 14 
January 1998, 30 ILM 1461 (1991). 
5 Canberra, 20 Mary 1980, in force 7 April 1982, 19 ILM 841 (1980).  
6 London, 1 June 1972, in force 11 March 1978, 11 ILM 251 (1972). 
7 Wellington, 2 June 1988, not in force, 27 ILM 868 (1988). 
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non-binding instruments, including Recommendations adopted by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties and Conservation Measures adopted under CCAMLR. The original Antarctic 
Treaty was never intended to be a static instrument. ‘Rather, the potential existed for an 
evolving regime that could cope with a variety of Antarctic management issues which the Treaty 
was unable to deal with or which had not been foreseen at the time of its negotiation’.8 For the 
conservation of flora this has been crucial, as early approaches to protecting the Antarctic 
environment were flawed in respect of plant conservation. 
There are no direct references to the Antarctic environment in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. 
However certain provisions, including the prohibition on nuclear explosions and the disposal of 
radioactive waste in Article V, and Article IX, which allows Consultative Parties to put forward 
measures on, inter alia, conserving the living resources of Antarctica, have an obvious 
environmental element.9 Deliberate measures to protect the Antarctic environment were first 
enacted at the third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting through the 1964 Agreed Measures 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.10 The Agreed Measures reveal a bias in favour 
of animals, a reflection of the comparative lack of knowledge and interest in Antarctic flora. In 
particular, the construction of Article VI(1) of the Agreed Measures limited its application to 
fauna: 
Each Participating Government shall prohibit within the Treaty Area the killing, 
wounding, capturing or molesting of any native mammal or native bird, or any attempt 
at any such act, except in accordance with a permit. 
Significant advances were made in the Environment Protocol, which extends protection to the 
environment within the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty.11 Although this was unsurprising, 
it is unfortunate that the negotiating parties did not instead apply the Protocol to the area 
covered by CCAMLR, which would have included the marine environment up to the Atlantic 
Convergence and been more in line with the ecosystem approach of the Antarctic Treaty 
System.12 This ecosystem approach, driven in part by the fragility and complexity of the Antarctic 
ecosystems,13 is evident in the Protocol’s objective: 
                                                          
8 Rothwell, (n 1) p. 110. 
9 C. Redgwell, ‘The Protection of the Antarctic Environment and the Ecosystem Approach’, in M. Bowman 
and C. Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law, 1996), 
p. 112. 
10 Recommendations III-VIII, available at: http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_meetings_meeting.aspx?lang=e 
(last accessed 01/04/2017). 
11 Article 3(1). 
12 Rothwell, (n 1) p. 142. 
13 B. Boczek, ‘The Protection of the Antarctic Ecosystem: A Study in International Environmental Law’ 
(1983) 13 Ocean Development and International Law 347-425. 
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The Parties commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and hereby designate 
Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.14 
This is enhanced by the Environmental Principles contained in Article 3. What is significant is 
that the negotiating States decided to recognise the intrinsic value of Antarctica in the 
operational part of the instrument, making the Environment Protocol unique in international 
environmental law. This is followed by a list of consequences that States should plan to avoid 
when carrying out activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.15 
The Environment Protocol is a framework instrument, with its provisions being elaborated on in 
a number of Annexes. For the purposes of the current discussion the most relevant of these are 
Annex II (the protection of flora and fauna) and Annex V (protected areas).16 Annex II of the 
Protocol largely mirrors the 1964 Agreed Measures, but places greater emphasis on protecting 
the diversity of flora and invertebrates.17 This is evident in a number of provisions. First, the 
definition of ‘take’ and ‘taking’ in Article 1(g) includes the removal or damage of ‘such quantities 
of native plants that their local distribution or abundance would be significantly affected’. 
Similarly, the conditions on the issuing of permits are now phrased so as to be relevant to plants, 
rather than just animals as was the case in the 1964 Agreed Measures. Further, plants may now 
be included in the list of protected species in Appendix A of the Annex, although no plant species 
is currently included in the Appendix. It should be noted that the objective of permits is to 
minimize, rather than eliminate, harmful interference, which, with regard to plants, is defined 
as ‘significantly damaging concentrations of native terrestrial plants by land aircraft, driving 
vehicles, or walking on them, or by other means’.18 The lack of guidance on what constitutes 
‘significantly damaging’ and a ‘concentration’ of native plants is problematic, but the existence 
of a permitting system means at least some consideration will be given to the harm human 
activity will cause to Antarctica’s flora. Another notable feature of Annex II compared to the 
1964 Agreed Measures is that it has included environmental protection in the list of emergencies 
                                                          
14 Article 2. 
15 Article 3(2). 
16 For a discussion of Annexes I, III and IV see C. Redgwell, ‘Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 
1991 Protocol’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 599-634. Annex VI – Liability 
Arising from Environmental Emergencies – which was adopted a later date, is examined in M. Johnson, 
‘Liability for Environmental Damage in Antarctica: The Adoption of Annex VI to the Antarctic Environment 
Protocol’ (2006-2007) 19 Georgetown International Law Review 33-55. 
17 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) p. 372. 
18 Article 1(h)(v). 
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that would justify derogation from the Annex, and the protection of an important population of 
an endemic plant species would arguably be covered by this.  
Annex V of the Protocol streamlined the previously complicated system of protected areas19 by 
creating two new categories: Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas (ASMAs). Article 3(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of areas that 
should be designated, and this also goes some way in addressing the bias against flora seen in 
the 1964 Agreed Measures. For example, Article 3(2)(d) calls on States to include ‘the type 
locality or only known habitat of any species’ in the ASPA network (emphasis added). An 
important feature of Annex V is the requirement that the proposed area of an ASPA or ASMA 
must be ‘of sufficient size to protect the values for which the special protection or management 
is required’. Redgwell considers this to be a ‘positive development’, as it marks a change in 
emphasis from the need to reduce the interference that designation has on other Antarctic uses 
seen in the 1964 Agreed Measures.20  
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora: 
The international regime operating in the Arctic differs significantly from that of Antarctica. 
There is no general multilateral conservation treaty,21 and international cooperation in 
environmental protection did not take on any meaningful form until the 1990s when it became 
clear that certain environmental issues, particularly the impacts of industrialisation, could not 
be effectively addressed unilaterally.22 In 1991 the Arctic States23 adopted the non-binding Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).24 Like CCAMLR and the Antarctic Environment 
Protocol, the AEPS adopts an ecosystem approach, albeit as part of a wider sustainable 
development paradigm.25 
                                                          
19 Redgwell, (n 16). 
20 ibid, 632. 
21 There is though one species-specific treaty: the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 13 
ILM 13 (1974). See Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 17) p. 351-353.  
22 ibid, p. 354. 
23 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. 
24 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment 
(Rovaniemi, June 1991). See Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, (n 1) 
p. 231-242. 
25 See para. 2.2. of the AEPS. 
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To coordinate AEPS activities the Arctic Council was established in 1996.26 The six Working 
Groups of the Council reflect a much broader environmental agenda than the primarily 
pollution-focussed AEPS. The most relevant of these in the current discussion is the Working 
Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).27 As with other regional 
conservation instruments the primary measures employed by CAFF are species and habitat 
protection. The value of these in terms of the conservation of Arctic flora is questionable 
however. The three species-specific strategies adopted by CAFF relate to birds,28 and although 
over 400 protected areas29 have been created ‘progress across ecosystems and habitats has 
been patchy’.30 In comparison, the non-legally binding framework for marine protected areas 
developed by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group are highly 
relevant to plants. Within the ‘Strengthen Ecological Resilience’ objective of the Framework, for 
example, States are called on to protect: 
Pristine areas that safeguard core ecosystem characteristics and offer long-term 
sustainable conservation that can balance possible impacts from future developments 
in other areas, or have a role as refugias in anticipated changed conditions.31 
This goes further than other ecosystem approaches seen in environmental instruments. First, it 
encourages the protection of important ecosystems to enable the Earth to cope with 
anthropogenic impacts, rather than merely for posterity. Second, it implies the importance of a 
precautionary approach by promoting the protection of sites so that alternative habitats are 
available for species if, for example, their former range is altered by climate change. If this 
approach was adopted more broadly, not only in the AEPS but also other conservation regimes, 
it would be a significant improvement in how plants are protected in international law. 
Unlike other regional arrangements there is a dedicated Flora Group operating within CAFF, 
which ‘promotes, encourages and coordinates the international conservation of Arctic flora, 
                                                          
26 1996 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, 19 September 1996, 35 ILM 1382. 
In addition to the Arctic States France, Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
have observer status, there are also six participants from indigenous tribes and representatives from 
relevant NGOs. 
27 https://www.caff.is/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). The other Working Groups are: Arctic Containments 
Action Programme, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response, Protection of the Marine Arctic Environment and the Sustainable Development Working 
Group. 
28 The ivory gull (Pagophila eburnean), eider ducks (Somateria) and murre (Uria). 
29 In 1996 CAFF created the Circumpolar Protected Areas Network to ensure the full range of Arctic 
habitats and ecosystems were protected. See:  
http://www.caff.is/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=716&Itemid=1118 (last accessed 
01/04/2017). 
30 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 17) p. 355. 
31 PAME, ‘Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas’ (April 2015), Annex IV, p. 33. 
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vegetation, and habitats as well as research activities’.32 The CAFF Flora Group has a broad 
programme of work, part of which is the compilation of national endangered plant lists, in 
accordance with IUCN criteria, to provide a clearer picture on how plant populations are 
changing.33 In addition to this, the Flora Group is participating in the Global Observation 
Research Initiative in Alpine Environments (GLORIA),34 which monitors the impacts of climate 
change on high mountain ecosystems. To date, seven GLORIA sites have been designated in the 
Arctic, and a further four are planned.35 Although neither of these initiatives have any legal 
effect, and will not per se protect plants, they perform an important function. In the short-term 
the scientific data will inform conservation decisions, whether these are taken at regional or 
national levels, and also provide longer-term insights into how the environment of Arctic flora 
is changing as a consequence of climate change. 
 
 An Arctic Treaty? 
An ongoing debate in polar law is the merits, or otherwise, of an Arctic treaty. Watson is a keen 
advocate, arguing that a stronger regional regime is needed to both address the sovereignty 
disputes that have arisen out of the increased accessibility of Arctic resources and to mitigate 
any further environmental impacts.36 Verhaag goes further, and argues that a global rather than 
regional treaty is needed because it is global problems that are affecting the Arctic.37 Jarashow, 
Runnels and Svenson, in contrast, believe that although an Arctic treaty would go some way in 
addressing the environmental problems of the region, it would be unable to reconcile the 
sovereignty disputes over Arctic resources.38 
In my view, an Arctic treaty, whether global or regional in nature, would be of little added value 
either to Arctic flora or the wider Arctic environment. The previous discussions on other regional 
conservation treaties and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity39 suggest that any 
conservation obligations imposed would have little legal effect, and so the situation would be 
                                                          
32 http://www.caff.is/flora-cfg/about-cfg (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
33 http://www.caff.is/flora-cfg/rare-plants (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
34 http://www.gloria.ac.at/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
35 http://www.caff.is/flora-cfg/gloria-sites (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
36 M. Watson, ‘An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute over the Polar Region’ (2009) 14 
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 307-334. 
37 M. Verhaag, ‘It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to Protect the Arctic 
Environment’ (2003) 15 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 555-579.  
38 M. Jarashow, M. Runnels and T. Svenson, ‘UNCLOS and the Arctic: The Path of Least Resistance’ (2007) 
30 Fordham International Law Journal 1587-1652. 
39 Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 (1992). 
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no different than the soft means already at the disposal of the Arctic Council Working Parties. 
Further, unlike Antarctica the Arctic is subject to national jurisdiction, and as all the Arctic States 
are party to a regional instrument, or to the Biodiversity Convention, or to both, an Arctic treaty 
would simply be replicating what States have already agreed to do. The argument that the Arctic 
is unique because of the unusual features of the polar environment is valid, but there has already 
been an adequate response to this through the creation of the Arctic Council. The Council, 
through its administration of the AEPS and the creation of the Working Groups, has 
demonstrated that it has the means and political support to enable scientific research and the 
agreement of guidance to aid in the management of the Arctic environment. Yes, more should 
and could be done to conserve Arctic flora, for example CAFF could develop species strategies 
for key arctic flora, but this criticism is equally true, if not more so, of every other conservation 
instrument that currently exists. 
 
Conclusions: 
The ecosystem approach prevalent in both Arctic and Antarctic environmental regulation has 
provided a framework for the protection of plants in areas where, perhaps understandably, their 
conservation has been overlooked. In Antarctica, prior to the adoption of the 1991 Environment 
Protocol it was only through the ecosystem concept that general protection was afforded to 
plants. More recent developments have, however, redressed this. Plants are now afforded the 
same status as animals in the Antarctic Treaty System, their habitats can be designated as 
protected areas and they may also be listed as protected species.  
In the Arctic, certain aspects of the AEPS are revolutionary in international environmental law. 
PAME’s promotion of protected areas as important refuges for biodiversity, rather than merely 
exhibits of once common ecosystems, represents a much more adaptable body of law than is 
evident in either the Biodiversity Convention or other regional conservation agreements. 
Equally, creation of a dedicated Flora Group within CAFF means that the particular challenges of 
plant conservation in this region are addressed. Both of these features should be adopted more 
broadly in international environmental law. 
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V 
THE PROTECTION OF MARINE AND FRESHWATER PLANTS 
 
Plants in Aquatic Ecosystems: 
Plants are not only important in the terrestrial biosphere. Between five and ten thousand species 
of red algae are believed to exist and a similar number of green algae.1 The algae include, but 
are not limited to, many species of seaweed and, like their terrestrial counterparts, form the 
foundations of their ecosystems.2 Additionally, more complex vascular plants may be found 
growing in all aquatic environments, providing important sources of food and shelter for a range 
of other species, as well as the infrastructure for aquatic habitats.  
This chapter begins by considering global and regional approaches to protecting these plants. 
Particular attention is paid to the conservation of marine biodiversity found in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. Conservation in this arena is particularly challenging as it must be 
reconciled with the seemingly inviolable principle of the freedom of the high seas and States’. 
This constitutes a further expression of State sovereignty that conditions and limits conservation 
action. The chapter concludes by looking at a second key plant biome – wetlands. Here we see 
how some of the issues raised above in relation to global and regional conservation may be 
addressed in such a way as to offer better legal protection for plants. 
 
Global Approaches to Protecting Marine Flora: 
 The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
There is no explicit mention of marine flora in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC).3 This is perhaps not surprising given the historic lack of scientific attention paid to marine 
                                                          
1 The third type of algae – brown algae – are considered to be more closely related to animals than plants, 
and so strictly speaking this chapter does not apply to them. In practice, however, any protection afforded 
to red and green algae will also benefit brown algae in the same area. 
2 T. Walker, Plant Conservation: Why It Matters and How It Works (Timber Press, 2013), p. 22-26. 
3 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 21 
ILM 1261 (1982). As the vast majority of States have ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, it should be 
noted that a few, most notably the United States, have not. Such States may, however, be subject to the 
four Geneva Conventions that preceded the 1982 Convention. See Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the 
Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 21-24. 
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biodiversity, beyond the commercially important fish and mammal species.4 However several of 
the general obligations concerning the marine environment found in Part XII of the Convention 
are relevant. First, there is the duty to ‘protect and preserve’ the marine environment in Article 
192. This is not limited to the marine environment within the control of the State and so applies 
to the high seas as well.5 Of particular importance is Article 194(5): 
The measures taken in accordance with this Part [XII] shall include those necessary to 
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, 
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life. 
That an ecosystem approach, albeit one that was probably not intended by the negotiators,6 is 
taken by the LOSC is welcome, as protecting marine ecosystems will not be possible without 
providing for the protection of marine flora.7 It should be noted, however, that the provision 
only applies to ‘rare or fragile’ ecosystems, and so comparatively abundant and thriving habitats 
will not be covered by the provision. It has been argued that to ignore commonplace species in 
conservation regulation has a negative impact on the conservation of biodiversity as a whole,8 
and arguably the same applies to the marine environment. Whilst true that the general 
obligation in Article 192 has no such qualification, and therefore applies to all marine 
biodiversity, this is a poor substitute for an explicit requirement to preserve either marine 
ecosystems or marine flora. Further, Article 194(4) does not permit any ‘unjustifiable 
interference’ with any lawful activities carried out by other States, and given the importance 
attached to the freedom of the high seas it is unlikely that ships can be excluded from travelling 
through specific areas.9 Further, given the common interest10 the international community has 
in the marine environment ‘it cannot be sustained that a State has a right to engage in a specific 
marine activity simply because it enjoys freedom of the sea, without being ready to consider the 
                                                          
4 G. Carleton Ray, ‘Ecological Diversity in Coastal Zones and Oceans’, in E.O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity 
(National Academy Press, 1988), p. 37. 
5 N. Oral, ‘Protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in areas beyond national jurisdiction: Can 
international law meet the challenge?’, in A. Strati, M. Gavouneli and N. Skourtos (eds), Unresolved Issues 
and New Challenges to the Law of the Sea: Time Before and Time After (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). 
6 D. Freestone, ‘The Conservation of Marine Ecosystems under International Law’, in M. Bowman and C. 
Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, 
1996), p. 103. 
7 D. Freestone and S. Salman, ‘Ocean and Freshwater Resources’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 340. 
8 S. Harrop, ‘Conservation regulation: a backward step for biodiversity?’ (1999) 8 Biodiversity and 
Conservation 679-707. 
9 R. Wolfrum and N. Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 445-480. 
10 Article 136 LOSC explicitly recognises the resources of the deep seabed as the common heritage of 
mankind. Although the same does not apply to the high seas, the Preamble to the Biodiversity Convention 
states that ‘the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind’. 
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different views, if any, of other interested States’. Included in the interests that must be taken 
into account are those relating to protection of the marine environment.11 
Between 2006 and 2015 an Ad Hoc Working Group of the UN considered the issue of biodiversity 
conservation in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ultimately recommending that a new 
implementation agreement to the LOSC be developed.12 It is hoped that this agreement would 
provide for a more coherent approach than is currently possible under the system of numerous 
regimes and organisations whose remit extend into the high seas. As Freestone observes, 
protection is possible through this sector-by-sector approach, but a lack of coordination 
between the different institutions involved can impede progress.13 A new, legally binding, 
agreement could go a long way in addressing the issues identified in global approaches to marine 
conservation. It remains to be seen, however, whether such an agreement would impose the 
necessary constraints on the freedom of the high seas. 
 
 Marine Protection in the Biodiversity Convention: 
In theory, the Biodiversity Convention14 applies equally to both terrestrial and marine life. Article 
2 explicitly includes ‘marine and other aquatic ecosystems’ within its remit. However, even in 
the context of the criticisms that have been levied against the treaty regime as a whole, its 
approach to the conservation of marine biodiversity is particularly weak. Freestone argues that 
there is an inherent bias against marine biodiversity in the Convention, which, although perhaps 
understandable given the comparative lack of understanding of marine ecology, has rendered it 
largely ineffective in relation to marine conservation. ‘In fact the whole approach of the 
Convention – directed as it is to finance and biotechnology issues and arguably, to a concept of 
national ownership of biological resources based on assumptions about endemic species – 
bypasses some of the key issues of marine biodiversity conservation’.15 Scully goes further than 
this, suggesting that the Biodiversity Convention is actually ‘a setback’ for the conservation of 
                                                          
11 T. Scovazzi, ‘Marine Protected Areas on the High Seas: Some Legal and Policy Considerations’ (2004) 19 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1-17, 7. 
12 Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction – 
UN Doc A/69/780*, 3 February 2015. 
13 D. Freestone, ‘Governance of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: An Unfinished Agenda of the 1982 
Convention?’, in J. Barrett and R. Barnes (eds), UNCLOS at 30 and Beyond (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 2015). 
14 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 
(1992). 
15 Freestone, (n 6) p. 91-92. 
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marine biodiversity.16 This is debatable, but it is certainly the case that the Convention was a 
missed opportunity to refocus marine conservation from the short-term interests in ensuring 
the perpetual exploitation of economically important species17 to a more long-term ecosystemic 
approach. 
The Conference of the Parties adopted an elaborated programme of work on marine and coastal 
biodiversity in 2004.18 Its vision illustrates the anthropocentric perception of the value of nature 
held by the international community, in this case driven by the national economic interests in 
the exploitation of the marine world.19 This is balanced to an extent by the explicit incorporation 
of the ecosystem approach into the programme. It is noted that ‘The success of the programme 
of work also relies on scientific research aimed at providing understanding of the functioning of 
the broader ecosystem in terms of its component parts and their connectivity’.20 This goes some 
way in answering Scully’s criticism of the Biodiversity Convention, although the content of a 
Conference of the Parties Decision should not be seen as completely remedying issues with the 
treaty per se. Also important in the programme of work is the recognition of the need to adopt 
a precautionary approach.21 Implementation of the programme is envisaged primarily at the 
national and local levels, but also through regional and global institutions when relevant.22 
Participation from a wide range of stakeholders in the implementation of the programme is 
encouraged.23 
The elaborated programme of work consists of a number of programme elements, one of the 
most pertinent being programme element 2: marine and coastal living resources.24 However in 
this element’s operational objectives a serious flaw in its construction can be identified: 
To promote ecosystem approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
and coastal living resources, including the identification of key variables or interactions, 
for the purpose of assessing and monitoring, first, components of biological diversity; 
                                                          
16 T. Scully, ‘The Protection of the Marine Environment and the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development’, The Law of the Sea: New Worlds, New Discoveries, Proceedings of the 26th Annual 
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, Genoa, 22-25 June 1992, cited in Freestone, ibid, p. 91. 
17 Wolfrum and Matz, (n 9). 
18 Decision VII/5, ‘Marine and coastal biological diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/5, 13 April 2004, 
Annex. 
19 ibid, para. 1. 
20 ibid, para. 4. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid, para. 5. 
23 ibid, para. 6. 
24 The other programme elements are: 1) implementation of integrated marine and coastal area 
management; 2) marine and coastal protected areas; 4) mariculture; 5) invasive species and 6) general 
activities. 
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second, the sustainable use of such components; and, third, ecosystem effects.25 
(emphasis added) 
To succeed in ensuring the effective conservation of marine plants, and marine biodiversity 
generally, any ecosystem effects should first be identified, in accordance with the precautionary 
approach, and then their sustainable use can be more accurately determined. By apparently 
prioritising sustainable use over ecosystem effects, a further reflection of the dominant 
economic interests in international conservation policy, the ability of the Biodiversity 
Convention regime to protect marine flora is undermined. 
As with terrestrial conservation, one of the principal means of protecting the marine 
environment is through protected areas. States are obliged, at least in theory, to consider 
creating marine protected areas within their jurisdiction by Article 8(a) of the treaty. Marine 
protected areas are also addressed in programme element 3 of the elaborated programme of 
work on marine and coastal biodiversity. However, this in no way constitutes a framework, or 
even a proposal for a framework, facilitating the creation of a global network of marine 
protected areas. As with the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the emphasis is primarily on national and 
regional measures that will feed into global objectives.26 More concerning, however, is the 
Contracting Parties’ apparent denial of responsibility for protecting the marine environment 
beyond State jurisdiction. The only suggested activity in operational objective 3.2 is: 
To support any work of the United Nations General Assembly in identifying appropriate 
mechanisms for the future establishment and effective management of marine 
protected areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
It is clear from this statement that the Contracting Parties do not consider the protection of the 
marine environment in areas outside national jurisdiction to fall within the remit of the only 
holistic global conservation instrument. This must inevitably lead to further questions over 
whether the Biodiversity Convention is fit for purpose.27 
Freestone advocates the adoption of a new protocol to the Biodiversity Convention to address 
its inherent weaknesses in relation to marine biodiversity.28 To be effective in this regard such a 
protocol would need to do two things. First, it would have to establish a framework, similar to 
the International Seabed Authority, to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
exploitation of biological resources found in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Second, it would 
                                                          
25 Operational objective 2.1. 
26 Operational objective 3.1. 
27 See chapter 2. 
28 Freestone, (n 6) p. 107. 
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have to clarify the relationship between States’ rights under the law of the sea with the 
environmental objectives of the biodiversity regime. These would overcome the concerns raised 
above about the dominance of the freedom of the high seas and the jurisdictional-focus of the 
Biodiversity Convention. Scovazzi goes further than this and argues that a new treaty for the 
protection of marine areas in the high seas should be negotiated. Key elements of this treaty 
would include a procedure through which important marine areas would be identified on the 
basis of common criteria, including ecological value, and then a set of protective measures that 
would be adopted on a case-by-case basis. He recognises that the convention would only be 
binding on the ships flying the flag of Contracting Parties, but points out that ‘every State is 
already under the obligations arising from customary international law and from the LOSC to 
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, wherever they are located, and to co-operate 
in this regard’.29 Whether this would be sufficient to protect a site from a third-party ship 
determined to exercise its right of innocent passage, particularly if its flag State disputed the 
scientific basis on which the area was designated, is debatable.  
Developments in international law to date, however, suggest that a new instrument is unlikely 
to appear. The emphasis of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention is on non-binding 
initiatives rather than new protocols,30 and as there is near universal participation with the 
biodiversity regime, that a marine protocol has not emerged suggests there is an absence of the 
international consensus required to formulate a new treaty. As such, the primary international 
instrument for the conservation of marine flora will remain the LOSC. Whilst this has some 
advantages, including the ecosystem approach evident in Part XII, the weaknesses outlined 
above suggest that global regulation of the marine environment is unable to afford sufficient 
protection to marine flora. Consequently, notwithstanding the possibility of the negotiation a 
new implementation agreement under the LOSC for biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, 
action is likely to be required at the regional level. 
 
Regional Approaches to the Conservation of Marine Flora: 
UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme was established in 1974 ‘to address the degradation of the 
world’s oceans and coastal areas through the sustainable management and use of the marine 
and coastal environment’.31 There are currently thirteen programmes operating under the remit 
                                                          
29 Scovazzi, (n 11), 17. 
30 S. Harrop and D. Pritchard, ‘A hard instrument goes soft: The implications of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s current trajectory’ (2011) 21 Global Environmental Change 474-480. 
31 http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/about/default.asp (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
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of UNEP,32 and an additional five independent regional seas initiatives.33 The focus of this 
chapter is on the Mediterranean programme34 as it is one of the more comprehensive 
instruments in terms of marine biodiversity protection.35  
Importantly, the 1995 Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity allows for 
the creation of protected areas that are partly or wholly in the high seas. This facilitates the 
protection of migratory species and also, to a certain extent, overcomes the absence of a 
supranational body capable of overseeing the conservation of marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.36 Articles 2(3) and 3(6) of the Protocol facilitate marine protection 
in areas where maritime boundaries are contested in recognition of the fact that whilst 
protective measures should not impact on contentious issues of sovereignty, neither should the 
absence of agreement on maritime boundaries preclude protective action.37 This is one of the 
key strengths this regional regime has over global marine treaties. Articles 2(3) and 3(6) have 
enabled the participating States to move beyond issues of sovereignty and develop a more 
robust conservation regime. In comparison, global regimes, including both the Biodiversity 
Convention and LOSC, are mired in technical debates over the relationships between different 
legal obligations and principles, and little is actually being achieved in the conservation of marine 
biodiversity. 
The 1995 Protocol is intended to ‘protect, preserve and manage’ important natural and cultural 
areas and also threatened and endangered species of flora and fauna.38 The principal means of 
achieving this is through the creation of specially protected areas.39 Article 6 outlines the 
protection measures that States should take in relation to these areas. It is qualified by reference 
to international law, which suggests that the same concerns relating to the priority of the right 
of innocent passage raised above apply. However, in the 1995 Protocol this is balanced by an 
                                                          
32 Of these, the programmes operating in the Caribbean, East Asian Seas, Eastern Africa, Mediterranean, 
North-West Pacific and Western African regions are administered by UNEP. The programmes in the Black 
Sea, North-East Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, ROPME Sea Area, South Asian Seas, South-East Pacific 
and Pacific are administered by other regional bodies. 
33 These cover the Antarctic, Arctic, Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea and North-East Atlantic. 
34 Specifically, the 1995 Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean (Barcelona, 10 June 1995, in force 12 December 1999) to the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona, 16 February 
1976, in force 12 February 1978, 15 ILM 290 (1976). The text of the Protocol is available at: 
http://www.rac-spa.org/protocol. 
35 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 388. 
36 Scovazzi, (n 11). 
37 ibid. 
38 Article 3. 
39 Article 4. 
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explicit reference to the need to regulate the passage of ships through protected areas.40 
Further, Article 6(a) requires States to take measures with the aim of ‘strengthening… the 
application of the other Protocols to the [Mediterranean] Convention and of other relevant 
treaties’. This provides sufficient scope for the Protocol to overcome the issues resulting from 
the general nature of the LOSC environmental provisions, and also the weak obligations of the 
Biodiversity Convention. Finally, the Protocol also adopts both an ecosystem and precautionary 
approach by requiring ‘the regulation and if necessary prohibition of any other activity or act 
likely to cause harm or disturb the species or that might endanger the state of conservation of 
the ecosystems or species’.41  
In addition to the specially protected areas, Contracting Parties are required to produce a list of 
Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance (SPAMIs). Sites may be listed because, 
inter alia, of their importance for conserving biodiversity, because they contain ecosystems 
specific to the Mediterranean or that host endangered species, or because of their inherent 
value.42 The protection afforded to SPAMIs is not as detailed as the provisions concerning 
specially protected areas. However, there is again an indication that a precautionary approach 
should be adopted as States are prohibited from authorising and undertaking ‘any activities that 
might be contrary to the objectives for which the SPAMIs were established’.43 (emphasis added) 
Protection of endangered species is addressed in Part III of the 1995 Protocol, which calls for 
both national and cooperative measures. A general obligation to protect all species of flora and 
fauna is imposed by Article 11(1), and States are also required to compile national lists of 
endangered species.44 With regards to protected plant species, States must:  
regulate, and where appropriate, prohibit all forms of destruction and disturbance, 
including the picking, collecting, cutting, uprooting, possession of, commercial trade in, 
or transport and exhibition for commercial purposes of such species. 
Like the conservation measures in Article 8 of the Biodiversity Convention, this provision is 
qualified by the phrase ‘where appropriate’. However, there is a subtle but important difference 
between the two regimes. Whereas the Biodiversity Convention subjects all conservation action 
to the judgement of a State as to whether it is possible and appropriate, the 1995 Protocol 
mandates a basic level of regulation for all endangered species and only affords discretion over 
whether to impose absolute prohibitions on the exploitation of a species. Although no detail is 
                                                          
40 Article 6(c). 
41 Article 8(h). 
42 Article 8(2). 
43 Article 8(3)(b). 
44 Article 11(2). 
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given on what specific measures this regulation should entail, arguably a failure to impose any 
regulation at all would constitute a violation of the Protocol. 
In addition to the national lists, Annexes II and III to the Protocol list endangered or threatened 
species, and species whose exploitation is regulated. The Contracting Parties are required to 
cooperate in adopting protection measures for the species included in the Annexes. With regard 
to Annex II, ‘the maximum possible protection and recovery’ of the listed species,45 including of 
their habitats is mandated.46 For the species listed in Annex III States, ‘in cooperation with 
competent international organizations’, one of the most important being the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),47 must adopt measures to ensure their 
conservation whilst controlling their exploitation.48 Exemptions to these provisions may only be 
granted for research purposes ‘necessary to ensure the survival of the species or to prevent 
significant damage’. Whilst an exemption to enable research into the conservation of a species 
is sensible, the exemption to avoid ‘significant damage’ affords significant discretion to States 
and could lead to conservation objectives being subordinated to socioeconomic interests. For 
example, does ‘significant damage’ only refer to physical damage to property, or could a State 
invoke this provision if an endangered species is found in a site that had been designated for a 
development considered to be vital to a State’s economic prosperity? 
To summarise, the 1995 Protocol provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of 
marine flora, both in terms of individual species and wider habitats and ecosystems. It provides 
a model that should be adopted on a global scale,49 preferably within the conservation remit of 
the Biodiversity Convention but, failing that, a new conservation instrument. Whilst renewed 
action under the LOSC is welcome, it remains debatable whether the conservation values of 
designated sites would be given appropriate weight in this regime should conflicts with the 
freedom of the high seas, and the rights States enjoy under that freedom, arise. 
 
The Conservation of Flora in Wetlands: 
Wetlands are crucial components of the natural world and constitute some of the most 
important areas for biodiversity, ecosystem services and natural resources. In addition to being 
                                                          
45 Article 12(2). 
46 Article 12(3). 
47 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, Washington, 3 March 
1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 UNTS 243. 
48 Article 12(4). 
49 Scovazzi, (n 11). 
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home to a huge variety of fish, birds, reptiles, invertebrates, mammals and plants, they regulate 
flooding, absorb and utilise sediments, nutrients and toxicants and provide water to around 
three billion people.50 ‘Yet in spite of these vital functions, wetlands in many parts of the world 
have been destroyed at an alarming rate in recent decades by excessive extraction, drainage, 
land reclamation and pollution’.51 The international response to this, largely driven by the 
International Waterfowl Bureau in the 1960s, is the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar)52 – the first, and still the 
only, binding global instrument concerning a specific habitat.53  One of the principal strengths of 
the Convention is its expansive definition of ‘wetland’ in Article 1(1). This includes ‘riparian and 
coastal zones adjacent to the wetlands, and islands or bodies of marine water deeper than six 
metres at low tide lying within the wetlands’.54 Since coming into force the Convention has been 
shown to have been relatively successful in protecting the world’s wetlands.55 Challenges 
remain, however, particularly in addressing climate change56 and alien/invasive species.57  
As with other international conservation instruments, the Ramsar Convention relies on the 
designation of sites as its primary mechanism.58 Article 2(1) calls on States to ‘designate’ suitable 
wetlands for inclusion in the Ramsar network. There are a number of points to note about this 
obligation. First, States may unilaterally decide which sites are to be included. This is in contrast 
to the procedure under Article 11 of the 1972 World Heritage Convention,59 in which States 
propose sites for listing but it is the World Heritage Committee that decides whether or not to 
                                                          
50 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 35) p. 403. 
51 ibid. 
52 Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 1975, 996 UNTS 245. 
53 There are of course other agreements designed to protect different habitats. However, the forest 
conservation instruments are non-binding (see chapter 2) and the instruments concerning the 
conservation of mountains only apply to specific regions. Two such treaties have been established: the 
Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Salzburg, 7 November 1991, in force 6 March 1995, 1917 UNTS 
135 (1992) and the 2003 Framework Convention on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the 
Carpathians (text available at: http://www.carpathianconvention.org/the-convention-17.html). 
54 Article 2(1). More detailed guidance on the different classifications of wetlands under the Ramsar 
Convention can be found in COP Resolution VII.11, ‘Strategic framework and guidelines for the future 
development of the List of Wetlands of International Importance’ (10 May 1999), Appendix A.  
55 G. Castro et al, The Ramsar Convention: Measuring Its Effectiveness for Conserving Wetlands of 
International Importance (World Bank/WWF, 2002), para. 19. 
56 L. de Stefano et al, ‘Defining adaptation measures collaboratively: A participatory approach in the 
Doñana socio-ecological system, Spain’ (2017) 195 Journal of Environmental Management 46-55. 
57 V. Batanjski et al, ‘Critical legal and environmental view on the Ramsar Convention in protection from 
invasive plant species: an example of the Southern Pannonia region’ (2016) 16 International 
Environmental Agreements 833-848. 
58 E. Goodwin, ‘Conservation of Coral Reefs Under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands’ (2006) 9 Journal 
of Wildlife Law and Policy 1-31. 
59 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 1972, 
in force 17 December 1975, 27 UST 37, 11 ILM 1358 (1972).  
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include them in the World Heritage List.60 One possible explanation for this is the greater 
instrumental values wetlands hold compared to the natural and cultural heritage sites that are 
the concern of the World Heritage Convention. These instrumental values are more closely 
aligned to the interests of States,61 particularly in the ecosystem services and natural resources 
that can be exploited in wetlands, and find expression in the assertion of State sovereignty in 
Article 2(3) of the Ramsar Convention. 
More importantly, the obligation in Article 2(1) extends to designation only. There is no 
requirement that notified sites enjoy protected status, or that protected status must follow 
listing.62 There is mixed evidence on whether designation of a Ramsar site alone is enough to 
protect it without additional national safeguards. In Italy, the inclusion of two privately owned 
sites in the Ramsar List created the political momentum necessary to enable their protection at 
the national level, and in New Zealand the presence of a listed wetland on a site implied a 
minimum level of conservation value, which led to it being administered by the Department of 
Conservation rather than the local government. However, in Greece the threats to unprotected 
Ramsar sites are an ongoing issue.63 As was observed in relation to the Biodiversity Convention, 
therefore, the extent to which the Ramsar Convention will be able to protect wetland-flora will 
depend on how well it has been implemented at the national level. 
Turning to the listing criteria, the starting point is Article 2, which calls on States to designate 
‘suitable wetlands’ on the basis of their ‘international significance in terms of ecology, botany, 
zoology, limnology or hydrology’. Although priority is given to wetlands that are important 
habitat for waterfowl, the very broad definition of ‘wetland’ employed by the Convention, and 
the wording of Article 2, means that wetlands may benefit from the Convention regardless of 
the presence of waterfowl. This is an important feature in the context of plant conservation. In 
the previous chapter I demonstrated how the construction of early conservation measures in 
Antarctica excluded the majority of plant species from their application. More detailed guidance 
has been provided by the Ramsar Conference of the Parties64 and there are now nine criteria 
                                                          
60 Article 11. 
61 T. Atherton and T. Atherton, ‘The Power and the Glory: National Sovereignty and the World Heritage 
Convention’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 631-649. 
62 COP Resolution VII.11, (n 54) Annex, para. 41. 
63 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 35) p. 410-411. 
64 COP Resolution VII.11, (n 54) and supplemented by Resolutions VIII.10, ‘Improving implementation of 
the Strategic Framework and Vision for the List of Wetlands of International Importance’ (26 November 
2002), IX.1, ‘Additional scientific and technical guidance for implementing the Ramsar wise use concept’ 
(1 January 2005) and X.20, ‘Biogeographic regionalization in the application of the Strategic Framework 
for the List of Wetlands of International Importance: scientific and technical guidance’ (4 November 2008). 
A consolidated version can be found in Ramsar Secretariat, Handbook 17: Designating Ramsar Sites (4th 
edition, 2010), Annex II. 
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categorised into two groups: sites containing representative, rare or unique wetland types 
(criterion 1), and sites of international importance for conserving biodiversity (criteria 2-9). A 
number of these are either directly or indirectly relevant to plants. Criterion 2, for example is: 
A wetland should be considered internationally important if it supports vulnerable, 
endangered, or critically endangered species or threatened ecological communities. 
For each of these, more details are provided on the considerations States should take into 
account when identifying sites for inclusion in the Ramsar List, and these reveal the strength of 
the Ramsar regime as a means of protecting plants. Taking Criterion 2 as an example, the most 
important point to note is that this refers directly to other conservation mechanisms, namely 
the IUCN Red List, Appendix I of CITES and the Appendices of the Convention on Migratory 
Species.65 States are called on to designate any wetland that supports species listed in these 
instruments as a Ramsar site.66  This illustrates how the regional conservation instruments 
discussed in chapter three should operate as constituent parts of a more cohesive international 
conservation regime. It utilises other sources of information on the conservation status of 
different species, avoiding the resource-intensive, and sometimes repetitive, process of 
gathering scientific data, enabling States to take more concrete action to achieve conservation 
outcomes.67 Further, Criterion 2 prioritises sites that host ecosystems at risk from changing 
conditions, whether the consequence of climate change or other factors. States are encouraged 
not only to protect these sites because they have high conservation value themselves, but also 
because they might be ‘functionally critical to the survival of other (perhaps rarer) communities 
or particular species’.68 This is a further recognition of the interconnectedness of the natural 
world, and enhances the potential of the Ramsar Convention to be a truly comprehensive 
conservation instrument. A common wetland that hosts a common species of waterfowl might 
not per se warrant protection, but could nevertheless fall within the Ramsar listing criteria if, for 
example, that waterfowl is the principal source of food for a rare and endangered bird of prey 
or maintains ecological balance by keeping potentially invasive plant species in check.  
There are two tiers to the protection afforded by the Ramsar Convention, although as noted 
above these fall short of actually applying a protected status to listed sites. Under Article 3(1) 
States must ‘formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the conservation of the 
                                                          
65 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 11 
November 1983, 19 ILM 15 (1980). 
66 Ramsar Secretariat, (n 64) p. 85.  
67 This is a further example of how a resilience thinking approach could be incorporated more broadly into 
international environmental law. Specifically, the sharing of data between actors would allow for a more 
efficient use of limited conservation resources. 
68 Ramsar Secretariat, (n 64), p. 85-86. 
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wetlands included in the List’, and they are under a general obligation ‘as far as possible’ to 
encourage the ‘wise use’ of all wetlands, regardless of whether they are listed, in their territory. 
This raises similar issues to the phrase ‘sustainable use’ found in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and indicates that, like the 1992 Convention, conservation is a means to the end of 
perpetuating use. Here, however, the socio-historic context is very different, as many wetlands 
have been subject to, and indeed owe their existence to, human management over hundreds of 
years. ‘The adoption of a “preservationist” stance would, indeed, make very little sense in this 
context, since the key ecological characteristics of many wetlands (such as the blanket peat bogs 
of upland Britain, which are the product of prehistoric forest clearance) have in fact been 
significantly created for human purposes’.69 Further, there is now extensive guidance on 
identifying wetlands on the basis of their conservation value, and Ramsar has generally proven 
successful at ensuring the conservation of wetlands,70 albeit with regional variation,71 as well as 
encouraging their restoration.72 The same cannot be said of the Biodiversity Convention. 
 
Conclusions: 
In 1988 Carleton Ray highlighted the potential consequences of human ignorance and 
indifference to the vast majority of marine biodiversity: 
The last fallen mahogany would lie perceptibly on the landscape, and the last black rhino 
would be obvious in its loneliness, but a marine species may disappear beneath the 
waves unobserved and the sea would seem to roll on the same as always.73  
So far humanity has been fortunate as any marine species that have disappeared have not had 
a demonstrable impact on the wider global ecosystem. The problem will be when a species that 
is fundamental to the regulation of the Earth’s life-supporting systems vanishes, and as the 
foundations of marine ecosystems it is likely that this species will be a plant. International 
environmental law, however, is incapable of affording adequate protection of marine flora. The 
Biodiversity Convention has renounced any responsibility, and within the LOSC regime it is likely 
that environmental concerns will always be second to the right of innocent passage.  
                                                          
69 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 35) p. 415. 
70 Castro et al, (n 55). 
71 V. Batanjski et al, (n 57). 
72 R. Gardner, ‘Rehabilitating Nature: A Comparative Review of Legal Mechanisms that Encourage Wetland 
Restoration Efforts’ (2003) 52 Catholic University Law Review 573-620. 
73 Carleton Ray, (n 4) p. 45. 
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For marine flora beyond the limits of wetlands, the 1995 Mediterranean Protocol provides a 
template that should be adopted at an international level. Its principal advantages address the 
weaknesses of the global regimes, particularly the greater emphasis on environmental 
considerations in designating and managing protected areas. However, despite its application 
to the high seas, the problem of regulating third party States determined to exercise their right 
of innocent passage remains. It is this issue above all else that must be addressed if marine flora, 
and the wider marine environment, is to be adequately protected. 
The Ramsar Convention, through the provisions on wise use, first seeks to protect and enhance 
the instrumental values of wetlands, developed through centuries of wetland management 
practices, and uses conservation as a means to achieve this end. Nevertheless, it has proven 
reasonably successful at protecting the world’s wetlands, and, as a corollary to this, the flora 
inhabiting those sites as well. Its key strengths lie in its detailed listing criteria, which explicitly 
refer to the IUCN Red List and other sources in international law, making Ramsar one of the 
more responsive treaty regimes.  
Ramsar is by no means perfect, however. Beyond formal guidance on the listing of suitable sites, 
and a ‘hands-off’ approach to international oversight of national implementation measures, the 
regime contains few binding obligations concerning the conservation of either plants or the 
wider natural environment. At the very least, the treaty should be amended so as to require that 
any wetland designated as a Ramsar site by a State is afforded a basic level of protection under 
that State’s domestic law. This would ensure that the Convention is able to deliver actual, rather 
than merely symbolic, protection for both the plants and wider ecosystem found on all sites 
considered worthy of listing under Ramsar.  
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PART 3: LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE DRIVERS OF PLANT DIVERSITY LOSS 
 
VI 
PLANTS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
 
Plants and the Challenges of Climate Change: 
Climate change has been recognised as one of the principal threats to biodiversity, and to plants. 
Based on current climate predictions, as much as a quarter of all species may be committed to 
extinction by 2050.1 Climate change poses unique challenges for plant conservation due to the 
characteristics of plants that reduce their capacity for adaptation. An example is the capability 
of plants to relocate to new habitat when their previous range has become unsuitable because 
of the changing climate.2 Relocation will take generations, and there are no guarantees that a 
plant’s seeds will be transported to a new area away from its parent, or that any new area will 
be ecologically-suitable. Climate change will not only affect individual species, but also the 
composition and viability of all ecosystems and therefore human society as well.3 A dramatic 
drop in species diversity could fundamentally alter the natural world’s resilience and render all 
current discussions of what constitutes ‘sustainable development’ irrelevant.4 
The science of climate change is complex however, and in certain respects plants are responding 
positively to changes in global climatic patterns. A 2016 study revealed that CO2 fertilisation, 
coupled with the longer growing periods made possible by warmer temperatures and increased 
rainfall, is resulting in a ‘greening’ of the Earth.5 There are regional variations, and it is noted 
that climate change is having a significant negative impact on plants in terms of satellite leaf 
area index in South America. ‘This is particularly important owing to the role of the Amazon 
forests in the global carbon cycle’.6 Furthermore, the study does not assess the quality of this 
                                                          
1 C. Thomas et al, ‘Extinction risk from climate change’ (2004) 427 Nature 145-148. 
2 J. Good and D. Millward, Alpine Plants: Ecology for Gardeners (Batsford, 2007), chapter 10. 
3 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 701-704. 
4 R. Peters II, ‘The Effect of Global Climatic Change on Natural Communities’, in E.O. Wilson (ed), 
Biodiversity (National Academy Press, 1988). See also: O. Edenhofer et al (eds), Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014). 
5 Z. Zhu, S. Piao and R. Myneni et al, ‘Greening of the Earth and its drivers’ (2016) Nature Climate Change, 
published online 25 April 2016, DOI: 10.1038/NClimate3004, 3. 
6 ibid. 
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greening in terms of biodiversity. It may be the case that only a few species are capitalising on 
these more favourable conditions, resulting in a net loss of biodiversity even though net plant 
biomass is increasing. It should also be noted that another study found that the impact of CO2 
fertilisation varies depending on the methodology used to measure it, and that other factors 
affected by climate change, such as nutrient and water availability, will also influence vegetation 
growth.7 What is clear is that the impacts of climate change on plants, whilst uncertain, cannot 
be ignored. 
In this chapter I examine plants’ place in climate change debates. First, the suggestion that there 
is a mismatch between biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation in international 
environmental law is considered. It is argued that whilst some advances have been made, 
certain aspects of the law mean that a joined-up approach has yet to be achieved, frustrating its 
ability to protect plants. 
Climate change poses a significant threat to the survival of many species, but particularly in polar 
and mountainous regions. The legal frameworks for conserving plants in the polar regions have 
already been discussed, so in this chapter attention will be on the conservation of mountain 
flora, a third key plant biome. Mountains are particularly challenging arenas for plant 
conservation. In addition to the problems of relocation noted above, the potential scope for 
relocations is restricted by the physical size of the mountain and whether the plants’ pollinators 
can survive at increased altitudes, where water, oxygen and other food supplies may be reduced. 
What is evident from an examination of global mountain instruments is that too much emphasis 
has been placed on the gathering of data about these issues at the expense of actual 
conservation measures, and the usefulness of this data is debatable. 
Examining how international law attempts to protect plants from the impacts of climate change 
is only one aspect of the relationship between plants and the climate however. An increasingly 
significant body of law has evolved in which plants are used to assist in the achievement of the 
global community’s climate change reduction targets.8 Two such mechanisms have been 
developed under the remit of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change:9 Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Both seek to incentivise low and zero carbon projects and activities, but as will be seen, design 
                                                          
7 W. Kolby Smith, S. Reed and C. Cleveland et al, ‘Large divergence of satellite and Earth system model 
estimates of global terrestrial CO2 fertilization’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 306-310. 
8 R. Amos, ‘Reassessing the Role of Plants in Society’ International Journal of Law in Context (forthcoming) 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552317000040.  
9 New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107. 
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flaws reduce their effectiveness and there are significant concerns relating to their broader 
environmental impacts.  
Underpinning this chapter are questions over whether international environmental law is fit for 
purpose, both in terms of plant conservation and environmental protection generally. 
 
Climate Change and the Conservation of Nature – A Mismatch? 
The principal instrument governing international efforts for reducing climate change is the 1992 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This has been supplemented by the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol,10 which imposed mandatory climate change reduction targets on many of 
the world’s developed States, and the 2015 Paris Agreement,11 which broadens the scope of 
reduction efforts to developing States, albeit with significant caveats.12 These instruments focus 
primarily on emission reductions,13 either through reduction targets or capacity building and 
financing of developing States, rather than specific measures intended to protect plants and the 
rest of the natural world from the impacts of climate change.14 This is significant as the 
challenges of biodiversity loss and climate change are considered to be interconnected, and 
there is an ongoing debate whether biodiversity and climate change policies are sufficiently 
integrated at the international level to allow for the effective fulfilment of both.15 Trouwborst 
argues that there is a ‘mismatch’ between the two issues, as ‘climate change is now placing 
demands on international conservation law which are fundamentally different from, and more 
severe than, the demands for which most conservation treaties were originally intended’.16 This 
is a view shared by McNeely. In his assessment of a number of major multilateral environmental 
agreements, he notes that although steps have been taken under each to address the impacts 
of climate change in the context of their individual remits, a coherent cross-cutting strategy to 
                                                          
10 Kyoto, 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
11 FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, in force 4 November 2016. 
12 For example, Article 4(1) of the Paris Agreement notes that peaking of emission levels will take longer 
for developing States. 
13 Although Article 7 of the Paris Agreement also recognised adaptation as a goal of the international 
climate change regime. 
14 Although such measures could of course form part of the broader adaption strategies outlined in Article 
7 of the Paris Agreement. 
15 D.A. Farber, ‘Separated at Birth? Addressing the Twin Crises of Biodiversity and Climate Change’ (2015) 
42 Ecology Law Quarterly 841-888. 
16 A. Trouwborst, ‘International Nature Conservation Law and the Adaptation of Biodiversity to Climate 
Change: a Mismatch?’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 419-442. See also D. Hodas, ‘Biodiversity 
and Climate Change Laws: A Failure to Communicate?’, in M. Jeffery, J. Firestone and K. Bubna-Litic (eds), 
Biodiversity, Conservation, Law + Livelihoods: Bridging the North-South Divide (IUCN Academy of 
Environmental Law / Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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deal with the effects of climate change has yet to emerge. Instead we ‘continue to stumble along 
with a patchwork of uncoordinated conventions, protocols, and agreements so weak that 
significant climate change will inevitably have major negative impacts on human well-being as 
well as terrestrial, aquatic, and avian life’.17 
Trouwborst’s reason for suggesting there is this mismatch is the inability of international 
conservation law to facilitate adaptation to climate change by the natural world, defined as 
‘both promoting resilience to change (in other words, reducing vulnerability to change) and 
accommodation of change’.18 The 1972 World Heritage Convention19 is an illustration of this. 
Despite climate change being recognised as a major threat to much of the world’s heritage, the 
Convention is largely powerless to facilitate adaptation ‘for the plain reason that the Convention 
is, more than anything, devoted to keeping things as they are’.20 In terms of specific adaptation 
policy goals, Trouwborst believes that conservation law must instead ‘(i) promote the dispersal 
of species; (ii) increase available habitat; and (iii) reduce pressures not linked to climate 
change’.21 To achieve this, he advocates, for example, redesigning protected areas so that they 
facilitate climate-induced migrations by running along north-south axis, or from low to high 
elevations.22 Whilst sound in theory, however, in practice there are significant problems with 
this approach. Particularly relevant to the current discussion is that natural obstacles, such as 
oceans or the top of the mountain, will eventually halt any migration, regardless of whether this 
migration is aided by protected areas. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity23 is another example of a conservation instrument that 
is not equipped to deal with climate change issues. Although, as I discuss below, there have been 
several COP Decisions that have addressed various aspects of the climate change challenge, 
these fail to compensate for the ‘general and heavily qualified’ obligations in the operational 
part of the treaty.24 The weakness of the Biodiversity Convention in this regard is further 
compounded by the lack of direct reference to the need to ensure and enhance the adaptability 
of nature to climate change.25 
                                                          
17 J. McNeely, ‘Applying the Diversity of International Conventions to Address the Challenges of Climate 
Change’ (2008) 17 Michigan State Journal of International Law 123-137, 137. 
18 Trouwborst, (n 16) 427. 
19 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 1972, in 
force 17 December 1975, 27 UST 37, 11 ILM 1358 (1972). 
20 Trouwborst, (n 16) 433. 
21 ibid, 428. 
22 ibid, 428-429. 
23 Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 (1992). 
24 Trouwborst, (n 16) 437. 
25 ibid. 
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Morgera takes the opposite view to Trouwborst and McNeely, arguing that ‘It has become 
increasingly inaccurate to refer to a “mismatch” between biodiversity law and climate change 
law’ due to the outcomes of the Biodiversity Convention COP-10 in 2010.26 First, Morgera points 
to the COP’s Decision on Biodiversity and Climate Change,27 which ‘aims to inject a more 
environmentally holistic and people-centred approach into state practice in tackling climate 
change’.28 Importantly, and in contrast to climate change instruments, there is an explicit 
recognition in the Decision that loss of and damage to biodiversity is a consequence of climate 
change.29 Included in the Decision is a moratorium on geoengineering, i.e. any process that seeks 
to artificially alter climatic conditions, due to the uncertainty surrounding the potential impacts 
of such activities on biodiversity.30 In other words, a precautionary approach is being adopted in 
climate change mitigation for purposes of biodiversity protection. At the same time, climate 
change mitigation efforts are not being totally restricted, as the moratorium includes exceptions 
for both carbon capture and storage31 and research conducted in accordance with Article 3 of 
the Convention.  
A further argument put forward by Morgera is the mainstreaming of climate change issues into 
the Biodiversity Convention’s Work Programmes following COP-10. For example, Decision X/30 
recognises the range of impacts climate change will have on mountain biodiversity, and goes 
some way to addressing the weaknesses of international law’s approach to protecting mountain 
flora discussed below. Not only does it encourage greater consideration of climate change 
impacts in mountain conservation planning, but also recognises that climate change reduction 
actions, such as the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure, can also impact on 
mountain biodiversity. 
It is true that COP-10 represents progress towards the effective integration of international 
climate change and biodiversity policies. However, there are a number of flaws in Morgera’s 
arguments that lead to the conclusion that a mismatch between the two areas still exists. For 
example, although there is an exception for carbon capture and storage to the moratorium on 
geoengineering, this exception is expressly limited to carbon capture from fossil fuels. It may 
therefore be inferred that bioenergy carbon capture and storage is not permitted under the 
                                                          
26 E. Morgera, ‘Far away, so close: A Legal analysis of the increasing interactions between the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and climate change law’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 85-115, 85. 
27 Decision X/33. ‘Biodiversity and climate change’, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33, 29 October 2010. 
28 Morgera, (n 26), 95. 
29 Decision X/33, (n 27) para. 2. 
30 ibid, para. 8(w). 
31 A footnote to para. 8(w) explicitly excludes carbon capture and storage from fossil fuels from the 
moratorium. 
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Decision on Biodiversity and Climate Change. This is problematic because carbon capture from 
biofuels has been recognised as essential if the international community is to meet its 2°C 
climate change target.32 Proponents of this technology could rely on Article 22(1) of the 
Biodiversity Convention, which states that the Convention will not affect the rights and 
obligations of States arising from other international agreements. However, despite its 
importance, neither the UNFCCC nor the 2015 Paris Agreement explicitly mention bioenergy 
carbon capture and storage, and so it is difficult to say that these instruments contain an 
obligation to employ this technology. Furthermore, Article 22(1) goes on to say that the 
Biodiversity Convention takes priority ‘where the exercise of those rights and obligations would 
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity’. That the moratorium has been imposed 
suggests that such a threat is considered to exist. Regardless, there is clearly a mismatch 
between biodiversity policy on geoengineering, specifically carbon capture from biofuels, and 
climate change mitigation methods. This could simply be a consequence of poor drafting and a 
future COP of either regime will clarify the position on this potentially crucial technology. In the 
meantime, however, the Biodiversity Convention does not endorse an important component of 
climate change mitigation strategies and so a mismatch exists.33 
Additionally, Morgera herself has acknowledged that there are limits on how far cooperation 
between the biodiversity and climate change regimes can go due to a reluctance on the part of 
some States to conflate the two issues. Consequently, the Decision on Biodiversity and Climate 
Change only called for the development of joint activities between the two regimes,34 rather 
than the more ambitious joint programme of work that had initially been proposed.35 
Finally, the lack of progress towards achieving the majority of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets show 
that whatever the potential may have been for COP-10 to overcome some of the inconsistencies 
between biodiversity and climate change policies, since that meeting integration between the 
two remains poor. Of particular relevance is Target 15. According to the Fourth Global 
Biodiversity Outlook, no progress has been made towards enhancing ecosystem resilience, and 
although some progress has been made in restoring degraded ecosystems, the 15% target is 
unlikely to be met by 2020.36 
                                                          
32 Edenhofer et al (eds), (n 4) 10. 
33 On the current approach to the international regulation of geoengineering, and potential ways forward, 
see C. Redgwell, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: Technological Solutions to Mitigation – Failure or 
Continuing Carbon Addiction?’ (2011) 2 Carbon & Climate Law Review 178-189. 
34 Decision X/33, (n 27) para. 13. 
35 Morgera, (n 26). 
36 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Montreal, 2014), p. 
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The Conservation of Mountain Flora: 
The conservation of mountain flora raises several unique practical and legal challenges. It has 
been on the agenda in international environmental fora for several decades, with scientific 
communities recognising the importance of mountain ecosystems long before the 1992 Rio 
Conference.37 International cooperation is a common feature of mountain-related instruments, 
often as a substitute for more specific obligations on States. 
The impacts of climate change on mountains have gradually been recognised in international 
documents. For example, the World Summit on Sustainable Development’s Plan of 
Implementation notes that ‘[Mountain ecosystems] are particularly fragile and vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change and need specific protection’.38 As Sands points out, however, 
‘The WSSD Plan of Implementation is long on general commitments and aspiration, but short on 
specific actions to be taken’,39 and this is equally true of the section on mountain biodiversity. 
Six areas for action are identified but these are expressed in very general terms and, like the 
Summit as a whole, focus on the social equity element of sustainable development.40  
A more detailed framework for action was provided ten years earlier in Agenda 21, Chapter 13 
of which concerns the sustainable development of mountains. This contains two Programme 
Areas, the most important for the current discussion being Programme Area A: Generating and 
strengthening knowledge about the ecology and sustainable development of mountain 
ecosystems.41 As the title suggests, the focus of this Programme Area is on collecting scientific 
information. The objectives of the Programme Area consequently include the conducting of 
surveys on the constituent elements of mountain ecosystems, the generation of databases to 
aid in the assessment of environmental impacts of activities on mountain ecosystems, to 
improve ecological awareness of agricultural and conservation practices and to improve regional 
coordination efforts in mountain conservation.42 The data that is made available in pursuit of 
these objectives will undoubtedly have its uses, and some of the activities encouraged by the 
Programme Area, such as facilitating the sharing of best environmental practices between local 
                                                          
37 B. Messerli, ‘Global Change and the World’s Mountains: Where Are We Coming From, and Where Are 
We Going To?’ (2012) 32 Mountain Research and Development s55-s63. 
38 A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002, para. 42. 
39 P. Sands and J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 48. 
40 ibid. 
41 Programme Area B is dedicated to promoting integrated watershed development and alternative 
livelihood opportunities. 
42 Para. 13.5. 
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communities,43 have the potential to address some of the more direct threats to plants, such as 
overgrazing. However, given the immediacy of the threats facing mountain ecosystems, the 
added value of yet more scientific data at the expense of positive conservation actions is 
debatable. Although Chapter 13 recognises that ‘Mountains are the areas most sensitive to all 
climatic changes in the atmosphere’,44 nothing in the Chapter directly addresses the impacts 
climate change is having on mountain ecosystems, or even about gathering data about those 
impacts. Further, the amount of data now being produced from multiple sources ‘has increased 
to a level that is no longer manageable’.45 
Despite the attention that mountain biodiversity had received, the Biodiversity Convention did 
not develop a Programme of Work on Mountain Biodiversity until 2004.46 Whilst the collection 
of scientific data has its place in the Programme, it also sets out a number of other direct actions 
for conservation,47 including: 
Monitor and exchange information on the impacts of global climate change on 
mountain biological diversity, and identify and implement ways and means to reduce 
the negative impacts.48 
Other actions called for in the Programme of Work, although not explicitly linked to the issue, 
will nevertheless require some consideration of how certain activities will contribute to climate 
change. For example, paragraph 1.1.1. encourages States to ‘Reduce the impacts of adverse 
land-use practices and changes in urban, forest, inland waters and agricultural areas in mountain 
ecosystems’, and 1.1.3. calls on States to ‘Prevent or mitigate the negative impacts of economic 
development, infrastructure projects and other human-induced disturbances on mountain 
biological diversity’. Importantly, and in contrast to other instruments examined in this work, 
the fundamental role of plants in supporting mountain ecosystems is also recognised: 
Soil retention and stability are closely connected with the extent of above-ground and 
below-ground vegetation, both essential to ecosystem resilience after disturbance. The 
high plant functional diversity of mountain ecosystems may also add to their resiliency 
and, should extreme disturbances occur, often provides effective barriers to high-
energy events such as rock falls and avalanches. It may also reduce extensive damage 
levels at lower elevations.49 
                                                          
43 Para. 13.6(b). 
44 Para. 13.4. 
45 Messerli, (n 38), s61. 
46 Decision VII/27, ‘Mountain biological diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/27, 13 April 2004, Annex. 
47 Programme Element 1. 
48 Goal 1.1.5. 
49 Annex, para. 3. 
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This is reflected in a further direct conservation action, which encourages States to ‘maintain 
and/or enhance soil stability and ecosystem integrity by way of a diverse and natural vegetation 
cover that will also promote soil biodiversity function’.50 The Programme of Work on Mountain 
Biodiversity therefore represents a step forward in international efforts to protect mountain 
flora from a range of pressures, including climate change. It moves beyond simply collecting data 
and attempts to deal with, in a more explicit manner than the actual Convention, some of the 
drivers of mountain biodiversity loss. The overall objective of the Work Programme was a 
significant reduction in the loss of mountain biodiversity by 2010. However, despite the status 
of mountain biodiversity not being specifically addressed, the Third Global Biodiversity Outlook, 
published in 2010, makes it clear that this target was not met. In the summary of the (lack of) 
progress towards the 2010 subsidiary biodiversity targets51 it was noted that for Goal 7.152 
‘limited action’ had been taken to enhance the resilience of biodiversity,53 which no doubt 
contributed to the failure of Goal 5.1,54 as a number of more fragile ecosystems were found to 
have declined.55 
The response of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention to this failure was Decision X/30 on 
Mountain Biological Diversity.56 In comparison to earlier instruments, Decision X/30 repeatedly 
emphasises the need to protect mountain biodiversity from the effects of climate change.57 A 
further important development was the recognition that mountains have a role to play in 
climate change mitigation. Paragraph 4 invites States to ‘safeguard and restore mountain 
biological diversity and related ecosystem services, given their potential to contribute to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation’, and paragraph 5(b) calls on States to ‘enhance the role of 
mountains in providing important ecosystem services such as natural carbon and water 
regulation’. This more rounded approach supports Morgera’s proposition that climate change 
and biodiversity policies are being increasingly integrated, although these broad (non-binding) 
statements fall short of a coherent and detailed policy. 
With regards to the means of implementation, the focus of Decision X/30, as with the 
Programme of Work on Mountain Biodiversity, is on national action and regional cooperation. 
                                                          
50 ibid, Goal 1.1.2. 
51 Decision VI/26, ‘Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, 2002, 
p. 317. 
52 Maintain and enhance resilience of the components of biodiversity to adapt to climate change. 
53 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (Montreal, 2010), p. 
19. 
54 Rate of loss and degradation of natural habitats decreased. 
55 Secretariat to the Convention, (n 54) p. 18. 
56 Decision X/30, ‘Mountain Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/30, 29 October 2010. 
57 See para. 2(c), 5, 5(a), and 5(c). 
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This is further evidence of the dominant sovereign interests of States that underpin international 
discussions on mountain conservation, although unlike the Decision containing the Programme 
of Work,58 Decision X/30 is free from an explicit recognition of State sovereignty. This emphasis 
on national action has achieved similar results as other activities under the Biodiversity 
Convention, namely few positive conservation outcomes. In the summary of Aichi Target 10, the 
Fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook notes that ‘insufficient information was available’ to be able 
to assess whether anthropogenic pressures on mountain ecosystems, including climate change, 
had been reduced. Other Aichi Targets, however, suggest that they have not. One element of 
Target 5 is for the degradation and fragmentation of habitats to be significantly reduced by 2020, 
but the Fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook indicates that habitats are becoming increasingly 
fragmented and degraded.59  
The specific conclusion that there is insufficient information on mountain ecosystems is more 
concerning than this general trend in two respects. First, it means that the principal global 
conservation regime does not know the status of one of the most vulnerable ecosystems. How 
can more specific conservation actions be developed without this basic knowledge? More 
worryingly, it was noted above that much of the focus of international mountain conservation 
efforts has, in fact, been on gathering data. That there was insufficient information for a proper 
assessment of the state of mountain ecosystems suggests that either this data has been 
mishandled in attempting to conduct that assessment, or, worse, that it is of limited practical 
use. With mountain ecosystems continuing to decline as pressures from climate change 
increase, we cannot afford to spend another three decades collecting data. 
To summarise, the regimes in place to conserve mountain flora contain major weaknesses that 
undermine the law’s ability to protect plants. Despite decades of data-gathering, there appears 
to be no clear picture on the state of the world’s mountain biodiversity. What is needed, 
therefore, is a single authority responsible for collating and disseminating this information in a 
clear and concise way so as to better inform any conservation strategies, a proposal that is also 
advanced by Messerli.60 Additionally, a fundamental rethink of traditional conservation 
methods, particularly protected areas, is needed. Like conservation law, be this national, 
regional or international conservation law, protected areas remain linked to a historic 
preoccupation with ‘preservation’, and are simply not designed to facilitate the adaptation and 
migration of the natural world. However, as noted above, merely redesigning protected areas 
                                                          
58 Decision VII/27, (n 47) para. 2. 
59 Secretariat to the Convention, (n 37) p. 50. 
60 Messerli, (n 38). 
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so that they facilitate climate-induced migrations will not address the deeper systemic 
challenges of climate change. 
 
The UNFCCC’s REDD Programme: 
The preceding discussion has looked at how international environmental law attempts to reduce 
the impacts of climate change on plants. This, however, is only one aspect of the relationship 
between plants and international climate change law. Plants are also central to policies and 
mechanisms designed to mitigate climate change as part of climate change solutions.61 
One such mechanism is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which 
was initially proposed by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica at the UNFCCC COP-11 in 2005.62 In 
subsequent COPs the scope of REDD was expanded, and in 2009 Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks, or REDD+,63 was given official recognition.64  
The rationale behind REDD is relatively straightforward. It is intended to make forests more 
valuable to the States in which they are located if they are left intact rather than felled for timber 
and other land-uses. REDD is therefore based on an instrumental understanding of the value of 
forests, both in terms of their utility as carbon sinks but also a commodity value as the focal 
point for investment. Whilst sound in theory, however, this added instrumental value creates 
pressure for the conversion of forests specifically for carbon storage, which is not necessarily 
beneficial for biodiversity. A number of issues must therefore be addressed if REDD is to be able 
to both play a significant role in combatting climate change and provide adequate protection of 
forests and their constituent species. 
First are issues of practical implementation, which fall into three categories: establishing 
baselines, monitoring and forest management.65 With regards to the necessary scientific basis 
of REDD, it has proven challenging to establish baselines for deforestation. Efforts to identify 
                                                          
61 For example, through bioenergy carbon capture and storage. See R. Amos, ‘Bioenergy Carbon Capture 
and Storage in Global Climate Policy: Examining the Issues’ (2016) 10 Carbon & Climate Law Review 187-
193. 
62 FCCC/CP/2005/Misc.1. Originally the mechanism was RED – degradation was added in 2007, Decision 
2/CP.13, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.  
63 For ease of reading, I have used the acronym REDD in the remainder of this chapter to refer to both 
REDD and REDD+. 
64 A. Wiersama, ‘Climate Change, Forests, and International Law: REDD’s Descent into Irrelevance’ (2014) 
47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1-66.  
65 L. Godden et al, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD): Implementation Issues’ (2010) 36 Monash University Law Review 139-172. 
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pre-industrial human forest levels have been frustrated by a lack of data and that human 
relationships with forests are complex. In many areas it has been a case of modification rather 
than wholescale deforestation, and other areas have undergone reforestation with varying 
degrees of success.66  
Related to the difficulties of establishing baselines are the challenges to monitoring carbon 
stocks: 
From a technical perspective there are two broad challenges. The first is measuring the 
change in forest carbon stocks associated with the conversion of forest to other land 
uses… afforestation or natural forest regeneration… The second challenge lies in 
assessing changes in forest carbon stocks in areas of forest that remain forested but are 
potentially subject to degradation.67  
The only way to accurately monitor this is with on-the-ground surveys of the quality of forests 
and the diversity of species. These require considerable technical and financial resources, 
although are becoming increasingly viable.68 
Forest management is a particularly contentious issue, as it involves questions of property rights 
over both the forests themselves and the carbon stored in them, as well as the impacts a REDD 
project will have on any community that relies on the forest for its livelihood.69 A key point is 
that in many States exactly who ‘owns’ a forest will be difficult to establish. It may be the case 
that a forest belongs to the State, but an indigenous community has the right to reside in it and 
holds the rights over the resources in that forest. Alternatively, forests might be privately owned 
but the State could hold the rights to the carbon stocks. If REDD is to be successfully 
implemented, establishing exactly who has what rights is critical, as it is this that will determine 
who should be credited for any emission reductions – the State or the project developer – and 
who should receive payment for those reductions.  
There is also a need to ensure that REDD supports biodiversity conservation. The reason for this 
is twofold. First, in the absence of a robust forest conservation regime ‘the potential for REDD 
to secure biodiversity conservation represents a critical opportunity to make progress where 
                                                          
66 ibid. 
67 Godden et al, (n 66) 153. 
68 S. Goetz et al, ‘Measurement and monitoring needs, capabilities and potential for addressing reduced 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation under REDD+’ (2015) 10 Environmental Research 
Letters 123001. 
69 W. Nartey, ‘A REDD Solution to a Green Problem: Using REDD Plus to Address Deforestation in Ghana 
through Benefit Sharing and Community Self-Empowerment’ (2014) 22 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 80-102. 
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prior instruments have floundered’.70 Second, maximising the potential of forests to act as 
carbon sinks does not necessarily mean that biodiversity will also be protected. Different species 
store different level of carbon,71 and REDD could incentivise the mass planting of a single species 
that absorbs the most carbon. Further, as Hinsley et al point out, not all threats to forest 
biodiversity will be detected through REDD’s current principal indicators of tree cover and 
carbon storage.72 
The Contracting Parties to the UNFCCC have demonstrated an awareness of the risks REDD 
potentially poses to forest biodiversity. At the 2010 COP-16 in Cancun they adopted safeguards 
to be incorporated into any REDD project. These include: 
That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological 
diversity, ensuring that the actions [taken in pursuit of REDD] are not used for the 
conversion of forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protection and 
conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other 
social and environmental benefits.73 
Whilst an important recognition of the potential risks posed by REDD to forest biodiversity, the 
practical value of this safeguard has been challenged. Saveresi, for example, questions whether 
it will be adequate to ensure biodiversity concerns are properly taken into account without an 
overarching supranational body – be this a single COP or a more formal joint body between the 
UNFCCC and Biodiversity Convention – to facilitate greater levels of cooperation between the 
different international entities responsible for different aspects of forest conservation.74 Long 
believes something much more radical than a mere safeguard is required to ensure that REDD 
is, at the very least, ecologically benign. He proposes a system in which REDD projects that meet 
certain criteria, such as the use of a diverse range of species in reforestation programmes, are 
classified as ‘biodiversity-enhancing projects’ and become eligible for additional financial 
support.75 
                                                          
70 A. Long, ‘Taking Adaptation Value Seriously: Designing REDD to Protect Biodiversity’ (2009) 3 Carbon 
and Climate Law Review 314-323, 319. 
71 A. Hinsley, A. Entwistle and D. Pio, ‘Does the long-term success of REDD+ also depend on biodiversity?’ 
(2015) 49 Oryx 216-221. 
72 ibid, 218. 
73 Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Appendix I, para. 2(e). Other safeguards relate to the 
protection of indigenous peoples and ensuring public participation in REDD activities. Further guidance 
on the implementation of the Cancun safeguards has been provided in Decision 12/CP.17, 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2; 12/CP.19, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1; and 17/CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.3. 
74 A. Saveresi, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of REDD’ (2012) 12 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 102-113. 
75 Long, (n 71) 322. 
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In addition to extra finance, Long proposes that these biodiversity-enhancing projects should be 
awarded additional credits under a market-based REDD scheme, which rewards project hosts 
for biodiversity-beneficial activities and also incentivises investment in biodiversity-enhancing 
activities. He argues that ‘the income generated through [biodiversity-enhancing] REDD credits 
would directly support adaptation and, accordingly, may decrease the need for voluntary or 
[Official Development Assistance] adaptation funding. Without the incentives envisaged in this 
proposal, REDD is unlikely to realize these benefits’.76 
Long’s proposals address the concern that REDD could lead to a further decline in forest 
biodiversity due to carbon storage being prioritised over conservation, and they also create new 
funding opportunities for conservation projects. However, they also share some of the 
implementation concerns noted above. Baselines would have to be established so that any 
improvements in a forest’s biodiversity could be accurately measured, and there would need to 
be ongoing monitoring to ensure that steps taken to secure additional funding were not 
abandoned once payment had been received. Long also envisages significant administrative 
infrastructure to support his proposals, with an expert panel being responsible for determining 
whether a project qualifies as ‘biodiversity enhancing’ and an Executive Board to provide 
oversight.77 This adds a further layer to an already complex international climate change 
bureaucracy, and would require significant levels of additional funding.  
The broader remit of REDD enables it to (potentially) address some of the other drivers of forest 
biodiversity loss, including hunting,78 forest fires79 and poverty.80 Further, it represents an 
opportunity to integrate the twin goals of climate change policy: adaptation and mitigation. 
However, this has made it increasingly difficult to implement. A report on the REDD programme 
was published in 201481 and its key findings with regards to the programme’s effectiveness were 
mixed. Notable progress was observed in relation to the programme’s outputs, for example on 
forest monitoring, reporting and verification and stakeholder involvement. The programme was 
also linked with increased awareness of forest conservation, and with the facilitation of forest-
dependent communities in having greater access to decision-making processes. However, the 
                                                          
76 ibid, 323. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Hinsley, Entwistle and Pio, (n 72). 
79 A. Hoover, ‘Using REDD to Promote Biodiversity-Sensitive Forest Fire Management Schemes’ (2009-
2010) 10 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 34-53. 
80 C. Hett et al, Carbon Pools and Poverty Peaks in Lao PDR’ (2012) 32 Mountain Research and 
Development 390-399. 
81 UN-REDD Programme, ‘External Evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing 
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level of resources needed to make developing States ‘REDD+ ready’ had been seriously 
underestimated, and no State reviewed by the report had made satisfactory progress in all areas 
of the REDD programme. Financial incentives had clearly not had the desired impact in terms of 
changing national behaviour,82 a point that is reinforced by the Fourth Global Biodiversity 
Outlook’s conclusions on deforestation.83 
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism: 
A second mechanism through which plants can play a role in combatting climate change is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a market-based mechanism designed to assist 
developed States in achieving their emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by 
financing carbon reduction projects in developing States.84 Where emission reductions that are 
in addition to what would have been achieved anyway are attributed to a project, the investors 
in that project are awarded Certified Emission Reduction credits (CERs), each equivalent to one 
tonne of carbon dioxide. These may be bought and sold as necessary by States when meeting 
their Kyoto Protocol obligations.85 As such, it is perhaps more accurately described as an 
emissions offsetting system, rather than an emissions reduction system, as it allows developed 
States to continue emitting greenhouse gases through the financing of carbon-reduction 
technologies in developing States.86 It also facilitates technology transfer, with investments in 
developing States being targeted towards new, high-tech low-carbon technologies.87 
There are a number of aspects to the operation of the CDM that are relevant to plants. The first 
relates to whether or not deforestation, reforestation and afforestation, i.e. the activities 
covered by REDD, should be considered eligible projects under the CDM.88 Resistance to 
including such activities within the CDM is primarily founded on the difficulty in determining 
whether any emissions reductions would be additional to a ‘business as usual’ policy.89 Further 
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84 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
85 For the rules and regulations of the CDM see Decision 3/CMP.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1.  
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grounds for opposing the inclusion of forestry and other carbon sink activities are that there are 
no guarantees that the emission reductions would be permanent.90 Future changes in national 
policy could see previously protected forests being felled and the stored carbon emitted. A 
compromise has been reached in the CDM, with reforestation and afforestation being accepted, 
but not deforestation. This is a practical solution to the problem, as it is easier to determine 
whether positive action, i.e. the planting and restoration of forests, was only possible with CDM 
financing than it is passive action, i.e. simply not cutting down trees, although the problem of 
potential re-emission remains.  
Forests are just one way in which plants can form part of a CDM project and other project-types, 
for example relating to biofuels, are common.91 Biofuels are not unproblematic however, 
particularly in the broader context of global climate ambitions, as I have explored elsewhere.92 
The question of whether any emissions reductions are additional93 to what would otherwise 
have been achieved in the absence of the CDM is at the heart of the environmental integrity of 
the Mechanism. Difficulties arise because it is based on hypothetical scenarios; project 
developers must predict what the emission reductions would be if the project did not go ahead, 
which inevitably involves a degree of (educated) guesswork. In addition to these practical 
difficulties, this approach also carries the risk of project developers exaggerating what the level 
of emissions would be to maximise the CERs from the project.94 Evidence shows that this 
overestimation, whether the result of intentional inflation or inaccurate modelling, is common,95 
suggesting that there are flaws in the design of the CDM that prevent it from operating 
efficiently. The way the CDM operates also creates a perverse incentive for governments to 
avoid regulating greenhouse gas emitters. Leaving it to the CDM to provide the funds for 
operators to move towards low-carbon technologies frees governments from imposing costly 
and burdensome command and control regulations on industries and creates new tax revenues 
from taxes on CERs.96 Similarly, operators have found it more cost-effective to continue emitting 
harmful gases than unilaterally moving to greener methods.97 Furthermore, the project-specific 
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nature of the CDM makes it harder to take into account the effects of national policies when 
judging the additionality of any emission reductions. Brown refers to the example of Chinese 
renewable energy operators. Individually, each project had a legitimate claim to being unable to 
compete with the fossil fuel industry and was therefore eligible for CDM support. However, 
China had taken steps, including significant national funding, that meant the national 
renewables industry was more competitive. The additionality of any emission reductions from 
the individual projects is therefore debatable.98 
Defining the CDM’s environmental integrity based on additionality alone ignores the wider 
environmental impacts a project is likely to have, especially on biodiversity. ‘In particular, these 
concerns exist where CO2 sequestration projects… result in large-scale plantations of mono-
cultural and/or non-indigenous tree species that could pose a threat to, or destroy local 
ecological systems’.99 Like REDD, there is nothing in the relevant international instruments that 
prohibits absolutely the mass planting of single species to maximise carbon absorption capacity 
at the expense of, inter alia, biodiversity and ecosystem functionality. The UNFCCC COP, acting 
as the Kyoto Protocol MOP, has highlighted the importance of ensuring CDM projects do not 
entail negative environmental impacts,100 but this a poor substitute for a legal prohibition on 
projects that would result in significant environmental harms. 
 
Conclusions: 
There are no easy answers to climate change, but this chapter has shown that the answers the 
international community have so far produced are flawed, insufficient and in some cases self-
defeating.  
In terms of broader biodiversity conservation, the inability of international environmental law 
to mitigate the impacts of climate change is as much a consequence of its historical development 
as it is a failure of more modern(ish) agreements. The early conservation treaties, which are 
predominately issue- or region-specific, are simply not designed to deal with an issue as 
pervasive as climate change. Whilst a lack of foresight on the part of negotiators in the 1970s 
can be forgiven, the failure of the Biodiversity Convention and UNFCCC regimes to produce a 
coherent and integrated response to global climate change cannot. Morgera is correct to point 
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out that efforts have been made to incorporate climate change into the work programmes of 
the Biodiversity Convention but, as the case study of mountain flora illustrates, these fall short 
of a comprehensive response that both mitigates the impacts of climate change on nature and 
facilitates its adaptation to those impacts. This issue is compounded by the similarly flawed 
mechanisms of listing endangered species and creating protected areas. These cannot respond 
adequately to climate change if they remain anchored to a political preoccupation with 
preservation. A protected area can enjoy the most formidable system of monitoring and 
enforcement, but this will be of no help to the biodiversity it hosts if its water supply evaporates 
because of the changing climate. Equally, however, mere reforms to protected areas will fall 
short of the more holistic response needed to climate change. 
Templates for this response can be found in REDD and the CDM, although these are not without 
their own issues. There are still, in my view, inadequate safeguards to ensure that carbon storage 
capacity is not maximised at the expense of biodiversity. For REDD, efforts should therefore be 
made to facilitate the sharing of best practice and the development of international guidelines 
to aid developing States in designing ecologically-benign and ecologically-beneficial REDD 
policies. With regard to the CDM, the concept of environmental integrity needs to be expanded 
to include ecological criteria. This would go some way to addressing concerns raised about the 
ecological credentials of the Mechanism. 
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VII 
REGULATING THE IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ON PLANTS 
 
Plants and International Trade: 
Trade is one of the principal manifestations of the anthropocentric values of plants, both 
instrumental and inherent. Thousands of species are utilised as building materials, 
pharmaceutical components and in a host of other everyday uses. Other species, notably 
orchids,1 are highly valued by collectors, and consequently take on a commercial value separate 
from any practical use. This trade has consequences for wild plant populations, particularly on 
species found in only a few locations or that are subject to excessive levels of collection and 
harvesting.2 For other species, trade in commercially cultivated plants has reduced demand for 
specimens collected from the wild, but this in turn has reduced the economic incentives for 
preserving those species’ natural sites.3 
This chapter explores the way in which international law approaches the interrelationships 
between international trade rules and the conservation of plants. Trade liberalisation has been 
a long-term objective of the international community and a complex regime, brought together 
under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has evolved to facilitate this. This 
regime however sits in tension with otherwise legitimate exercises of State sovereignty that are 
contrary to WTO rules. At the same time, the international community has recognised, 
particularly through the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species4 (CITES), 
that trade in certain species can be a contributory factor to their decline.  
Whilst the WTO and CITES are the two main international trading regimes, and therefore the 
focus of this chapter, they are not the only trade instruments relevant to plant conservation.5 
                                                          
1 For a remarkable account of how orchids can become an all-consuming passion see E. Hansen, Orchid 
Fever: A Horticultural Tale of Love, Lust and Lunacy (Methuen, 2001). 
2 For example, see: H. de Boer and B. Gravendeel, ‘Harvesting of salep orchids in north-western Greece 
continue to threaten natural populations’ (2016) 50 Oryx 393-396. 
3 M. Bishop, A. Davis and J. Grimshaw, Snowdrops: A Monograph of Cultivated Galanthus (Griffin Press, 
2006), p. 342-343. 
4 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, Washington, 3 March 
1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 UNTS 243. 
5 As this work is principally concerned with public international law I do not examine the relationship 
between the environment and trade in the context of the European Union. For a discussion of how issues 
similar to those covered in this chapter are addressed by the European Union see N. de Sadeleer, EU 
Environmental Law and the Internal Market (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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Another is the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement.6 This is, however, much more 
limited in scope, and although it places greater emphasis on sustainable development than 
earlier agreements, it remains ‘little more than a commodity market adjustment among 
consumer and producer states’.7 It should also be noted that other conservation agreements 
contain trade provisions, notably the regional conservation agreements examined in chapter 
three,8 but these lack the same level of detail as CITES and the WTO regime and so are not 
examined here. 
This chapter begins with an appraisal of the jurisprudence of the WTO Dispute Panel and 
Appellate Body to see how the environmental exceptions in Article XX of the 1994 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade9 (GATT) might apply in the event of a State restricting trade for 
purposes of protecting and conserving a plant species. Attention then turns to CITES, where I 
highlight some of the key features of that Convention, emphasising how these relate to the 
challenges particular to the conservation of plants. The analysis of these two regimes suggests 
that a broad framework exists through which the effective conservation of plants can be 
achieved at the same time as guaranteeing the integrity of the international trade system, but 
reforms are needed to address specific difficulties. 
As with all of the other regimes examined in this work, the influence of State sovereignty cannot 
be ignored. It is here where the tension between trade and non-trade priorities is most 
apparent.10 However, whereas in other areas of the law State sovereignty is invoked to prevent 
environmental obligations from limiting States’ right to exploit the natural world, in the context 
of trade States assert their sovereignty as a means of protecting and furthering their domestic 
environmental agenda. On one level, it is self-evident that included within the peremptory norm 
of sovereignty is the right of States to set and pursue an environmental policy in accordance 
                                                          
6 1 February 2006, in force 7 December 2011, TD/TIMBER,3.12, OJ L262, 9 October 2007, 8. 
7 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 636. 
8 For example, Article XI of the 2003 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, not in force. Text available at: http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-convention-
conservation-nature-and-natural-resources-revised-version. 
9 Note that the original 1947 agreement (Geneva, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194, in force provisionally 
since 1 January 1948 under the 1947 Protocol of Application, 55 UNTS 308) has been incorporated into 
the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which is itself a component of the 1994 Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (in force 1 January 1995, 33 ILM 1125 (1994); 1867 UNTS 3). 
For ease of reading, in this chapter I simply refer to this instrument as the ‘GATT’.   
10 S. Zin and A. Kazi, ‘An Analysis of Customary International Law and the Importance of Dispute 
Settlement: A Study of Environmental Law Exceptions Under Article XX’ (2011) 7 Macquarie Journal of 
International and Comparative Environmental Law 39-80. 
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with their own environmental values.11 The measures designed to give effect to these policies, 
however, can impact on the sovereignty of other States, either by requiring those States to 
adopt certain policies if they wish to access the markets of the regulating State, or by otherwise 
undermining the rights all States enjoy in the international trading regime. Similarly, the rights 
and obligations States have under the WTO regime may conflict with the rights and obligations 
contained in multilateral environmental agreements.12 In trade disputes, these tensions with 
environmental rights and obligations manifest in diverse ways, including the imposition of trade 
restrictions: 
• To protect the domestic environment of the importing State.13 
• To achieve a particular environmental objective.14 
• As a sanction for failing to comply with an environmental obligation.15 
• As a way of forcing a State either to adopt stricter environmental standards or cease an 
environmentally harmful activity.16 
The environmental disputes discussed below all result from an exercise by one State of its 
sovereign right to determine its own environmental policy that conflicts with the obligations it 
has undertaken when it ratified the GATT, itself an exercise of sovereignty, and as such the rights 
of other States to set their own trade and environmental policies. These disputes, therefore, 
have not only required the WTO Dispute Panel and Appellate Body to reconcile the equally 
legitimate, but not necessarily compatible, goals of environmental protection and trade 
                                                          
11 For example, Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (31 ILM 874 
(1992)) says: ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and development policies…’ (emphasis added). 
12 A. Lindroos and M. Mehling, ‘From Autonomy to Integration? International Law, Free Trade and the 
Environment?’ (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 253-273. 
13 For example, both the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (in force 11 September 2003, 39 ILM 1027 
(2000)) and the 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (in force 1992, 28 ILM 657 (1989)) condition the exportation of potentially environmentally 
harmful material on certain conditions, including notification and risk assessment. See further, C. Bail, R. 
Falkner and H. Marquard (eds), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology 
with Environment & Development? (The Royal Institute of International Affairs / Earthscan, 2002). 
14 The objective behind listing a species under CITES is to prevent its extinction due to the impacts of 
international trade, see Article II of the Convention. 
15 Under para. 30 of Conf. Resolution 14.3 (CITES Compliance Procedures) the CITES Standing Committee 
may, in the event of unresolved or persistent non-compliance, recommend that all trade in one or more 
species be suspended for the State Party in question. 
16 In the United States, the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman’s Protective Act 1967 (22 USC §1978) and 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 1976 (16 USC 
§1821(e)(2)) set out the trade sanctions that the United States will impose on any State that engages in 
unsustainable fishing practices or practices that undermine the effectiveness of the 1946 International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (161 UNTS 72, as amended 19 November 1956, 338 UNTS 336). 
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liberalisation, but also the reciprocal rights and obligations that are constituent elements of 
State sovereignty. 
 
Protecting Plants through the Environmental Exceptions in the GATT: 
Despite the environment being a relatively low priority for the post-war international 
community in the late 1940s,17 it was nevertheless envisaged that a State could raise legitimate 
environmental concerns that would justify it imposing unilateral restrictions on free trade. 
Article XX of the GATT contains a list of exceptions that a WTO Member may invoke to justify 
measures that would otherwise be unlawful. Two of these relate to the environment: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made in effective conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; 
Through a series of disputes, the two dispute settlement organs of the WTO, the Dispute Panel 
and Appellate Body, have established a regime that affords appropriate and balanced respect 
to a State’s sovereign right to determine its domestic environmental policies, the complexity of 
both environmental challenges and the regulatory responses to those challenges and the 
international trading order. At the same time, however, the approach in resolving these carries 
implications that could frustrate a State’s efforts to protect plants through the imposition of 
measures that restrict trade. 
 
Article XX(g) – The Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources: 
To understand the relationship between the WTO trading regime and the protection of plants it 
is necessary to examine some of the key decisions within the WTO’s environmental 
jurisprudence. The first is United States – Tuna I,18 in which Mexico challenged the United States 
                                                          
17 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 8. 
18 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (United States – Tuna I), DS21/R – 39S/155, 3 September 
1991. 
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ban on imported and domestic tuna caught using methods that resulted in excessive incidental 
dolphins deaths.19 In theory, because it applied equally to tuna caught by United States 
fishermen the measure could have been considered as an internal law, regulation or 
requirement that complied with the equal national treatment rule in Article III(4) of the GATT. 
However, controversially the Dispute Panel upheld Mexico’s challenge, finding that Article III 
only applied to measures that regulated a product per se, and not the production process of that 
product.20 The Panel in US – Tuna I was concerned that through the disputed measure the United 
States sought to impose its own environmental agenda on other States, and the Panel did not 
believe such an exercise of extraterritoriality could be lawful under the GATT.21 
United States – Tuna I was criticised on environmental grounds. Not only did it represent ‘a 
worst-case scenario’ because a progressive environmental law had been declared unlawful 
because of a conflict with a trade rule, but it also threatened the operation of several other key 
environmental measures.22 Consequently, the ruling has never been officially adopted by the 
States party to the GATT, and subsequently a very different approach has been taken. In a 
number of disputes, most notably United States – Reformulated Gasoline,23 the Appellate Body 
developed a two-stage approach to analysing whether a measure was justifiable under Article 
XX. First, the design of the measure is assessed against the criteria set out in the individual 
exceptions in paragraphs (a) – (j). Second, the application of the measure is examined against 
the conditions in the chapeau of Article XX, i.e. that it is not applied in such a way as to be 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.  
The importance of this two-tier approach was emphasised in the seminal United States – 
Shrimp.24 This concerned a challenge by several Asian WTO Members against United States laws 
that prohibited the importation of shrimp caught using methods lethal to sea turtles.25 If a 
harvester used a method that was dangerous to sea turtles, their access to the United States 
shrimp market was conditioned on the harvester’s State of origin having in place a regulatory 
                                                          
19 A similar case was brought by the European Community a year later: United States – Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna (United States – Tuna II), DS29/R, 16 June 1994. 
20 United States – Tuna I, (n 18) para. 5.15. 
21 ibid, para. 5.32. 
22 T. Goplerud, ‘The Struggle to “Green” GATT: Free Trade and Environmental Responsibility in the Wake 
of the United States-Mexico Tuna-Dolphin Dispute’ (1993) 17 William and Mary Journal of Environmental 
Law, 215-236, 222-223. 
23 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (United States – Reformulated 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996 (Appellate Body); WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996 (Panel). 
24 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (United States – Shrimp), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998 (Appellate Body); WT/DS58/R (Panel). 
25 Specifically, section 609 of Public Law 101-62, adopted pursuant to the Endangered Species Act 1973 
(16 USC §1537 (2000)). 
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regime to control incidental sea turtle deaths, or a finding that that State’s environment was not 
an important site for sea turtles. 
In the first instance, the Dispute Panel delivered what was another highly-criticised ruling. In 
particular, the Panel departed from the approach set out by the Appellate Body in United States 
– Reformulated Gasoline by not only applying the conditions in the chapeau before considering 
whether one of the Article XX exceptions applied, but also by reading into the chapeau a much 
broader test founded on the object and purpose of the entire WTO trading system (the 
protection of free trade) rather than the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX (the 
prevention of abuse through the Article XX exceptions).26 Again, had this decision stood it would 
have made it all but impossible for a State to adopt measures that restricted trade with the aim 
of achieving an environmental objective, or indeed any objective related to the policies referred 
to in the Article XX exceptions. Following an appeal by the United States, however, the Appellate 
Body overruled the Dispute Panel and set out in the clearest possible terms a more balanced 
interpretation of Article XX. 
One criticism the Appellate Body had of the Panel was that it had shown a complete lack of 
understanding of the purpose of Article XX and how it should operate. The Appellate Body made 
it clear that the way in which it had set out the two-stage assessment process in United States – 
Reformulated Gasoline, i.e. consideration of the specific exception and then a broader review of 
the measure against the chapeau, reflected ‘not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the 
fundamental structure and logic of Article XX’.27 By reversing the process, the Panel had made it 
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine whether United States law constituted 
discrimination or a disguised restriction.28 
The Appellate Body also criticised the Panel for giving an inappropriate and unnecessarily broad 
interpretation to the types of measures that could not be justified under Article XX, to the extent 
that any measure that conditioned market access on the adoption of the policy of the regulating 
State would be held as an unjustifiable breach of the WTO regime.29 As the Appellate Body 
observes: 
Paragraphs (a) to (j) [of Article XX] comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions 
to substantive obligations established [in the WTO regime], because the domestic 
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and legitimate 
in character. It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries 
                                                          
26 United States – Shrimp (Panel), (n 24) para. 7.44. 
27 ibid, (Appellate Body), para. 119. 
28 ibid, para. 120. 
29 ibid, para. 121. 
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compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in principle by one 
or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a 
priori incapable of justification under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if 
not all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles 
of interpretation we are bound to apply.30 
Having addressed the fallacies of the Panel decision, the Appellate Body proceeded to apply 
Article XX correctly to the dispute.31 The first issue that was addressed was whether the sea 
turtles qualified as ‘exhaustible natural resources’. Drawing on the reference to sustainable 
development in the preamble to the 1994 WTO Agreement and other developments in 
international environmental law,32 the Appellate Body held that Article XX(g) could be read as 
including living resources.33 Regarding whether the turtles were an exhaustible natural resource, 
the Appellate Body noted that this would be difficult to dispute, as all seven species of sea turtles 
were listed in Appendix I of CITES, and so were believed to be at risk of extinction.34 
The second issue was whether the measures adopted by the United States were ‘related to’ the 
conservation of the sea turtles. Here, the Appellate Body focussed on the design of the measure 
and found that conditioning access to the United States shrimp market on, inter alia, the use of 
turtle exclusion devices was inherently linked to the conservation objective being pursued.35 
Third, were the measures made ‘in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption’? The measures in question only related to imported shrimp. However, separate 
regulations had been passed by the United States at an earlier date that required all United 
States fishermen to use turtle exclusion devices or take other preventative steps. This was 
deemed sufficient for the purposes of Article XX(g).36  
Finally, the Appellate Body assessed the measures against the chapeau of Article XX. Here it was 
not concerned with the design of the measures, but rather their application. The nature of this 
assessment was seen as reflecting that a balance had to be struck between a State’s right to 
                                                          
30 ibid. 
31 In theory, the Appellate Body’s jurisdiction is limited to interpreting the WTO instruments (see Article 
17 of Annex 2 of the 1994 WTO Agreement, ‘The Understanding on rules and procedures governing the 
settlement of disputes’ (the DSU). However, because the Appellate Body lacks the power to refer a case 
back to the Dispute Panel once it has correctly interpreted the law it often applies its interpretation to the 
facts. It does so because the stated aim of the DSU is ‘to secure a positive solution to the dispute’ (Article 
3.7). See further, ibid, paras. 123-124. 
32 United States – Shrimp, (n 24) paras. 129-131. 
33 ibid, para. 128. 
34 ibid, para. 132. 
35 ibid, para. 141. 
36 ibid, paras. 143-145. Had the measures on domestic fishermen only been contained in draft legislation 
this would have arguably not been enough to satisfy the Appellate Body. The legislation would be 
susceptible to amendment or withdrawal, leaving domestic production free from restriction. 
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invoke an exception under Article XX and that State’s duty to respect the rights that other States 
enjoyed within the WTO regime.37 
The Appellate Body found several instances where the United States had failed in its duty to 
respect the trade rights of the Asian States party to the dispute. The Appellate Body, again 
drawing on international environmental law, recognised that ‘the protection and conservation 
of highly migratory sea turtles, that is, the very policy objective of the measure, demands 
concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed 
in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations’.38 Further, that the United States had already 
been involved in the negotiation of a regional turtle conservation agreement39 illustrated its 
acceptance ‘that consensual and multilateral procedures are available and feasible for the 
establishment of programs for the conservation of sea turtles’.40  
Consequently, the measures adopted by the United States were applied in a manner that 
constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. Therefore, and notwithstanding that it 
was considered to serve a legitimate environmental policy objective, the Appellate Body found 
that the US regulation did not comply with the Article XX chapeau and thus was not justified 
under Article XX.41 More important than what was decided in this ruling, however, is what was 
not: 
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in this 
appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment 
is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that 
the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures 
to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we 
have not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally 
or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect 
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and 
do.42 
This ruling effectively ended the debate over whether States could pursue environmental 
policies that conflicted with their obligations in the WTO regime. However, as I discuss below, 
the way in which the Appellate Body applied the chapeau in United States – Shrimp is 
problematic in the context of plant conservation. 
                                                          
37 ibid, para. 156. 
38 ibid, para. 168. 
39 The 1996 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, in force 2001, 
text available at: http://www.iacseaturtle.org/texto-eng.htm. 
40 United States – Shrimp, (n 24) para. 170. 
41 ibid, para. 186. 
42 ibid, para. 185. 
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 Article XX(b) – The Protection of Human, Animal and Plant Life and Health: 
Although principally concerned with Article XX(g) of the GATT, the Appellate Body’s ruling in 
United States – Shrimp applies equally to the application of Article XX(b).43 The analytical process 
follows the same pattern. First, the stated objective of the measures is assessed against the 
criteria in paragraph (b), namely that the measures are ‘necessary’ to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health. Second, the application of the measure is tested against the criteria of the 
chapeau. 
Guidance on the ‘necessity’ test was provided by the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef.44 Again, 
we see the Appellate Body stressing the importance of using the ordinary meaning of words 
when interpreting treaty provisions. That ‘necessary’ means ‘indispensable’ was considered self-
evident, but the Appellate Body also noted that there are ‘a range of degrees of necessity’, from 
indispensable to ‘making a contribution to’. For the purposes of Article XX, a ‘necessary’ measure 
would fall closer to the ‘indispensable’ end of the scale, but the application of the provision was 
not limited to this. Instead, there must ‘in every case [be] a process of weighing and balancing a 
series of factors’ including the contribution made by the measure to the stated objective,45 ‘the 
importance of the common interests or values protected’ by the law or regulation in which the 
disputed measure is found, and the impact on international trade.46 This has been seen as 
introducing a proportionality element to those exceptions in Article XX that use the word 
‘necessary’, but only where the measure in question falls short of the ‘indispensable’ 
threshold.47 If the measure is indispensable to the stated objective, then it does not have to be 
assessed against these proportionality criteria. This is ‘regardless of it being vastly more trade 
restrictive than the next less-trade restrictive alternative, and regardless of whether the next 
                                                          
43 Also relevant here is the 1994 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) (in force 1 January 1995, 1867 UNTS 493). This elaborates on the principles of 
Article XX(b) in the specific context toxins and other contaminants contained in food, drink and feed. 
44 Korea – Measures Affecting the Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R; 
WT/DS169/AB/R (11 December 2000). This was not an environmental case but rather concerned the 
exception in Article XX(d), which covers measures ‘necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of 
[the GATT], including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and 
the prevention of deceptive practices’. 
45 In Korea – Beef this was of the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law at issue, but under 
Article XX(b) would be the contribution of the measure towards the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health. 
46 Korea Beef, (n 44) para. 164. 
47 M. Trebilcock, R. Howse and A. Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (4th edition, Routledge, 
2013), p. 682. 
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less-trade restrictive alternative comes very close to achieving the Member’s chosen level of 
protection’.48  
The Appellate Body elaborated on this proportionality element of ‘necessity’ in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres.49 Brazil sought to justify its ban on imported retreaded tyres by arguing it was 
necessary to protect human, animal and plant health from the environmental risk associated 
with waste tyres. The importation ban was not directly related to the tyres per se, however, but 
rather that the presence of imported tyres in Brazil resulted in fewer domestic tyres being 
retread and were therefore being disposed of sooner. The Appellate Body upheld the Dispute 
Panel’s ruling and found in favour of Brazil, stating that although an import ban is one of the 
most trade-restrictive measures that a State can adopt, it may nevertheless be found to be 
‘necessary’ under Article XX(b). This was a significant ruling. ‘Without the ability to ban products 
produced by environmentally unsustainable practices, countries [would] be lacking an essential 
measure for achieving environmentally sustainable development, since the measure is precisely 
tailored to deterring the unwanted practice’.50  
Once it has been established that the import ban contributes to the goal of protecting human, 
animal or plant life or health,51 there must be a comparison of possible alternatives to establish 
whether the same level of protection could be achieved through a less trade restrictive measure. 
This process ‘is a holistic operation that involves putting all the variables of the equation 
together and evaluating them in relation to each other after having examined them individually, 
in order to reach an overall judgement’.52 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres the Appellate Body 
examined the different alternatives proposed by the complainants, including landfill, stockpiling, 
incineration and recycling, and found that none of them would have achieved the same level of 
environmental protection as the import ban. Brazil’s import ban was consequently found to fall 
within the scope of Article XX(b). 
This reinforcement of a State’s right to set and pursue its own policy objectives, regardless of 
what impacts the measures needed to achieve these policies may have on international trade,53 
                                                          
48 ibid. 
49 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December 2007. 
50 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary’ 
(1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 728-735, 730. 
51 This does not have to be demonstrated through a quantitative risk analysis. The Appellate Body stated 
that because the Dispute Panel is in a better position to determine the availability and nature of evidence 
supporting States’ contentions they should be afforded a certain amount of discretion when selecting the 
methodology by which this evidence will be tested, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, (n 49) paras. 145-147. 
52 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, (n 49) para. 182. 
53 ibid, para. 156, drawing on United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005. 
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is significant. It means that the WTO regime will not prevent a State from adopting a policy of 
absolute protection of plants. Obviously, it is unlikely that a State would ever seek to protect 
absolutely all plants, but it is possible that a State would seek to give such protection to a 
particular species, for example if it held significant inherent value as a national symbol. The issue 
however, as was seen in relation to Article XX(g), will be demonstrating that any measures satisfy 
the conditions of the chapeau. 
 
Applying the WTO Jurisprudence to the Conservation of Plants: 
In his analysis of United States – Shrimp di Pepe, whilst recognising the major contribution the 
decision has made to strengthening the environmental credentials of the WTO system, believes 
it is also problematic.54 On the one hand, the decision protected a State’s sovereign right to 
dictate its own environmental policy, recognised that States pursue priorities other than free 
trade through public international law and legitimised the use of relevant multilateral 
environmental agreements in the interpretation of WTO obligations, regardless of whether all 
Members of the WTO are party to them.55 On the other hand, ‘one should not underestimate 
the fact that, in the end, the decision was against the United States and that the chapeau of 
Article XX could turn out to be a formidable barrier to the full implementation of paragraph[s] 
(b) and (g)’.56 Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body has proven itself more willing to 
accommodate environmental concerns than was initially feared in the early 1990s.57 It is for the 
State wishing to restrict trade for environmental purposes to establish that the measure in 
question is both sufficiently related to the stated objective and satisfies the test of the chapeau, 
but this is to be expected for a provision that is an exception in a trade instrument and as United 
States – Shrimp illustrates, this is not an insurmountable challenge. This suggests that the WTO 
regime would not be hostile to measures that restrict trade for the purpose of protecting plants. 
However, the approach of the Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp raises several obstacles 
that could frustrate such unilateral attempts. 
As the Appellate Body emphasised in United States – Shrimp, whether a measure can be justified 
under Article XX can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. It is therefore useful to consider 
                                                          
54 L.S. di Pepe, ‘The World Trade Organization and the Protection of the Natural Environment: Recent 
Trends in the Interpretation of G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) and (g)’ (2000) 10 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 271-302. 
55 ibid, 294-296. This reversed the Panel’s position in United States – Tuna II (n 19). 
56 Di Pepe, ‘The World Trade Organization and the Protection of the Natural Environment’, (n 54) 302. 
57 K. von Moltke, ‘The Last Round: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Light of the Earth 
Summit’ (1993) 23 Environmental Law 519-531. 
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three scenarios that may arise should a State wish to use Article XX(g)58 to justify a restriction of 
trade to protect plants: 
Scenario 1: State X conditions the sale of biofuels in its territory on the State of origin of 
the biofuels having in place sustainability criteria equivalent to those that have been 
imposed on State X’s domestic producers. The objective of this measure is to combat 
climate change by ensuring that the production of biofuels does not result in the clearing 
of primary forest. 
Scenario 2: State X prohibits the importation of timber from a non-native species listed 
as critically endangered by the IUCN, unless the State of origin has been certified as 
having in place a regulatory regime to ensure that the timber is harvested sustainably.   
Scenario 3: State X prohibits the importation of timber of a native species unless the 
State of origin has been certified as having in place a regulatory regime to ensure that 
the timber is harvested sustainably. Although the species is critically endangered in 
State X, its global population means that it is not at risk of extinction. 
Scenario 1 is similar to that posited by Rancourt,59 who believes that such a measure could be 
justified as relating to the legitimate goal of combatting climate change under Article XX(g).60 
The difficulty would be justifying such a unilateral move under the chapeau. Its legality would 
depend on the State being able to demonstrate that it had engaged in bilateral and multilateral 
talks with other States in an effort to agree a consensual approach to regulating the 
sustainability of biofuels before adopting its own standards.61 Further, just as the United States’ 
involvement in multilateral discussions in other fora had shown that they consider the issue of 
turtle conservation to be one that is better addressed at a multilateral level, so too could any 
involvement by State X in the negotiations of the global climate change instruments62 
                                                          
58 Article XX(g) is the focus of these scenarios for two reasons. First, it is arguably more likely that a State 
will seek restrict trade to protect plants as an exhaustible natural resource, rather than the health or life 
of the plants per se. Second, the application of paragraph (b) is relatively straightforward compared to 
that of paragraph (g). Provided that the State seeking to restrict trade can demonstrate that the proposed 
measure is ‘necessary’, as defined in Korea – Beef and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, to achieve the desired 
level of environmental protection, and that there is not a less-trade-restrictive alternative that would 
achieve the same level of protection, then the conditions of paragraph (b) will be met. Note that the 
legality of the measure would still depend on its compatibility with the conditions of Article XX’s chapeau. 
59 M. Rancourt, ‘Promoting Sustainable Biofuels Under the WTO Legal Regime’ (2009) 5 McGill 
International Journal on Sustainable Development Law and Policy 73-144. 
60 See further R. Amos, ‘Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage in Global Climate Policy: Examining the 
Issues’ (2016) 10 Carbon & Climate Law Review 187-193, 189-191. 
61 Rancourt, (n 59) 104-105. 
62 This is not an unfair assumption, as there are currently 196 States party to the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107): 
142 
 
 
 
demonstrate their recognition of the need for coordinated global action to address climate 
change. 
The issue of international standards is particularly pertinent to scenario 1. The WTO encourages 
its Members to adopt international environmental standards, where they exist, stating that 
when they do so ‘they are unlikely to be challenged legally in a WTO dispute’.63 It follows, 
therefore, that the Dispute Panel is more likely to uphold a plant conservation measure if it is 
justified under international environmental law, for example by the inclusion of the target 
species in CITES. The difficulty, as was highlighted in the discussion of listing as a conservation 
mechanism in chapter three, is that lists of endangered species found in international 
environmental instruments are a poor evidentiary tool because they lack representativeness. 
Additionally, as I discuss below, politics is becoming an increasingly determinative factor in the 
listing decisions of the CITES COP. 
Potentially a more valuable resource for States wishing to justify domestic conservation policies 
is the IUCN Red List. It is not clear whether this would be a legitimate international standard for 
the purposes of justifying a measure under Article XX, as the Appellate Body in United States – 
Shrimp merely stated that the inclusion of the turtle species in Appendix I was sufficient for 
determining whether they qualified as an exhaustible natural resource.64 Arguably it would. One 
of the stated aims of the Red List is to ‘Provide a global context for the establishment of 
conservation priorities at the local level’, and the Red List is increasingly used in conservation 
legislation and planning at the national level.65 Further, the Red List is one of the indicators that 
has been developed by the Biodiversity Convention’s Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on 
Indicators for the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 to assess the international 
community’s progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets.66 Finally, whilst encouraging States 
to adopt international standards, the WTO permits a State to adopt stricter measures ‘if there 
is scientific justification’.67 The Red List, as an objective international standard, should constitute 
a sufficient ‘scientific justification’ if a State wishes to move beyond the international consensus 
on the appropriate level of protection for a species. 
                                                          
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php. 
63 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm. 
64 United States – Shrimp, (n 24) para. 132. 
65 G.M. Mace et al, ‘Quantification of Extinction Risk: IUCN’s System for Classifying Threatened Species’ 
(2008) 22 Conservation Biology 1424-1442, 1438. 
66 Available at: https://www.cbd.int/sp/indicators/. 
67 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm. 
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In scenario 2 problems arise in the first stage of the Article XX process, establishing that the 
measure is related to the goal of paragraph (g). As noted above, there are two parts to this 
provision. First, the resource in question must be related to the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource. Here analogies may be drawn with the disputed measures in United States – 
Shrimp and so would likely be found to be acceptable. Second, they must be made in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. That the species in question is not 
native to State X suggests that this part of Article XX(g) will not be satisfied. How can restrictions 
be imposed on domestic production if the species in question is not being harvested in State 
X?68 For these reasons, the measures in scenario 2 would therefore probably not be covered by 
the exception.  
This raises the question of whether Article XX may be used in such a way as to amount to an 
exercise of extraterritoriality by one State over another. The evidence indicates that this would 
not be permitted under WTO law. In United States – Shrimp the Appellate Body did not rule on 
whether there needed to be a jurisdictional link between the regulating State and the natural 
resource in question, but that it found there to be ‘sufficient nexus’ between the United States 
and the turtles suggests that there is some kind of jurisdictional element to Article XX.69 This can 
be contrasted with the earlier United States – Tuna II decision, where the Panel stated that ‘it 
could see no valid reason supporting the conclusion that the provisions of Article XX(g) apply 
only to policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the territory 
of the contracting party’.70 The focus of US – Tuna II, however, was on migratory fish populations 
that spent a significant amount of time in the high seas, beyond State jurisdiction. This would 
obviously not be the case for plants, and given the Panel’s rejection of an ‘extrajurisdictional 
application’ of Article XX in their, albeit flawed, decision in United States – Tuna I,71 it is unlikely 
that WTO law would permit a State to regulate a resource that is located exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of another State. 
For scenario 3 one challenge would be in proving that the measures related to the conservation 
of an exhaustible natural resource. As noted above, little guidance was given by the Appellate 
Body on what might amount to ‘exhaustible’. If the Appellate Body only considered the status 
                                                          
68 It could of course be harvested from commercially cultivated sources. In such circumstances, however, 
they would be no need to impose any restrictions as no pressure would be being put on wild populations 
of the species in question. 
69 United States – Shrimp, (n 24) para. 133. In this case it was sufficient that every species could be found 
in waters under the United States’ jurisdiction at some point during their migration. It was not necessary 
that every population of the species spent some time in United States waters. 
70 United States – Tuna II, (n 19) para. 5.20. 
71 United States – Tuna I, (n 18) para. 5.32. 
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of the species in State X then it is likely that the first part of the paragraph (g) analysis would be 
satisfied. On the other hand, if the Appellate Body looked at the global status of the species, 
then Article XX(g) would probably not apply.72 If the Appellate Body accepted the conservation 
of an endangered local population of an otherwise common species as a legitimate goal, the 
second part of the Article XX(g) analysis should not be an issue. It would be reasonable to assume 
that some restrictions would have been placed on the domestic harvesting or management of 
the species as it is threatened with extinction in State X. However, it is debatable whether the 
test in the chapeau would be met. In United States – Shrimp the Appellate Body stated: 
[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an 
economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force 
within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration different conditions 
which may occur in the territories of those other Members.73 
That the species State X is seeking to protect is not at risk in other States suggests that its 
measures would be considered ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ under the chapeau, and therefore 
outside the scope of the GATT exceptions. Further, the same issue as that in scenario 1 would 
be encountered, namely the existence of multilateral environmental agreements that are more 
appropriate fora in which action to protect an endangered species should be taken. In particular, 
Appendix III of CITES74 provides a mechanism through which restrictions on international trade 
can be imposed on specimens of an endangered species originating from a particular State.75  
The analysis of Article XX and its potential application to plant conservation measures supports 
di Pepe’s suggestion that the chapeau may undermine the effective operation of the 
environmental exceptions.76 This situation could be addressed if the Dispute Panel engaged in a 
more thorough assessment of any relevant multilateral environmental agreement. It would be 
neither appropriate nor necessary for the Dispute Panel to pass judgement on the quality of an 
environmental treaty, i.e. whether it can achieve its stated objectives. However, in general 
terms, the Dispute Panel could assess the design and application of a treaty to determine 
whether it operates principally at the supranational or national level, and whether it applied 
generally or specifically. For example, although CITES potentially applies to all species, its 
                                                          
72 There several such species to which this scenario would apply. For example, the Eurasian Red Squirrel 
(Sciurus vulgaris) has all but disappeared from the United Kingdom, but is listed by the IUCN as ‘Least 
Concern’ because of its global population. 
73 United States – Shrimp, (n 24) para. 164. 
74 Again, it would be fair to assume that State X is party to CITES as there are currently 182 parties to the 
Convention: https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php. 
75 Article II(3) of CITES. 
76 Di Pepe, (n 54). 
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application is limited to those species that have been listed in the appendices, and the process 
through which a species may be listed is governed by the CITES institutions. Further, CITES 
contains mechanisms through which a State may unilaterally impose tighter restrictions on 
certain species than those resulting from inclusion in the appendices,77 again subject to the 
requirements established by the CITES COP. The Biodiversity Convention, in comparison, 
imposes very generic obligations and States are free to determine what habitats and species 
warrant protection and the exact form this protection should take.78 
If a State imposes non-trade conservation measures for a species that nevertheless have an 
impact on international trade, these should be viewed by the Dispute Panel as a legitimate 
exercise of the authority granted to the State to adopt such measures by the Biodiversity 
Convention, provided that the measures are otherwise lawful. Rather than respecting 
international environmental law, precluding the application of Article XX to such measures 
merely because a State has engaged in the Biodiversity Convention would in fact frustrate its 
proper operation because the treaty depends on nationally-determined measures for its 
implementation. The integrity of the international trade regime would be maintained through 
the other safeguards developed by the Appellate Body, including the relevant tests of 
paragraphs (b) and (g) and the requirement under the chapeau to engage in meaningful 
consultation with States likely to be affected. In other cases, such as where CITES is the relevant 
treaty because the measure in question is an export ban on a particular species, it would be 
legitimate to require the States to follow the procedures of this more specific environmental 
agreement, otherwise Article XX would allow a State to circumvent that treaty. Here the result 
would be the same as under the current application of the law, i.e. Article XX would not apply 
because a State has indicated its acceptance of the need to adopt a multilateral approach to 
certain environmental problems. However, the basis of the decision would be the nature of the 
relevant environmental treaty rather than its mere existence.  
The potential limiting effect of the chapeau would not be as significant an issue if there existed 
effective multilateral conservation regimes through which genuine protection of plants could be 
achieved. I argue elsewhere in this work that many of the global and regional conservation 
agreements are incapable of delivering this. CITES, in comparison, has several features that 
enable it to respond to the challenges of conserving plants, at least to the extent that their 
existence is threatened by international trade. 
                                                          
77 See the discussions on Appendix III and Article XIV of CITES on p. 151 et seq. 
78 For example, see Article 8. 
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The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species:  
CITES and the Threats to Biodiversity: 
CITES is viewed as one of the most successful international conservation agreements.79 
However, whilst it has many of the attributes considered to be essential in environmental 
instruments, including institutional oversight and effective non-compliance procedures,80 there 
is a limit to the impact CITES will have on the conservation status of a species.  
Firstly, whilst opinions vary on the extent to which trade affects a species’ conservation status, 
the consensus appears to be that it is not a direct cause of extinction.81 The reason for this is 
one of economics. As a species nears extinction, locating and collecting it will become so 
expensive as to be no longer commercially viable.82 In certain cases, where the species is valued 
as part of a collection, rarity may increase its commercial value. Nevertheless, ‘very few species 
have been entirely exterminated as a result of international trade’.83 CITES can thus be 
characterised more as a response to a perceived problem,84 rather than to an actual issue that 
is supported by empirical data. The difficulty, when following the principle of environmental law 
that prevention is preferable to remediation, is in both predicting what species are likely to be 
subject to significant levels of international trade, and whether that species’ value will rise or 
fall as it becomes harder to find. The latter is possibly more easily determined than the former. 
Demand in plants that are traded because they are integral to a production process is likely to 
fall when they become too costly to locate, whilst the value of those plants that are sought after 
by collectors of rare species will increase exponentially as they near extinction. These are only 
generalisations however. If, for example, nothing can replace what a plant contributes to a 
production process, and demand for the resulting product is such that people will pay any price 
for it, then the plant would remain commercially valuable regardless of the costs in locating it. 
CITES response to this challenge can be found in the listing criteria for Appendix II, which allows 
for the listing of a species ‘which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may 
become so unless trade in such specimens is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid 
utilization incompatible with their survival’.85 This does not, however, set out indicators to assist 
                                                          
79 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 484. 
80 See chapter 3. 
81 M.A. du Plessis, ‘CITES and the Causes of Extinction’, in J. Hutton and B. Dickson (eds), Endangered 
Species Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and Future of CITES (Earthscan, 2000). 
82 C. Huxley, ‘CITES: The Vision’, in Hutton and Dickson (eds), ibid, p. 4. 
83 ibid, p. 5. 
84 ibid, p. 4-5. 
85 Article II(2)(a).  
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in this determination, and neither does the additional guidance for the listing of a species in 
Appendix II that has been developed by the COP.86 
Secondly, CITES is only concerned with international trade. Trade that remains within the 
borders of a State, regardless of how unsustainable that trade may be or the conservation status 
of the species involved, does not fall within the Convention’s remit, although it may still be the 
subject of other international or national regulations. 
Thirdly, as with all conservation agreements, CITES is dependent upon effective implementation 
at the national level.87 Particularly important are the reporting requirements, which form the 
basis for listing proposals and other trade review mechanisms operating under CITES.88 Whether 
this is achieved will depend on the capacity and internal structures of States to both monitor 
trade and compile the data necessary for the CITES reports.89 
Finally, prohibiting trade in a species, rather than implementing controls that reduce trade, may 
simply create a black market in illegal wildlife. Illegal wildlife trade is estimated to be worth 
billions of dollars,90 and in the same financial league as narcotics, arms and people trafficking.91 
Illegal wildlife trade can provide local people with a lifestyle that would be otherwise 
unobtainable,92 and often there will be extensive organised crime networks involved. This has 
necessitated a close working relationship between CITES and Interpol.93 
Nevertheless, CITES remains an important conservation agreement, as addressing international 
trade in wildlife is an essential component of any holistic conservation strategy. Furthermore, 
many of the features of the Convention enable it to effectively provide for the protection of 
plants from the impacts of unsustainable international trade. This is despite the inclusion of 
                                                          
86 See Annex 2a of Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II). 
87 For example, inaccurate and incomplete national reporting is one reason why early efforts to control 
commercial trade in whale products failed, see J.E. Scarff, ‘The International Management of Whales, 
Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment’ (1977) 6 Ecology Law Quarterly 323-427, 365. 
88 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 520-522. 
89 R.B. Martin, ‘When CITES Works and When It Does Not’, in Hutton and Dickson (eds), (n 81). 
90 https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
91 O. Holmes and N. Davies, ‘Revealed: the criminals making millions from illegal wildlife trafficking’ (The 
Guardian, 26 September 2016), available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/26/revealed-the-criminals-making-millions-
from-illegal-wildlife-trafficking. 
92 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 483. 
93 F. Comte, ‘Environmental Crime and the Police in Europe: A Panorama of Possible Paths for Future 
Action’ (2006) 15 European Environmental Law Review 190-232. 
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plants in the remit of CITES almost being an afterthought when the treaty was being 
negotiated.94  
 
 CITES and the Challenges of Plant Conservation: 
CITES benefits from a comprehensive administrative infrastructure. The Conference of the 
Parties enjoys the support of both a Secretariat95 and a Standing Committee,96 the latter 
constituting an ‘inner cabinet’ with a key role in monitoring the implementation and 
enforcement of the Convention.97 Scientific advice is provided by the Animals and Plants 
Committees, which also have a role in ensuring the effective implementation of CITES.98 The 
existence of a formal treaty body dedicated to providing scientific advice on all matters 
pertaining to the international trade in plants makes CITES unique among multilateral 
environmental agreements99 and ensures that flora are afforded the same attention as fauna, 
at least in matters included in the Plants Committee’s remit. Additionally, Article IX requires each 
Contracting Party to establish both a Management and Scientific Authority. These constitute ‘a 
global network of institutions which co-operate directly with their counterparts in other states, 
unfettered by the constraints of formal diplomatic channels’.100 Again, this marks CITES out from 
other conservation instruments, as it requires that some positive action is taken at the national 
level to implement the treaty.101 
Under CITES, restrictions on trade vary according to the Appendix in which a species is listed. 
The principal listing criteria is contained in Article II of the Convention. However, almost 
immediately after coming into force, the Contracting Parties recognised the need for more 
detailed guidelines for the listing of species.102 At the first COP the Bern criteria were adopted103 
                                                          
94 Wijnstekers notes that the original impetus behind CITES was a desire to see international trade in 
animals regulated. In 1960, for example, the Seventh IUCN General Assembly called on governments to 
restrict the importation of animals, and in 1963 it called for a convention regulating trade in ‘rare or 
threatened wildlife species or their skins and trophies’ – W. Wijnstekers, The Evolution of CITES (9th 
edition, International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation, 2011), p. 31. 
95 Article XII. 
96 The current Roles of Procedure of the Standing Committee are available at:  
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/E-SC65-Rules.pdf (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
97 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 489.  
98 Resolution Conf. 11.1 (Establishment of Committees). 
99 The Biodiversity Convention’s Updated Global Strategy for Plant Conservation 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/17), in comparison, is not part of that treaty’s formal institutional architecture, 
but rather a non-binding programme of work. 
100 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 489. 
101 ibid, p. 490. 
102 ibid, p. 493. 
103 Resolution Conf. 1.1, now repealed. 
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but these were criticised, particularly by range States and proponents of sustainable utilisation, 
for their ‘rigidity’, which made it difficult to downgrade a species from Appendix I to Appendix 
II, or remove a species completely from CITES.104 In 1992 the Bern criteria were replaced by the 
Fort Lauderdale criteria.105 These set out in a comprehensive manner biological criteria to aid 
States in determining whether a species was ‘threatened with extinction’ for the purposes of 
Appendix I,106 as well as guidance for the two categories of species that may be listed in Appendix 
II.107 The Fort Lauderdale Criteria also re-emphasised the importance of consulting range 
States108 before submitting a proposal to list or upgrade a species in the CITES Appendices.109  
A review of the biological criteria for Appendix I set out in Annex 1 of the Fort Lauderdale criteria 
shows these to be highly relevant to plants: 
A species is considered to be threatened with extinction if it meets, or is likely to meet, 
at least one of the following criteria: 
a) The wild population is small, and is characterized by at least one of the 
following: 
i. an observed, inferred or projected decline in the number of 
individuals or the area and quality of habitat; 
ii. each subpopulation being very small; 
iii. a majority of individuals being concentrated geographically during 
one or more life-history phases; 
iv. large short-term fluctuations in population size; or 
v. a high vulnerability to either intrinsic or extrinsic factors. 
b) The wild population has a restricted area of distribution and is characterized 
by at least one of the following: 
i. fragmentation or occurrence at very few locations; 
ii. large fluctuations in the area of distribution or the number of 
subpopulations; 
iii. a high vulnerability to either intrinsic or extrinsic factors; or 
iv. an observed, inferred or projected decrease in any one of the 
following: 
- the area of distribution; 
- the area of habitat; 
- the number of subpopulations; 
- the number of individuals; 
- the quality of habitat; or 
- the recruitment. 
c) A marked decline in the population size in the wild, which has been either: 
                                                          
104 P.H. Sand, ‘Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and 
Environment’ (1997) 1 European Journal of International Law 29-58, 45. 
105 Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II). 
106 ibid, Annex 1. 
107 ibid, Annexes 2a and 2b. 
108 See also Resolution Conf. 8.21 (Consultation with range States on proposals to amend Appendices I 
and II). 
109 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 493. 
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i. observed as ongoing or as having occurred in the past (but with a 
potential to resume); or 
ii. inferred or projected on the basis of any one of the following: 
- a decrease in area of habitat; 
- a decrease in quality of habitat; 
- levels or patterns of exploitation; 
- a high vulnerability to either intrinsic or extrinsic factors; or 
- a decreasing recruitment. 
Many species of plants have small populations that are geographically concentrated,110 or are 
vulnerable to extrinsic factors such as climate change.111 It is therefore concerning that only 
around three hundred species of plants are listed in Appendix I,112 less than half the number of 
animals, and only a fraction of the number of species a recent study estimated were at risk of 
extinction.113 Even if it is accepted that international trade is not a major driver of biodiversity 
loss, it is still difficult to reconcile these statistics, particularly as trade is considered by some to 
be a greater threat to plants than it is to animals.114 In comparison, nearly 30,000 species of 
plants are listed in Appendix II, around six times the number of animals.115 
One of the principal reasons why CITES may be considered one of the more successful 
multilateral conservation agreements is that it has developed intelligent responses to difficult 
issues. This is demonstrated by the inclusion in Appendix II of so-called ‘look alike’ species,116 i.e. 
species that are at minimal risk from international trade but are nevertheless regulated because 
they are sufficiently similar in appearance to an at-risk species that traders may seek to deceive 
customs officials into thinking an endangered species is a more common one. One of the main 
challenges in the implementation of CITES, particularly in developing States, is the lack of 
training given to customs officials to identify species.117 The listing of ‘look alike’ species goes 
some way in addressing this concern. It would, for example, be impossible for a customs official, 
and indeed many experts, to distinguish the corm of one species of Cyclamen from another 
                                                          
110 For example, see A. Mendoza-Fernández et al, ‘Threatened plants of arid ecosystems in the 
Mediterranean Basin: a case study of the south-eastern Iberian Peninsula’ (2014) 48 Oryx 548-545. 
111 J.E. Good and D. Millward, Alpine Plants: Ecology for Gardeners (Alpine Garden Society / Batsford, 
2007), p. 155-162. 
112 https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
113 RBG Kew, ‘The State of the World’s Plants Report – 2016’ (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 2016). 
114 W.C. Burns, ‘CITES and the Regulation of International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical 
Appraisal’ (1990) 8 Dickson Journal of International Law 203-223, 204. 
115 (n 112). 
116 The treaty text on refers to the listing of species that look like a species listed on Appendix II; it is silent 
on the issue of species that are similar to an Appendix I species. Annex 2a of Resolution Conf. 9.24 however 
makes it clear that species that look like Appendix I species should also be included in Appendix II. 
117 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 525. 
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without the assistance of a laboratory. Identifying a particular specimen just as a Cyclamen corm, 
however, is relatively straightforward and can be done on the basis of appearance alone.118  
A further example is the split-listing of species, i.e. separating a certain population of a species 
into a different Appendix because it is either well-managed, and can therefore support a certain 
level of trade, or is at greater risk from the impacts of international trade and therefore warrants 
protection under Appendix I.119 This counters the charge that CITES is an overly restrictive 
mechanism,120 although the Parties have noted that the split-listing of a species can lead to 
enforcement difficulties.121 
A second positive feature of CITES is the emphasis it places on precaution, which is evident in 
the rules governing the listing of species in the Appendices. Dickson identifies two versions of 
the precautionary principle in the CITES framework. The first is an ‘action guiding’ interpretation 
that is evident in the requirement of Article II(2)(a) that a species be listed because it might 
become at risk of extinction unless subject to regulation by CITES. The second is the strict criteria 
that must be met before a species can be downgraded from Appendix I to Appendix II, or 
removed from CITES completely.122 Paragraph A(2) of Annex 4 to Resolution Conf. 9.24, for 
example, states: 
2. Species included in Appendix I should only be transferred to Appendix II: 
a) If they do not satisfy the [biological criteria for Appendix I species] and when of 
one of the following precautionary safeguards is met: 
i. the species is not in demand for international trade, nor is its transfer 
to Appendix II likely to stimulate trade in, or cause enforcement 
problems for, any other species included in Appendix I; or 
ii. the species is likely to be in demand for trade, but its management is 
such that the Conference of the Parties is satisfied with: 
A. implementation by the range States of the requirements of the 
Convention, in particular Article IV; and 
B. appropriate enforcement controls and compliance with the 
requirements of the Convention; or 
iii. an integral part of the amendment proposal is an export quota or other 
special measure approved by the Conference of the Parties, based on 
management measures described in the supporting statement of the 
                                                          
118 All Cyclamen are listed in Appendix II of CITES, see C. Grey-Wilson, Cyclamen: A Guide for Gardeners, 
Horticulturalists and Botanists (revised edition, B.T. Batsford, 2002), chapter 12. 
119 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 492. 
120 M. Bowman, ‘A Tale of Two CITES: Divergent Perspectives upon the Effectiveness of the Wildlife Trade 
Convention’ (2013) 22 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 228-238, 
236. 
121 Resolution Conf. 9.24, Annex 3. 
122 B. Dickson, ‘Precaution at the Heart of CITES?’, in Hutton and Dickson (eds), (n 81) p. 43-44. Dickson’s 
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amendment proposal, provided that effective enforcement controls are 
in place…123 
These impose an extremely high threshold on any State wishing to downgrade or delist a 
species.124 The difficulty in downgrading a population or species remains one of the main 
criticisms of CITES, especially from range States and those who believe sustainable utilisation is 
a more effective conservation strategy than absolute prohibitions on international trade. 
Furthermore, despite the Contracting Parties being obliged to list a species once it has met the 
criteria for either Appendix I or II, the listing process is becoming increasingly politicised,125 
particularly if the species concerned is economically valuable.126 Nevertheless, given the 
controversy over including the precautionary principle, however it may be interpreted, in other 
multilateral environmental agreements,127 that CITES has explicitly endorsed the role of 
precaution in addressing the impacts of international trade on wildlife, if not the principle per 
se, is a positive achievement. 
Species that have been listed in CITES are subject to a permitting system, which is set out in 
Articles III and IV for Appendix I and II species respectively. Both Appendix I and Appendix II 
species must be accompanied by an export permit, the requirements of which are: 
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not be 
detrimental to the survival of that species; 
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was 
not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna 
and flora; and 
(c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen 
will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health 
or cruel treatment.128 
Appendix I species must also be accompanied by an import permit, and it is the strict conditions 
for these that limit trade in those species.129 An import permit will only be granted where: 
                                                          
123 The procedural requirements for amending Appendices I and II are contained in Article XV. 
124 R.W.G. Jenkins, ‘The Significant Trade Process: Making Appendix II Work’, in Hutton and Dickson (eds), 
(n 81), p. 49. 
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Treaty Regimes’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 211-239, 222-228. 
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127 J. B. Wiener, ‘Precaution’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
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129 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 500. 
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(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of import has advised that the import will be for 
purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species; 
(b) a Scientific Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the proposed recipient 
of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and 
(c) a Management Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the specimen is not 
to be used for primarily commercial purposes.130 (emphasis added) 
That Article IV does not require a determination that the import of an Appendix II species is not 
for primarily commercial purposes means that a significant amount of trade in those species can 
legally take place. There is nevertheless a risk that trade in a certain species reaches 
unsustainable levels. Theoretically, Article IV(3) safeguards against this by requiring the relevant 
Scientific Authority to monitor the export of Appendix II species and, where it believes that the 
export of a species ‘should be limited in order to maintain the species throughout its range at a 
level consistent with its role in the ecosystem’, to advise the Management Authority of suitable 
measures to limit the number of export permits for that species. This introduces an ecosystem 
approach into CITES, as the relevant threshold is the level at which a species can sustain its role 
in its ecosystem rather than the level at which it can sustain trade. However, there have been 
concerns about the efficacy of this mechanism in controlling the levels of trade in Appendix II 
species. In particular, it relies on the exporting State having the administrative and technical 
capacities to operate it, and the differing capacities of exporting States have resulted in the 
national implementation of Article IV varying considerably.131 
Consequently, the Conference of the Parties has developed the ‘significant trade procedure’.132 
This creates a role for the CITES institutions in monitoring Appendix II species that are subject to 
particularly high levels of trade. Following a review of all available data and consultations with 
the range States, the Animals or Plants Committee will recommend that certain measures are 
taken to temporarily restrict trade in an affected species.133 The significant trade procedure thus 
goes some way in overcoming the problems of relying solely on exporting States to monitor and 
control trade in Appendix II species. There has, however, also been problems in the 
implementation of this procedure, with some initial confusion over what exactly its purpose was. 
                                                          
130 Article III(3). See also Resolution Conf. 5.10 (Definition of ‘primarily commercial purposes’). 
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In many cases the Animals Committee had failed to make clear exactly what measures it was 
recommending.134 
Article VII of CITES contains several exceptions, which if applicable either amend or negate the 
permit conditions. The most relevant of these to plants is that where a specimen of a listed 
species has been artificially propagated, a certificate to that effect from the Management 
Authority of the State of export may be presented in lieu of the CITES permits.135 Reflecting the 
advances in plant cultivation techniques, Resolution Conf. 11.11 (Regulation of trade in plants) 
defines ‘artificially propagated’ as: 
a) grown under controlled conditions; and 
b) grown from seeds, cuttings, divisions, callus tissues or other plant tissues, spores or 
other propagules that either are exempt from the provisions of the Convention or 
have been derived from cultivated parental stock. 
Excluding artificially propagated species from the CITES permits requirements is a sensible 
measure, and the smaller administrative burden could incentivise the greater use of cultivated 
specimens to meet commercial demand rather than collections from the wild. At the eleventh 
Conference of the Parties in 2000, for example, Lewisia cotyledon was removed from Appendix 
II because virtually all commercial trade in that species now comes from cultivated, rather than 
collected, specimens.136 On the other hand, this reduces the economic value of the wild habitat 
of the species in question.137 In relation to Galanthus it has been observed that wild collection 
makes their habitat commercially-valuable. Without it, there would be pressure to convert the 
site to another land-use and the Galanthus would be lost.138  
Operating alongside Appendices I and II is Appendix III, which includes ‘all species which any 
Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing 
or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of 
trade’.139 Appendix III is thus a recognition of the globalised nature of wildlife trade and that this 
issue is best addressed through international cooperation. As with Appendix I and II species, 
specimens of Appendix III species from the regulating State must be accompanied by an export 
permit, which will be granted when the exporting Management Authority has determined that 
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the specimen was collected in a manner that did not violate the State’s protection laws and, if 
it is a live specimen, that any risk to it during transport is minimised.140 Additionally, all imports 
of Appendix III species must be accompanied with a certificate of origin and, where the specimen 
is from a State that has listed the species in Appendix III, an export permit. This provides a useful 
tool with which a State can regulate trade in a species that it considers to be particularly 
valuable, either as an important economic resource or because of its inherent value. However, 
doubts have been raised over the efficacy of Appendix III, with many species eventually needing 
to be regulated under Appendix I or II. At the sixteenth Conference of the Parties in 2013, for 
example, Malagasy ebony (Diospyros spp.) and Malagasy rosewood (Dalbergia spp.) were 
included in Appendix II because regulation under Appendix III had been insufficient.141 
Like Appendix III, Article XIV of CITES enables a State to pursue its domestic conservation agenda 
through an international forum. However, whereas the scope of Appendix III is limited to species 
within the regulating State’s jurisdiction, Article XIV permits a State to adopt stricter regulations 
for any species listed in the Appendices, regardless of whether it is native to that State. It may 
therefore be characterised as an exercise of the same kind of extraterritoriality that gave rise to 
the United States – Tuna and United States – Shrimp WTO disputes. Article XIV has proven just 
as controversial, particularly when used by economically powerful consumer States to advance 
their own conservation agenda that is contrary to the consensual position represented by the 
CITES appendices,142 but in this case such action is given explicit legitimacy by the treaty text. 
Hutton makes the point that Article XIV shifts the determination on the sustainability of the level 
of trade in a species from the range States, which is required to make this decision by Article IV, 
to the importing State. This is also contrary to the emphasis in CITES that is placed on the role 
of range States in making sustainability determinations.143 However, given the problems in 
implementing Article IV it might be better for the State of import, which is often a developed 
State, to make this judgement as it is likely to have greater capacity to do so. Further measures 
suggested by Hutton to improve the legitimacy of actions taken under Article XIV are similar to 
the criteria of chapeau to Article XX of the GATT: 
Those taking stricter domestic measures should be expected not only to demonstrate 
that the CITES listing is inappropriate, and that legal commercial trade continues to have 
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a negative effect on the species despite the CITES listing and the operation of the 
significant trade process. They should also be expected to show that the measure they 
are taking has been discussed with the range state concerned and can reasonably be 
expected to have a positive conservation effect.144 
As previously noted, the Contracting Parties have already stressed the importance of consulting 
with range States. Regarding Hutton’s other proposals, whilst sound in theory they present 
significant practical difficulties. In particular, they would by necessity lead to a conflict of 
scientific evidence, as the State wishing to impose unilateral trade restrictions would have to 
demonstrate that the scientific basis for CITES’ treatment of a species was flawed. Of the current 
CITES institutions, the obvious choice to assess the validity of conflicting scientific evidence 
would be the Animals or Plants Committee, but these bodies would have already been involved 
in recommending that the species in question be listed in either Appendix I or II and has a role 
in submitting a species to the significant trade procedure. As such, it is difficult to envisage a 
situation in which one of these Committees found that both the CITES listing was inappropriate 
and the significant trade procedure was incapable of restricting unsustainable international 
trade. The purpose of the recommendations resulting from this process is to address concerns 
that regulation under Appendix II for a certain species is failing, and a failure to implement these 
constitutes a non-compliance issue.145 Alternatively, recourse could be made to the dispute 
settlement mechanism in Article XVIII of CITES, which allows the Parties involved to submit the 
dispute for arbitration if they fail to reach a negotiated settlement. The issue would be the same 
however, namely choosing between conflicting but potentially equally legitimate scientific 
evidence.146 
Furthermore, the sovereignty implications of one State attempting to compel another to adopt 
certain environmental standards through unilateral restrictions on trade that were central to 
the WTO disputes discussed above are not as relevant in this context. The provisions of Article 
XX of the GATT are exceptions that may be invoked when a State wishes to derogate from its 
WTO obligations, and the Appellate Body has appropriately characterised the Article XX analysis 
as a balancing of a State’s rights to pursue its own environmental policies against its GATT 
obligations and the corresponding rights of other States under that regime. Article XIV, in 
comparison, is not an exceptions clause but rather an explicit right afforded to States to adopt 
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stricter measures regardless of the common position agreed by the CITES Parties and set out in 
the Appendices. Thus, as Bowman correctly points out: 
Provided they are exercised in good faith and in furtherance of the Convention’s 
objectives, and consistently with other treaty obligations, no formal infringement of 
sovereign rights can possibly arise, since all parties have consented to this option in 
advance.147 
Neither is this a particularly unusual feature in environmental law. Article 193 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union148 affords EU Member States the right to adopt stricter 
environmental standards than the common EU position, subject to them being compatible with 
EU law.  
The final feature of CITES that warrants discussion is the system in place to ensure compliance 
with its obligations. In lieu of any explicit non-compliance provision in the treaty text, a system 
has been developed through Resolutions and Decisions of the Conference of the Parties,149 with 
the Standing Committee playing a key role.150 Consequently, the CITES non-compliance 
procedures are technically not legally binding, but they are nevertheless taken seriously by the 
Contracting Parties.151 In brief, the Secretariat, using a range of sources such as States’ reports 
and the significant trade procedure, monitors compliance with the Convention’s obligations. 
Where it finds a State to be in violation of the treaty it informs that State and requests all 
relevant information and, if necessary, a remediation plan.152 If a compliance issue remains 
unresolved it is notified to the Standing Committee, which will conduct its own investigation.153 
Should a State fail to remedy the violation, the Standing Committee may take a number of steps 
to bring it back into compliance, ranging from the provision of advice on capacity-building, to 
issuing a formal non-compliance warning and requiring a compliance action plan to be 
submitted by the State in question.154 In the event of ‘unresolved and persistent’ non-
compliance and if the State shows no intention to address the problem, the Standing Committee 
                                                          
147 Bowman, (n 120) 237. 
148 [2008] O.J. C 115/47. 
149 See Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, (n 7) p. 518, and Resolution Conf. 14.3 (CITES compliance 
procedures). 
150 R. Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and Compliance (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs / Earthscan, 2002), chapter 3. 
151 R. Reeve, ‘The CITES treaty and compliance: progress or jeopardy?’ (Chatham House Sustainable 
Development Programme, September 2004, BP 04/01).  
152 Resolution Conf. 14.3 (CITES compliance procedures), paras. 15-20. 
153 ibid, paras. 21-28. 
154 ibid, para. 29. 
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can recommend either a partial or total suspension in CITES trading rights for that State.155  
When deciding what measures to take it will take into account: 
a) the capacity of the Party concerned, especially developing countries, and in 
particular the least developed and small island developing States and Parties with 
economies in transition; 
b) such factors as the cause, type, degree and frequency of the compliance matters; 
c) the appropriateness of the measures so that they are commensurate with the 
gravity of the compliance matter; and 
d) the possible impact on conservation and sustainable use with a view to avoiding 
negative results. 
These criteria demonstrate an awareness of the significant challenges many developing States 
face in meeting their international environmental obligations.156 At the same time, they allow 
for meaningful sanctions to be imposed on any State that fails to implement CITES. Importantly, 
the Conference of the Parties has decided that a failure to submit annual and biennial reports157 
constitutes ‘a major problem with the implementation of the Convention’ and must be reported 
by the Secretariat to the Standing Committee. Many of the trade suspensions currently in place 
relate to a failure to submit annual reports,158 highlighting the importance of national reporting 
to the operation of CITES.159 
One criticism of the CITES regime is that it is too limited in scope to make any real difference to 
the conservation of endangered species. It has therefore been suggested that there should be 
stronger ties between CITES and the Biodiversity Convention, even to the point of recasting 
CITES as a protocol to the Biodiversity Convention.160 This reflects broader concerns about the 
impact that the fragmentation of international environmental law has on efforts to develop a 
holistic response to current ecological crises.161 I am unconvinced that a radical reformation of 
CITES is the appropriate response. Regardless of the lack of demonstrable impact CITES is having 
on the conservation status of the world’s most endangered species,162 on paper at least it has 
all the hallmarks of a sound environmental instrument, including institutional oversight and 
robust non-compliance procedures. It therefore has the potential to deliver effective protection 
for plants. In comparison, the Convention on Biodiversity is by design a deeply flawed 
                                                          
155 ibid, para. 30. 
156 E.M. McOmber, ‘Problems in Enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species’ (2002) 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 673-701, 696-697. 
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instrument, and one that is largely failing to protect both plants163 and the natural world as a 
whole.164 Rather than the diminishing of CITES, the natural world would be better served by 
CITES becoming the template for reforms to both the Biodiversity Convention and other 
multilateral conservation agreements. 
 
Conclusions: 
The relationship between the environment and international trade is complex, involving trade-
offs between competing but equally valid national and international priorities, and between the 
constituent elements of State sovereignty. In the WTO, the jurisprudence of the dispute 
settlement bodies has evolved from ‘the worst-case scenario’165 for environmentalists to a well-
reasoned position in which the right of States to pursue their own environmental policies is 
balanced against their obligations under the WTO regime, and the corresponding rights of other 
States to enjoy the freest possible trade relations.  
Following United States – Shrimp, a State may impose the strictest of trade restrictions to protect 
plants, provided the measure is either necessary for the protection of the plants’ life or health 
(Article XX(b)) or relates to the conservation of the plants as an exhaustible natural resource and 
made in conjunction with domestic restrictions (Article XX(g)). The difficulty is in the second 
stage of the Article XX process, i.e. satisfying the criteria of the chapeau and demonstrating that 
the application of the measure is not arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. A key component of this is that the State must show that, prior 
to adopting the unilateral trade restriction, it engaged in negotiations with other States.  
Whilst a sound interpretation of an exceptions provision to a regime intended to liberalise 
international trade, for advocates of conservation it is problematic. The existence of multilateral 
conservation regimes that enjoy near-universal participation by States could frustrate a State’s 
attempts to justify the imposition of unilateral trade restrictions for the purposes of protecting 
plants. The State’s likely membership of conservation regimes would indicate their 
acknowledgment that such issues can only be effectively addressed with international 
cooperation, and its acceptance of the approach taken by those regimes. As in the case of the 
endangered turtles, therefore, the criteria of the chapeau will probably preclude the justification 
of unilateral conservation measures under Article XX of the GATT. This situation could be 
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remedied if the WTO Dispute Panel undertook a more thorough assessment of the nature of the 
environmental agreement relevant to the subject matter of the national measures. If, as in the 
case of the Biodiversity Convention, the treaty only establishes a very broad framework within 
which States enjoy considerable discretion to determine the form and design of conservation 
measures, then a State’s engagement with that instrument should not preclude the application 
of Article XX to domestic conservation measures.  
The limitations of the current position adopted by the WTO Appellate Body would not be as 
problematic for the conservation of plants if there existed effective conservation treaties. As has 
been observed elsewhere in this thesis, however, many global and regional conservation 
instruments are incapable of delivering meaningful protection to nature. The possible exception 
is CITES, which, in contrast to many other conservation instruments, benefits from technical and 
robust institutional oversight and an effective non-compliance procedure. CITES has developed 
intelligent responses to certain practical difficulties associated with managing trade in wildlife, 
and the Contracting Parties have explicitly endorsed the importance of adopting a precautionary 
approach when considering a species for listing. 
Further, CITES, arguably more than any other instrument, can respond to the specific challenges 
encountered in the conservation of plants. The emphasis on small, localised and vulnerable 
populations in the Fort Lauderdale listing criteria, for example, means many of the world’s rarest 
plants are eligible for listing in Appendix I. That so few plants are listed here is a cause of concern, 
which may be attributable both to the increasingly politicised nature of CITES listing decisions 
and the economic value of many plant species. Nevertheless, rather than needing substantial 
reform or subordination into a regime with a more comprehensive conservation remit, CITES is 
instead a template of a regime that provides a more sophisticated legal standard for the 
protection of plants. 
Doubts have been cast over the links between international trade and extinction, but trade is 
often a factor in a species decline, even if it is not the main driver. Further, trade is one issue 
that is relatively easy to address through regulation. Other drivers of biodiversity loss, notably 
climate change, require fundamental changes to society if they are to be mitigated, whereas the 
introduction of controls can immediately affect the impacts of international trade on a species, 
provided that such controls can be enforced. This chapter has shown that both the WTO and 
CITES have the potential to deliver these controls at the same time as respecting international 
trade rules and the sovereignty of States, and are therefore highly relevant instruments for the 
conservation of plants. 
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VIII 
ALIEN/INVASIVE SPECIES AND DISEASE 
 
The Threat of Alien/Invasive Species and Disease: 
Alien/invasive species1 are one of the principal drivers of biodiversity loss.2 Once established, an 
alien/invasive species competes with native species that occupy a similar ecological niche. They 
may also introduce new diseases to which native species have not been previously exposed and 
therefore have no defence against. Similarly, if, for example, it is a new type of predator to which 
there is no equivalent in the ecosystem, the alien/invasive species could wipe out prey species 
that have not evolved defensive behaviours. As well as direct impacts on certain species, a 
biological invasion can have a wider detrimental effect on ecosystems, including plant life. 
Studies show that plant diversity and abundance are reduced in areas in which an alien/invasive 
species has become established.3 If initially left unchecked, an alien/invasive species can be 
extremely difficult and costly to eradicate. In Florida alone, over $500 million is spent every year 
to remove alien/invasive species of fauna and flora.4 Globally, the costs of invasive species have 
been estimated at approximately 5% of the world’s economy.5 
Globalisation has opened a range of pathways through which alien/invasive species may be 
introduced, including tourism, the pet trade, international shipping, agriculture, aquaculture, 
horticulture and construction. Furthermore, other drivers of biodiversity loss, particularly 
climate change, are facilitating the spread of alien/invasive species by opening up previously 
inhospitable habitats to colonisation.6 In mountainous regions, for example, as warmer 
                                                          
1 In this chapter I use the term ‘alien/invasive species’ as a generic term to indicate any species that may 
have a negative ecological impact. However, it is important to note that not all alien species are invasive, 
and not all invasive species are alien. Where an ecosystem has been disturbed, such as where the numbers 
of a particular predator are dramatically reduced, the population of that predator’s prey species may 
increase to the point that it becomes invasive. Equally, if the circumstances are such that an alien species 
is unable to reproduce in sufficient numbers, for example if there is a shortage of females in the alien 
population, it is unlikely to become invasive.  
2 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Montreal, 2014), p. 
70-74. 
3 RBG Kew, ‘The State of the World’s Plants Report’ (2016), p. 48. 
4 National Park Service and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, ‘Florida Invaders’ (2013), 
available at: https://www.nps.gov/ever/learn/nature/floridainvaders.htm (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
5 RBG Kew, (n 3) p. 48. 
6 D. A. Strifling ‘An Ecosystem-Based Approach to Slowing the Synergistic Effects of Invasive Species and 
Climate Change’ (2011) 22 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 145-193 and E.V. Hull, ‘Climate 
Change and Aquatic Invasive Species: Building Coastal Resilience Through Integrated Ecosystem 
Management’ (2012) 25 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 51-93. 
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temperatures reach higher altitudes so too do lowland plant species. These tend to be more 
robust and so can outcompete the more specialist high alpine species, increasing the pressures 
on these already vulnerable plants. In the same way, the changing climate and the mass 
movement of materials from one part of the world to another is facilitating the spread of 
infectious diseases. Although disease it not currently considered to be as big a threat to 
biodiversity as alien/invasive species, it is of increasing concern to conservationists.   
International concern over alien/invasive species is reflected in a number of instruments.7 In 
relation to plants, measures are contained in, inter alia, the 1951 International Convention for 
the Establishment of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation,8 the 1954 
Phyto-Sanitary Convention for South Africa South of the Sahara,9 the 1956 Plant Protection 
Agreement for the Asia and Pacific Region10 and the 1959 Agreement Concerning Co-operation 
in the Quarantine of Plants and Their Protection Against Pests and Diseases.11 The primary focus 
of these instruments, and of the regimes discussed in this chapter, is the prevention of the 
spread of plant pests and diseases by improving cooperation between States in minimising the 
risk of introduction.12 Many international organisations have been established to consolidate 
and provide scientific expertise on alien/invasive species, including the Global Invasive Species 
Programme13 and the IUCN Invasive Species Specialist Group.14 Finance is an ongoing concern 
for such initiatives. The Global Invasive Species Programme was closed in 2011 due to a lack of 
funds.15 
Controlling alien/invasive species also forms part of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention’s16 
Strategic Plan: 
                                                          
7 A.M. Perrault and W.C. Muffett, ‘Turning off the Tap: A Strategy to Address International Aspects of 
Invasive Alien Species’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
211-224. 
8 Rome, 18 April 1951, in force 1 November 1953, UKTS 44 (1956). 
9 London, 29 July 1954, in force 15 June 1956, 1 SMTE 115. 
10 Rome, 27 February 1956, in force 2 July 1956, 247 UNTS 400. 
11 In force 19 October 1960, 1 SMTE 153. 
12 P. Sands and J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 507. 
13 http://www.diversitas-international.org/activities/past-projects/global-invasive-species-programme-
gisp (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
14 http://www.issg.org/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
15 http://www.bgci.org/news-and-events/news/0794/?sec=resources&option=com_news&id=0794 (last 
accessed 01/04/2017). 
16 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 3 ILM 822 
(1992). 
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By 2020, invasive alien species and pathways are identified and prioritized, priority 
species are controlled or eradicated, and measures are in place to manage pathways to 
prevent their introduction and establishment.17 
Despite decades of cooperation under a range of instruments, however, little progress is being 
made towards achieving this target.18 This chapter explores why this might be the case.  
I begin by evaluating two different bodies that have the control of alien/invasive species as part 
of their remit: the Biodiversity Convention and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. The 
lack of a single, coherent strategy to deal with all stages of a biological invasion is suggested as 
the principal reason why action against alien/invasive species has largely been ineffective. In the 
case of infectious disease, the issue is not the multiplicity of international regulation, but rather 
the comparative lack of detailed provisions. This is contrasted with the advances being made in 
conservation science, which show a growing appreciation of the threat disease poses to plants.  
 
International Regulation of Alien/Invasive Species: 
 The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: 
The threat of alien/invasive species to biodiversity has been a priority for the parties to the 
Biodiversity Convention19 since the fourth Conference of the Parties, where it was adopted as 
an official cross-cutting issue.20 Article 8(h) of the Convention requires States, ‘as far as possible 
and as appropriate’, to: 
Prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten 
ecosystems, habitats or species. 
Like many of the provisions in the Biodiversity Convention, Article 8(h) is lacking in detail. It has, 
however, been elaborated by the Convention’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice through the Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and 
                                                          
17 Decision X/2, ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, 29 October 2010, Annex, Target 9. 
18 There are four elements to this Target, none of which are on course to be met, see: Secretariat to the 
Convention, (n 2) p. 70.  
19 The Biodiversity Convention defines ‘invasive alien species’ as ‘species whose introduction and/or 
spread outside of their natural past or present distribution threatens biological diversity’ 
(https://www.cbd.int/invasive/WhatareIAS.shtml - last accessed 01/04/2017).  
20 Decision IV/1, ‘Report and recommendations of the third meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice and Instructions by the Conservation of the Party to the Subsidiary 
Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IV/1), 1998. 
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Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species.21 
Combined, these Principles constitute a comprehensive response to a biological invasion: 
A. General: 
Principle 1 Precautionary approach 
Principle 2  Three-stage hierarchal approach 
Principle 3 Ecosystem approach 
Principle 4 The role of States 
Principle 5 Research and monitoring 
Principle 6 Education and public awareness 
B. Prevention: 
Principle 7 Border control and quarantine measures 
Principle 8 Exchange of information 
Principle 9 Cooperation, including capacity-building 
C. Introduction of species: 
Principle 10 Intentional introduction 
Principle 11 Unintentional introductions 
D. Mitigation of impacts: 
Principle 12 Mitigation of impacts 
Principle 13 Eradication 
Principle 14 Containment 
Principle 15 Control 
 
The Principles under heading A reflect several general principles and concepts of international 
environmental law. Underpinning all action concerning alien/invasive species is precaution.22 
The Guiding Principles import the same terminology23 of ‘approach’ seen in both the preamble 
of the Biodiversity Convention and Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.24 It is also evident 
that the Guiding Principles incorporate a weak interpretation25 of the precautionary principle: 
                                                          
21 Decision VI/23, ‘Alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or species’ 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VI/23), 2002, Annex. 
22 Precaution is also central to many domestic mechanisms designed to prevent the introduction and 
spread of alien/invasive species. See, for example, T. Low, ‘Preventing Alien Invasions: The Precautionary 
Principle in Practice in Weed Risk Assessment in Australia’, in R. Cooney and B. Dickson (eds), Biodiversity 
& The Precautionary Principle: Risk and Uncertainty in Conservation and Sustainable Use (Earthscan, 
2005). 
23 The use of the term ‘precautionary principle’ in this chapter should be read as including both the 
‘precautionary principle’ as it is referred to in environmental literature and also the ‘precautionary 
approach’ that is expressed in certain environmental instruments. 
24 ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’, 1992 Rio Declaration on Environmental and Development 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
25 C.R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1003-1058. 
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Lack of scientific certainty about the various implications of an invasion should not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take appropriate eradication, containment 
and control measures.26 
A second key concept in the Guiding Principles is the ecosystem approach, which, in the context 
of the Biodiversity Convention, is defined as ‘a strategy for the integrated management of land, 
water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way’.27 A further twelve principles have been developed to aid States in implementing the 
ecosystem approach, one of the most important of which is Principle 5: 
Ecosystem functioning and resilience depends on a dynamic relationship within species, 
among species and between species and their abiotic environment, as well as the 
physical and chemical interactions within the environment. The conservation and, 
where appropriate, restoration of these interactions and processes is of greater 
significance for the long-term maintenance of biological diversity than simply protection 
of species.28 
Evidence suggests that one reason why a species may become invasive is a failure to adopt an 
ecosystem approach in conservation and sustainable use practices. This is particularly true 
where the instrumental value of a particular species is prioritised over its ecological value. For 
example, an area off the coast of South Africa, between Dyer Island and Geyser Rock, is known 
as ‘shark alley’ because it is commonly used by great white sharks (Carcharodon carharias) to 
hunt Cape fur seals (Arctocephalus pusillus). Shark alley is being overtaken by kelp, which blocks 
the sharks access to the area and has transformed it from a hunting ground for the sharks to a 
refuge for the seals. The kelp is not an alien species, but has become invasive because the 
shellfish species that feed on it have been overharvested to meet demand in Asian markets.29 
By not respecting the ‘dynamic relationship’ between the species that inhabit shark alley, 
humans have enabled one species to dominate and fundamentally alter the ecology of the area. 
This is contrary to both the ecosystem approach seen in the Biodiversity Convention regime and 
the ecosystem approach that may be read into Part XII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.30 
Similarly, other studies show that more diverse ecosystems are not only less susceptible to 
biological invasion, but can also play a role in slowing the spread of an alien/invasive species. 
                                                          
26 Guiding Principle 1. 
27 Decision V/6, ‘Ecosystem Approach’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/V/6), 2000. 
28 ibid.  
29 BBC Natural World, Great White Shark – A Living Legend, first broadcast on BBC2 on 2 January 2009, 
from 31:55. 
30 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (Montego Bay), 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994, 21 ILM 1261 (1982). D. Freestone, ‘The Conservation of Marine Ecosystems under International 
Law’, in M. Bowman and C. Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity 
(Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 103. 
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Alien species face greater levels of competition from established native species in such 
ecosystems, reducing their ability to survive and thrive.31 
The three-stage hierarchal approach in Principle 2 mirrors the construction of Article 8(h) of the 
Convention, with the priority being the prevention of the spread or introduction of an 
alien/invasive species.32 If an alien/invasive species becomes established the first response 
should be eradication, but where this is not feasible, steps should be taken to contain and 
control its spread and negative impacts. With regard to prevention, Guiding Principle 7 states: 
1. States should implement border controls and quarantine measures for alien species 
that are or could become invasive to ensure that: 
a. Intentional introductions of alien species are subject to appropriate 
authorization (principle 10); 
b. Unintentional or unauthorized introductions of alien species are minimized. 
2. States should consider putting in place appropriate measures to control 
introductions of invasive alien species within the State according to national 
legislation and policies where they exist. 
3. These measures should be based on a risk analysis of the threats posed by alien 
species and their potential pathways of entry. Existing appropriate governmental 
agencies or authorities should be strengthened and broadened as necessary, and 
staff should be properly trained to implement these measures. Early detection 
systems and regional and international coordination are essential to prevention. 
The construction of Guiding Principle 7 highlights the weakness that has already been observed 
in the Biodiversity Convention regime. Guiding Principle 7 does not impose any obligations on 
States; it merely suggests possible actions within pre-existing national administrative and 
legislative structures. The consequences of this less-than-assertive approach are evident in the 
Fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook’s assessment of progress towards Aichi Target 9.33 In some 
cases, a failure to adopt appropriate risk assessment and border control measures may be due 
to a State’s lack of capacity. Guiding Principles 8 and 9 respond to this concern by calling on 
States to cooperate in the collecting and sharing of data and develop capacity-building 
programmes. ‘Such capacity-building may involve technology transfer and the development of 
training programmes’.34  
As invasive/alien species are one of the principal drivers of biodiversity loss, that Guiding 
Principle 10 allows for the intentional release of a potentially invasive species is concerning. 
Under the Principle this should be subject to the prior authorisation of the State in which the 
                                                          
31 J.D. Ackerman et al, ‘Biotic resistance in the tropics: patterns of seed plant invasions within an island’ 
(2016) Biological Invasions DOI: 10.1007/s10530-016-1281-4. 
32 This reflects the prevention principle in environmental law, i.e. that it is better to prevent an 
environmental harm rather than remediate it. 
33 See (n 17) above. 
34 Guiding Principle 9. 
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species is being introduced and an analysis of the risks associated with the release. Similarities 
can therefore be drawn with the system governing the transboundary movement of living 
modified organisms seen in the Biodiversity Convention’s Biosafety Protocol,35 although the 
measures contained in the Protocol benefit from being in a binding instrument, and, as a rule, 
the provisions of that Protocol are also phrased in stronger language than either the parent 
Convention or the Guiding Principles on alien/invasive species.36  
The intentional introduction of alien species is an ideal candidate for a new protocol to the 
Biodiversity Convention.37 First, the subject matter is analogous to that of the Biosafety Protocol, 
i.e. the release of a foreign entity that could potentially have a significant adverse impact on 
ecological systems. Second, the provisions on prior authorisation, risk analysis, international 
cooperation and data gathering seen in the Guiding Principles are similar to those that govern 
the transboundary movement of living modified organisms in the Biosafety Convention.38 Third, 
alien/invasive species are arguably a bigger threat to biodiversity than living modified organisms, 
or at least the threat of alien/invasive species to biodiversity is currently better understood and 
the subject of more scientific studies than that of living modified organisms. Consequently, a 
protocol on alien/invasive species is more likely to have a positive impact on the state of the 
world’s biodiversity, and could prove more valuable in the Contracting Parties’ efforts to meet 
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. If nothing else, the adoption of a binding protocol on one aspect 
of a key driver of biodiversity loss would counter the argument that the Biodiversity Convention 
is, at best, a missed opportunity,39 or at worst, a hollow instrument that has done more harm 
than good for the conservation cause.40 
For unintentional introductions, in Guiding Principle 11 we see a similar emphasis on 
preventative action, based on risk and impact assessments of ‘common pathways’ through 
which an alien/invasive species may be introduced. These include ‘fisheries, agriculture, 
                                                          
35 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal), 29 January 2000, 
in force 11 September 2003, 39 ILM 1027. 
36 Article 8(1) of the Biosafety Protocol, for example, states: ‘The Party of export shall notify, or require 
the exporter to ensure notification to, in writing, the competent national authority of the Party of import 
prior to the intentional transboundary movement of a living modified organism that falls within the scope 
of Article 7, paragraph 1. The notification shall contain, at a minimum, the information specified in Annex 
I’. 
37 This suggestion finds support in L. Glowka and C. de Klemm, ‘International Instruments and Processes 
and Non-Indigenous Species: Is a Protocol Necessary? (1996) 26 Environmental Policy and Law 247-267. 
38 For example, see Articles 7 (application of the advance informed agreement procedure), 15 (risk 
assessment) and 20 (information sharing and the biosafety clearing-house) of the Biosafety Protocol. 
39 C. Wold, ‘The Futility, Utility, and Future of the Biodiversity Convention’ (1998) 9 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental law and Policy 1-42. 
40 R. Adam, ‘Missing the 2010 Biodiversity Target: A Wake-up Call for the Convention on Biodiversity?’ 
(2010) 21 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 123-166. 
168 
 
 
 
forestry, horticulture, shipping (including the discharge of ballast waters), ground and air 
transportation, construction projects, landscaping, aquaculture including ornamental 
aquaculture, tourism, the pet industry and game farming’. The range of activities highlights the 
need to integrate policies designed to prevent the establishment and spread of alien/invasive 
species with other environmental and non-environmental policies.41 
The final group of Guiding Principles address the responses to a biological invasion. Guiding 
Principle 12 focusses on the mitigation of the impacts of an alien/invasive species. Mitigation 
measures fall into three categories: eradication, containment and control. That mitigation is 
explicitly addressed is a positive feature of the Biodiversity Convention’s approach to 
alien/invasive species, and one that is not shared in other areas of concern of the Convention, 
or in other regimes that address alien/invasive species. The Biosafety Protocol, for example, is 
only concerned with ensuring the transboundary movement of living modified organisms is 
subject to prior authorisation and risk assessment, and mitigation and remediation is also 
missing from the 1997 International Plant Protection Convention.42 
Methods to eradicate, contain or control an alien/invasive species should be safe to both 
humans and the environment, including agricultural systems. The methods employed should 
also be ‘ethically acceptable to stakeholders in the areas affected’.43 This is reflective of the 
tension in conservation law and policy between conservationists and those that are principally 
concerned with protecting an animal’s welfare. For the former, the killing of individual animals 
may be a legitimate response to the threat an alien/invasive species poses to the ecological 
stability of a region. For welfarists, in comparison, that the animals are free from suffering is the 
principal concern.44 However, ‘Culling, even when expertly carried out, is likely to cause some 
suffering. Wild animals cannot be simply pre-stunned and then cleanly and quickly killed like 
domestic animals in a slaughterhouse. Indeed, from the welfare perspective the destruction of 
alien species, as a component of conservation strategy, has been described as analogous to 
ethnic cleansing’.45 In terms of plant protection the welfarist position is particularly problematic. 
Allowing an alien/invasive species to remain unchecked could result in significant damage to the 
plants native to the ecosystem in question. 
                                                          
41 See also para. 12(d) of Decision VI/23, (n 21). 
42 See below. 
43 Guiding Principle 12. 
44 S.R Harrop, ‘Trade-offs between Animal Welfare and Conservation in Law and Policy’, in N. Leader-
Williams, W.M. Adams and R.J. Smith (eds), Trade-offs in Conservation: Deciding What to Save (Zoological 
Society of London / Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 119-123. 
45 ibid, p. 128-129, drawing on T.C. Smout, ‘The alien species in 20th century Britain: constructing a new 
vermin’ (2003) 28 Landscape Research 11-20. 
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Harrop proposes a number of ways the conflicting priorities of conservationists and welfarists 
may be reconciled in international law. These include the regulation of hunting and killing 
methods46 and the adoption of international standards, either under the auspices of a parent 
convention or an international organisation such as the International Organisation for 
Standardisation.47 In the present context, the most practicable of Harrop’s suggestions is to 
include welfare concerns as one consideration in a wide-ranging impact assessment,48 as States 
are already encouraged to conduct risk and impact assessments on the likelihood of 
establishment and potential impacts of an alien/invasive species by the Guiding Principles.49 It 
may be that the ecological evidence suggests that the alien/invasive species may only have a 
limited impact, or can easily be controlled through non-lethal means. In these circumstances, 
subject to the requirements of the precautionary approach, eradication could be precluded on 
the grounds of welfare concerns.  
Guiding Principle 13 recognises that, ‘Where it is feasible, eradication is often the best course of 
action to deal with the introduction and establishment of invasive alien species’. Once again, the 
importance of identifying and monitoring likely pathways through which an alien/invasive 
species may enter a State is emphasised, as eradication is more likely to be feasible at the early 
stages of an invasion when the populations of the species will probably be highly localised. 
Guiding Principle 13 contains features that are considered to be important if an eradication 
strategy is to be successful, including post-eradication monitoring and engagement with local 
communities. Post-eradication monitoring purposes are similar to those of post-project 
monitoring in environmental assessment.50 First, it can indicate whether the target species has 
actually been eradicated, and second, the data produced can be used in the formulation of 
future response measures. Under Guiding Principle 13, the secondary effects of eradication on 
biological diversity should be taken into account when deciding whether to attempt eradication, 
and post-eradication monitoring from previous biological invasions could provide an important 
source of data on what these secondary effects might be. The consideration of the wider effects 
eradication may have on biodiversity is also an additional way in which the Guiding Principles 
seek to enact an ecosystem approach.  
                                                          
46 Such as those contained in Article 8 and Appendix IV of the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of 
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Berne, 19 September 1979, in force 1 June 1982, UKTS 56 (1982)). 
47 Harrop, (n 44) p. 131-132. 
48 ibid, p. 132. 
49 See, for example, Guiding Principles 7 and 11. 
50 N. Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 196. 
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With regards to containment, Guiding Principle 14 notes that this is ‘often an appropriate 
strategy in cases where the range of the organisms or of a population is small enough to make 
such efforts feasible’. The importance of monitoring the species is stressed, as this will indicate 
the success of any containment measures and enable a quick response to any new outbreaks. 
Should eradication and containment be either unfeasible or ineffective, States should seek to 
control the alien/invasive species in accordance with Guiding Principle 15: 
Control measures should focus on reducing the damage caused as well as reducing the 
number of invasive alien species. Effective control will often rely on a range of integrated 
management techniques, including mechanical control, chemical control, biological 
control and habitat management, implemented according to existing national 
regulations and international codes. 
Doubts have been raised over whether such integrated management techniques exist. A 2013 
review of the availability of decision tools to enable the efficient management of a biological 
invasion found there to be a severe lack of multi-criteria frameworks that take account of the 
ecological, social and economic impacts of an invasion and also assess the likely impacts of any 
response measures.51 In other words, the holistic approach to analysing the risks of and 
responding to the establishment of an alien/invasive species advocated in the Guiding Principles 
has yet to be developed. The consequences of this include the poor targeting of management 
actions, the inefficient use of public resources and, as a corollary to these, lower success rates.52 
The findings of the 2013 review suggest not only that many alien/invasive species are not being 
effectively controlled, but also that States’ capacity-building efforts and information exchange 
mechanisms are inadequate. Similar concerns were raised by the Conference of the Parties in 
their review of the ongoing work on alien/invasive species.53 In particular, the Conference of the 
Parties calls for greater coordination54 with other international organisations and treaty bodies 
such as the 1997 International Plant Protection Convention, the World Organisation for Animal 
Health, the World Trade Organisation, CITES and the International Maritime Organisation, ‘with 
a view to filling gaps and promoting coherence in the regulatory framework, reducing 
                                                          
51 E.D. Dana, J.M. Jeschke and J. García-de-Lomas, ‘Decision tools for managing biological invasions: 
existing biases and future needs’ (2013) 48 Oryx 56-63. 
52 ibid, 60-61. 
53 Decision IX/4, ‘In-depth review of ongoing work on alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or 
species’, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/4, 9 October 2008.  
54 Lack of coordination in responses to alien/invasive species is also a problem in the domestic law of some 
States: Y. Zhao, ‘Prevention and Control of Alien Invasive Species – China’s Implementation of the CBD’, 
in M.I. Jeffery, J. Firestone and K. Bubna-Litic (eds), Biodiversity Convention, Law + Livelihoods: Bridging 
the North-South Divide (IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research Studies / Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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duplication, promoting other actions to address invasive alien species at the national level and 
facilitating support to Parties including through capacity-building’.55  The Conference of the 
Parties has also elaborated on some of the Guiding Principles. For example, regarding the 
collection and sharing of data Contracting Parties are encouraged to submit case studies on the 
successful use of, inter alia, risk assessment procedures, monitoring techniques and remediation 
measures.56 Whilst further guidance is welcome, this is still a poor substitute for a 
comprehensive and legally binding protocol on alien/invasive species. 
A template for this new protocol can be found in the EU’s Regulation on alien/invasive species.57 
As with all the other regimes discussed in this chapter, the provisions of the Regulation are 
underpinned by risk assessment, both of alien/invasive species58 and likely pathways of 
introduction.59 The Regulation adopts a similar hierarchy to that seen in the Guiding Principles. 
First, Member States are required to take action to prevent the intentional and unintentional 
introduction of alien/invasive species by prohibiting their importation, use and cultivation in the 
territory of the Union.60 In comparison to the Guiding Principles, the intentional introduction of 
a species is limited to purposes for the conservation of the species in question, or where 
products derived from an alien/invasive species are essential for medicinal research and use.61 
In these circumstances, a permit must be obtained from the relevant competent national 
authority, the conditions of which include having appropriate storage and transport facilities 
and there being measures in place to prevent and contain any escape.62 
In the event of an invasion, the primary response under the Regulation is eradication. When 
implementing eradication measures Member States must take into account the likely impact on 
‘human health and the environment, especially non-targeted species and their habitats, and 
ensuring that animals are spared any avoidable pain, distress or suffering’.63 In recognition of 
the difficulties in eradicating certain species, Article 18 permits a State to not pursue eradication 
                                                          
55 Decision IX/4, (n 53) Part A, para. 11. 
56 ibid, Part B, para. 15. See: https://www.cbd.int/invasive/assessments.shtml (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
57 Regulation No. 1143/2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of 
invasive alien species [2014] OJ L317/35. The Regulation uses a similar definition of ‘invasive alien species’ 
as the Biodiversity Convention and includes any species ‘whose introduction or spread has been found to 
threaten or adversely impact upon biodiversity and related ecosystem services’ (Article 3(2)). Importantly, 
natural migrants, i.e. species whose natural range has been altered by, for example, climate change, are 
not covered by the Regulation (Article 2(2)(a)). 
58 Article 5. 
59 Article 13. 
60 Article 7. 
61 Article 8(1). 
62 Article 8(2). 
63 Article 17(2). 
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where, for example, a cost-benefit analysis indicates that the long-term costs of eradication will 
be ‘exceptionally high and disproportionate to the benefits of eradication’.64 This would cover a 
situation similar to that in New Zealand, where efforts to eradicate wasps have proven futile 
because cleared areas are soon recolonised.65 The importance of surveillance in detecting an 
invasion as early as possible is emphasised in Article 14, which requires Member States to 
establish a system to collect data on the occurrence of alien/invasive species in the environment 
including, where possible, in a transboundary context.66 
Where eradication is not viable Member States must put in place management measures so that 
the species’ ecological, environmental and socioeconomic impacts are minimised. These may 
include lethal and non-lethal, biological and chemical actions aimed at eradication, containment 
and control.67 They can also include measures designed to enhance the resilience of ecosystems 
to enhance their capacity to respond to current and future invasions.68 This is an additional 
preventative step that is not seen in the Biodiversity Convention’s Guiding Principles. 
Another positive feature of the Regulation, and again one that is not shared by the Guiding 
Principles, is that it requires the restoration of ecosystems that have been degraded, damaged 
or destroyed by an alien/invasive species.69 Restoration may be considered the missing step in 
the Guiding Principles,70 but whilst this has noted advantages, particularly if it includes the 
restoration of ecosystem services, the potential costs in undoing systemic and potentially 
irreversible damage to an ecosystem must be taken into account. This is recognised in the 
Regulation, as restoration does not have to be undertaken where the costs would be 
disproportionate to any likely benefits.71   
To summarise, the Biodiversity Convention’s Guiding Principles offer a framework for action to 
address a biological invasion, which gives appropriate emphasis on the need for risk 
assessments, monitoring and cooperation. The response hierarchy reflects the environmental 
mantra that prevention is better than remediation and at the same time recognises that 
different invasions will require different responses based on eradication, containment and 
control. However, that alien/invasive species continue to spread suggests that the current 
                                                          
64 Article 18(1)(b). 
65 J.R. Beggs et al, ‘The difficulty of reducing introduced wasps (Vespula vulgaris) populations for 
conservation gains’ (1998) 22 New Zealand Journal of Ecology 55-63. 
66 Article 14. 
67 Article 19(1). 
68 Article 19(2). 
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71 Article 20(1). 
173 
 
 
 
approach is not working. A new protocol, drawing on a range of sources including the Guiding 
Principles, the EU’s Regulation on alien/invasive species and other areas of international 
environmental law, could go a long way in enhancing the law’s ability to address one of the key 
drivers of biodiversity loss and to protect plants.   
 
 The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation: 
Alien/invasive species is a core area of concern for the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. It 
has, for example, produced guidance on addressing the threat of alien/invasive species to the 
forestry sector, which follows the same hierarchy of prevention, eradication, containment and 
control as the Biodiversity Convention.72 More significant is the 1997 International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC);73 a treaty that has the objective of ‘securing common and 
effective action to prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants and plant products, 
and to promote appropriate measures for their control’.74 For the purposes of the Convention 
both ‘plants’ and ‘plant products’ are given broad definitions, with the latter meaning: 
‘unmanufactured material of plant origin (including grain) and those manufactured products 
that, by their nature or that of their processing, may create a risk for the introduction and spread 
of pests’.75 In contrast, as I discuss further below, the narrow definition applied to ‘pest’ 
undermines the IPPC’s utility as a conservation instrument. 
Article IV requires each Contracting Party to establish a national plant protection organisation. 
These have a broad range of responsibilities, covering both administrative matters and direct 
action, including certification of imported products and the inspection of regulated articles in 
international traffic. The IPPC thus adopts a similar model to CITES by requiring States to 
designate a national authority to facilitate the implementation of the Convention at the national 
level. There are significant differences however. First, the national plant protection organisation 
may be seen as a hybrid between the CITES scientific and management authorities. Combining 
these roles may be a positive development, as it has been necessary for the CITES Conference 
of the Parties to clarify the roles of the two different authorities.76 Second, each Contracting 
                                                          
72 http://www.fao.org/forestry/aliens/en/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
73 In force 2 October 2005, amending the 1951 Convention (Rome, 6 December 1951, in force 3 April 1952, 
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74 Article I(1). 
75 Article II. 
76 CITES Resolution Conf. 10.3 (Designation and role of the Scientific Authorities). 
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Party only needs to provide for the national plant protection organisations ‘to the best of its 
ability’.77 The same qualification applies to the obligations in Article IV(3), which relate to, inter 
alia, the internal transmission within a State of information about plant pests and research into 
plant protection. In the case of Article IV(3) the inclusion of the phrase ‘to the best of its ability’ 
may be defended as both a recognition that the capacity of States to undertake such activities 
varies according to domestic circumstances and as deference to a State’s right to determine its 
own priorities for scientific research. The same cannot be said of the establishment of national 
plant protection organisations, and arguably the effectiveness of the IPPC regime, as with CITES, 
depends on these organisations being able to properly carry out their functions. Whilst the 
imposition of sanctions against States that fail to establish a national authority that meets that 
standard may be counter-productive,78 other steps can be taken, such as directing capacity-
building support to those States.79 
In contrast to Article IV, the other substantive provisions of the IPPC do not refer to individual 
State capacities. The central control mechanism of the IPPC is phytosanitary certification, which 
is set out in Article V. Any export of ‘plants, plant products and other regulated articles or 
consignments thereof’ must be accompanied with a phytosanitary certificate.80 These 
certificates must comply with the conditions in Article V(2), which include: 
a) Inspection and other related activities leading to issuance of phytosanitary 
certificates shall be carried out only by or under the authority of the official national 
plant protection Organisation. The issuance of phytosanitary certificates shall be 
carried out by public officers who are technically qualified and duly authorized by 
the official national plant protection Organisation to act on its behalf and under its 
control with such knowledge and information available to those officers that the 
authorities of importing contracting parties may accept the phytosanitary 
certificates with confidence as dependable documents. 
b) Phytosanitary certificates, or their electronic equivalent where accepted by the 
importing contracting party concerned, shall be as worded in the models set out in 
the Annex to this Convention. These certificates should be completed and issued 
taking into account relevant international standards. 
                                                          
77 Article IV(1). 
78 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(Harvard University Press, 1998). Yang, in contrast, believes that despite the difficulties associated with 
them, formal treaty sanctions still have an important role to play in the enforcement of multilateral 
environmental agreements, T. Yang, ‘International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional 
Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1131-1184. 
79 CITES Decision 16.29 (capacity building), for example, directs the Secretariat to ‘provide targeted 
capacity-building support to CITES Management and Scientific Authorities, Customs and law enforcement 
entities, the judiciary, legislators and other stakeholders, particularly in new Parties and Small Island 
Developing States’. 
80 Article V(1). 
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Again, a comparison can be made with CITES, as we see a similar emphasis on consistency 
between States in the format and content of phytosanitary certificates. The IPPC goes one step 
further than CITES, however, and rather than merely encourage States to adopt a certain 
format,81 has made this a formal legal standard. This may address some of the concerns 
regarding inconsistent national implementation resulting from the qualified obligation in Article 
IV(1), although there is still a risk that some national plant protection organisations will simply 
lack the technical and financial resources to effectively carry out their duties. 
Throughout the IPPC reference is made to the need to comply with international trade rules. 
The preamble, for example, states: 
[P]hytosanitary measures should be technically justified, transparent and should not be 
applied in such a way as to constitute either a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination or a disguised restriction, particularly on international trade. 
Standards of international trade law have also been incorporated into the operational part of 
the IPPC through Article VI: 
1. Contracting parties may require phytosanitary measures for quarantine pests and 
regulated non-quarantine pests, provided that such measures are: 
(a) no more stringent than measures applied to the same pests, if present 
within the territory of the importing contracting party; and 
(b) limited to what is necessary to protect plant health and/or safeguard the 
intended use and can be technically justified by the contracting party 
concerned. 
2. Contracting parties shall not require phytosanitary measures for non-regulated 
pests. 
Prohibiting the Contracting Parties from imposing phytosanitary measures for non-regulated 
pests is problematic. Unlike the definitions seen in the Biodiversity Convention and EU 
Regulation, the definitions of ‘quarantine pest’ and ‘regulated non-quarantine pest’ focus 
exclusively on the potential economic impacts of a plant pest. It prevents a State from imposing 
measures on a plant pest that targets a non-economically important species of plant, but one 
that may nevertheless warrant protection, for example because it is a national symbol or 
because it is a key component in a rare habitat. This unnecessarily restrictive approach can be 
contrasted with that taken to the environmental exceptions in Article XX of the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.82 As was discussed in the previous chapter, under Article XX, a 
State is free to determine its own environmental policies, regardless of any economic 
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implications, and only has to show that any trade restrictive measures are suitably linked to the 
stated objective and have not been applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner.83 Article VI(2) 
of the IPPC appears to reflect the approach that the GATT Dispute Panel was condemned for 
taking by the Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp, which could have automatically 
precluded entire classes of trade restriction measures from the scope of Article XX of the GATT.84 
The IPPC does not impose any conditions on the import of plants or plant products, but Article 
VII recognises that States have the ‘sovereign authority’ to take certain measures. However, ‘in 
order to minimize interference with international trade’, any restrictions on the importation of 
plants and plant products must comply with the conditions of Article VII(2). We see here a similar 
trade-off between free trade and State sovereignty that has been observed in the wider 
environment/trade debates.85 However, whereas under the GATT State sovereignty has, to a 
certain extent, re-exerted itself over international trade rules, here strict conditions still severely 
limit a State’s freedom to act according to its own environmental priorities. Again, it is possible 
to question the desirability of this; the IPPC is not a trade instrument, but a treaty intended to 
control the spread of plant pests. 
Finally, the importance of international cooperation in addressing the threat of plant pests is 
emphasised by the IPPC. The Contracting Parties must ‘cooperate with one another to the fullest 
practicable extent in achieving the aims of [the] Convention’, particularly in information 
exchange, combatting pests that threaten crop production and pest risk analysis.86 At the 
regional level, Article IX calls on States to establish regional plant protection organisations, which 
‘shall participate in various activities to achieve the objectives of this Convention, and where 
appropriate, shall gather and disseminate information’.  
Having identified some of the key features of the IPPC, it is possible to assess its value as both a 
response to the challenge of alien/invasive species and a plant conservation instrument. On the 
positive side, the expansive definition given to ‘pest’ means potentially any ‘species, strain or 
biotype of plant, animal or pathogenic agent injurious to plants’ may be subject to regulation 
under the Convention. The actual scope of the IPPC is, however, restricted to economic impacts 
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84 ibid. 
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balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621-639; K.J. Hunt, ‘International Environmental Agreements 
in Conflict with GATT – Greening GATT after the Uruguay Round Agreement’ (1996) 30 International 
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by the reference in the definitions of ‘quarantine pests and ‘regulated non-quarantine pests’, 
i.e. the categories of pest that may be subject to phytosanitary measures. As noted above, pests 
that do not have an economic impact are not only not included in these definitions, but the 
Contracting Parties are explicitly forbidden to adopt phytosanitary measures to control them. 
This is one of several instances where the IPPC prioritises free trade over environmental 
concerns, and whilst trade liberalisation is a legitimate consideration, it is possible to question 
the apparently overwhelming emphasis on trade rules in a non-trade instrument. That the 
revised version of the IPPC was adopted by the FAO Conference prior to the WTO Appellate 
Body’s landmark ruling in United States – Shrimp might be one explanation for this.  
Another unusual, and from an environmental perspective, negative, feature of the IPPC is that 
it does not mention the importance of precaution. Instead there is only a vague preambular 
reference to ‘approved principles governing the protection of plant, human and animal health, 
and the environment’. Again this is surprising, as not only is precaution a hallmark of earlier 
environmental agreements,87 but measures designed to prevent the introduction and spread of 
alien/invasive species (or plant pests) are inherently precautionary in nature. This may be a 
further reflection of international trade law, in which the precautionary principle has received a 
lukewarm welcome.88 
Notwithstanding these issues, and the qualified nature of Article IV, that the IPPC is a binding 
legal agreement means it is a significantly stronger regime than the Biodiversity Convention’s 
Guiding Principles. It is ironic, then, that in this instance the existence of a legally binding treaty 
for plants may be frustrating efforts to establish a more coherent international response to 
alien/invasive species. The existence of the IPPC may be one reason why a protocol on 
alien/invasive species has not materialised under the Biodiversity Convention, as States may be 
unwilling to duplicate its provisions.89 It has also resulted in major gaps in international law. In 
its 2008 review of the work being undertaken to address the issue of alien/invasive species, the 
Conference of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention highlighted ‘the lack of international 
standards covering invasive alien species, in particular animals, that are not pests of plants under 
the [IPPC]’.90 Taking these issues into account, it could be argued that the IPPC should be 
repealed and replaced with a new legally binding instrument, preferably a protocol to the 
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Biodiversity Convention. This would allow for a more comprehensive approach to be taken to 
alien/invasive species, and reflect the jurisprudence of the World Trade Organisation Appellate 
Body on the legitimacy of trade restrictive measures taken for environmental (and other non-
economic) reasons. Finally, a new instrument, particularly one modelled on the Biodiversity 
Convention’s Guiding Principles, would provide an opportunity to redress another weakness of 
the IPPC: the absence of any detailed mitigation measures following the establishment of a plant 
pest. The only provision of the IPPC that relates to post-invasion response is Article VII(6), which 
permits, rather than requires, States to take ‘appropriate emergency action on the detection of 
a pest posing a potential threat to its territories or the report of such a detection’. If a State 
decides to act, any measures imposed must be communicated to the Secretary of the 
Commission on Phytosanitary Measures and affected Contracting Parties, and ‘shall be 
evaluated as soon as possible to ensure that [their] continuance is justified’. This suggests a lack 
of appreciation of how difficult it can be to eradicate a species once it has become established.  
 
Controlling the Spread of Disease: 
The threat that infectious diseases pose to biodiversity was initially neglected in conservation 
science due to the misguided belief that parasites evolve so as not to harm their hosts.91 Ecology 
has now advanced and research is being undertaken to both better understand how diseases 
spread within and between species and how different diseases can best be treated.  
The evidence on the impact infectious disease has on biodiversity is mixed. It is difficult to 
attribute historical extinctions to disease, as sample material that is suitable for testing is rarely 
available.92 In terms of recent extinctions, disease is not considered to be a common cause. In 
2004 an analysis of the extinctions listed on the IUCN Red List found that only thirty-one out of 
833 were partly attributable to disease.93 Disease can therefore be compared with international 
trade; it is known to be a contributory factor to a species decline and eventual extinction, but is 
rarely the primary factor and, so far at least, has not been the sole cause of extinction.94 It is also 
possible, however, that disease is being underestimated as a cause of extinction. Whilst scientific 
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evidence is lacking, there is anecdotal evidence indicating widespread disease immediately prior 
to a species’ extinction.95 
Notwithstanding the comparative lack of scientific evidence, clearly disease represents a threat 
to biodiversity. An outbreak of a disease can have a devastating effect on infected species, and 
although disease has yet to lead to global extinction, it has been responsible for the localised 
extinction of a species.96 Ash dieback, for example, is leading to largescale mortality events in 
woodlands across Europe, putting at risk not only the European ash (Fraxinus excelsior) but also 
the ecosystems of which they are an integral part.97 Replicating the ecosystem functions of such 
species is inherently difficult, and often require trade-offs to be made between different 
ecological priorities. In the case of the European ash, alternative species that have a similar role 
in their ecosystem support a very different group of species to the European ash, and those tree 
species that support the same species of flora and fauna as the ash do not perform a similar 
function in the ecosystem.98 Furthermore, as with many other drivers of biodiversity loss, 
anthropogenic changes including habitat loss and climate change increase the threat diseases 
pose to biodiversity by facilitating the spread of a disease to previously uninfected areas. 
International trade, for example, is believed to be behind the spread of the ash dieback and 
sudden oak death diseases.99 
As with alien/invasive species, prevention is the best defence against disease. Again, adherence 
to the precautionary principle is crucial. ‘If action to manage disease is delayed until unequivocal 
evidence of the threat is obtained, it is likely to be too late’.100 Preventative action based on the 
precautionary principle requires that species or populations susceptible to disease be identified, 
and also that those diseases more likely to become infectious are identified.101 It is not the case 
that every population of a species will be vulnerable, for example a population may have evolved 
a natural defence to a disease due to historic exposure. Neither is it inevitable that every disease 
will have a demonstrably negative impact on a species’ status.102 
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Once established, the options available for managing a disease are limited. McCallum identifies 
five possibilities, not all of which are viable for plants. First, uninfected populations can be 
isolated, with the aim of preventing the spread of the disease. As McCallum observes, ‘In almost 
all cases, an extinction-threatening disease will be a relatively recent introduction into the 
population under threat: otherwise, that population would no longer exist’.103 Therefore 
isolating healthy populations can ensure the species survives even if infected populations are 
wiped out. Where there are multiple populations of a plant species this may be an effective way 
to manage a disease. Uninfected populations could be effectively quarantined by restricting 
access and other safeguards that limit the chances of transmission. It could, however, be difficult 
to maintain the quarantine, particularly in more remote areas where preventing people from 
inadvertently contaminating the site would require either constant monitoring or the erection 
of physical barriers. In comparison, if there is only a single population of the plant species 
isolating healthy individuals may be difficult. It would require relocating them with all the 
associated risks that entails, including the possibility that the plant would die because it is unable 
to establish itself in its new environment.  
Instead, infected individuals could be removed. Culling is a widespread practice for controlling 
diseases in livestock, but is more problematic in the wild. There are two types of culling, neither 
of which are suitable for plants. First there is so-called ‘stamping-out’ culling, i.e. the non-
selective killing of potential hosts of the disease.104 This would remove the risk of transmission, 
but could itself result in the local or even global extinction of a plant species if there were only 
a few small populations of it. Equally, where the species is common and fundamental to the 
integrity of an ecosystem, its complete removal could lead to greater ecological damage than 
the disease alone would cause. Alternatively, the ‘test and cull’ approach may be used, with 
each individual tested and those found to be carrying the disease removed. Again, this is 
problematic when the species in question is a plant. In many cases, a plant will only exhibit the 
signs of a disease during certain stages of its annual lifecycle, for example in disfigured or 
discoloured flowers. Waiting for such signs to become apparent means leaving healthy 
individuals exposed to infected plants for a prolonged period. The alternative would be to take 
genetic material of each individual for testing, but this would be an expensive and timely 
process, and there is also the possibility that initially healthy individual plants would contract 
the disease between the samples being taken and the infected plants being removed. 
                                                          
103 ibid, 2834. 
104 ibid. 
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The third disease management tool is habitat modification. In some cases, this can be very 
effective. McCallum refers to the example of draining swamps to reduce the transmission of 
malaria.105 As many plants are specifically adapted to survive in certain habitats, however, this 
is obviously not a feasible option for tackling plant diseases. 
Another possibility is vaccination.106 Although typically seen as a way of preventing disease in 
animals, work is being done to produce vaccines for plants. The basic method is the same; a 
plant is treated with an inducing agent that stimulates defence responses, ultimately resulting 
in an ingrained resistance to a disease.107 However the viability of mass-producing plant 
vaccinations is debatable, not only due to the costs associated with producing vaccines,108 but 
also the practical difficulties in locating and treating individual plants in at-risk populations. 
Finally, genetic-management options are available. It is always possible that a species will evolve 
a natural resistance to a disease. A recent study on Tasmanian devils (Sarcophilus harrisii) 
suggests that the species is developing a natural defence against the so-called devil facial tumour 
disease, a transmissible type of cancer that has caused the Tasmanian devil’s population to 
collapse by around 80% over the last twenty years.109 This should not be relied on as a primary 
response to a particular disease, however. It is contingent on enough infected members of the 
species being able to reproduce so that they can pass on the genetic information needed for 
future generations to begin to develop resistance. There is also a risk that exposing uninfected 
members of a species to diseased individuals would simply increase the spread of disease. 
Furthermore, in the case of the Tasmanian devils it is unlikely that the species would have 
survived long enough for this natural resistance to evolve without the direct intervention of 
humans. This intervention, initially involving the isolation of uninfected populations and now 
focussed on the rehabilitation of wild individuals that were taken into captivity for treatment,110 
has been very expensive. For other species, particularly if they do not enjoy the flagship status 
of the Tasmanian devils, this may simply not be economically or scientifically feasible.111 
Nevertheless, developing natural resistance through genetic evolution remains perhaps the best 
defence to infectious diseases. ‘If this process of evolution of resistance or tolerance in the host 
                                                          
105 ibid, 2835. 
106 ibid. 
107 I.L. Kothari and M. Patel, ‘Plant immunization’ (2004) 42 Indian Journal of Experimental Biology 244-
252. 
108 McCallum, (n 91) 2835. 
109 B. Epstein et al, ‘Rapid evolutionary response to a transmissible cancer in Tasmanian devils’ (2016) 7 
Nature Communications, doi: 10.1038/ncomms12684. 
110 http://www.tassiedevil.com.au/tasdevil.nsf/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
111 L. Douglas and G. Winkel, ‘The flipside of the flagship’ (2014) 23 Biodiversity and Conservation 979-997. 
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could be accelerated or facilitated, it would represent a powerful means to control emerging 
disease threats’.112 The practical obstacles to this must be considered however. Not only in terms 
of the financial costs, but also the scientific expertise needed to both develop genetically-
resistant individuals and understand the disease that is being targeted. There is, as well, the 
need to consider the risks in releasing what would be genetically-modified organisms into the 
natural environment. A gene that is intended to provide protection against a particular disease 
could result in that species becoming resistant to other natural and chemical controls, allowing 
it to become an invasive species and a threat to biodiversity. 
In contrast to the advances being made in conservation science to respond to the threat that 
disease poses to biodiversity, relatively little action is being taken in international environmental 
law and policy. Disease is not, for example, addressed in a comprehensive manner by the 
Biodiversity Convention. Indeed, preventing the spread of and finding cures to disease are not 
even listed in the general in situ and ex situ conservation measures in Articles 8 and 9 of the 
Convention. Neither is disease mentioned in the Updated Global Strategy for Plant 
Conservation113 or the broader strategic plan for biodiversity.114 As with alien/invasive species, 
to find binding legal provisions on the prevention of disease it is necessary to turn to 
international organisations for which the conservation of biodiversity is a secondary concern. 
Article 6 of the World Trade Organisation’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, for example, 
calls for pest/disease free and low prevalence areas, based on factors including geography, 
ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance and the effectiveness of control measures imposed.115 
The most comprehensive regime that seeks to protect plants from disease is the IPPC. That 
pathogenic agents are included within the meaning of ‘pest’ means that the IPPC applies equally 
to diseases as it does to alien/invasive species. However, its scope is again limited to diseases 
that will have an economic impact. 
For international law to be able to respond to the increasing threat of infectious disease to 
biodiversity a more holistic approach is needed. A positive first step would be to designate 
disease as an official thematic programme of the Biodiversity Convention, with a programme of 
work being developed that focusses on four core areas. Species and areas most at risk of disease 
need to be identified and monitored so that any outbreaks are discovered as early as possible. 
The same must be done for pathways for disease and other factors that facilitate the spread of 
                                                          
112 McCallum, (n 91) 2835. 
113 Decision X/17, ‘Consolidated update of the Global Strategy for Plant Conservation 2011-2020, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/17, 29 October 2010. 
114 See (n 17) above. 
115 Article 6(2). 
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disease. Preventative actions, such as the risk assessment and prior authorisation mechanisms 
employed by the IPPC and Biosafety Protocol, should be established. Finally, response measures, 
such as those examined by McCallum, should be prioritised for research, and technical and other 
capacity-building support should be given to States to assist them in developing these. Once 
established, this programme of work should begin to provide some insight into the extent of the 
threat infectious disease poses to biodiversity, the efficacy of pre-existing preventative and 
response mechanisms and the actions that are most likely to be successful in the future. It may 
become apparent that, as with alien/invasive species, a binding protocol to the Biodiversity 
Convention is needed to provide a more robust framework. Alternatively, a targeted programme 
of work may be sufficient to mitigate the effects of disease on biodiversity, and instead of a 
disease protocol additional efforts to address other causes of biodiversity loss, such as habitat 
loss and climate change, which are themselves drivers of disease, would be of greater 
conservation value. 
 
Conclusions: 
Alien/invasive species are a persistent and growing threat to biodiversity. Arguably, this is 
because there is no single, binding instrument setting out a comprehensive strategy for the 
prevention of and response to their establishment. The most comprehensive regime is that 
contained in the Biodiversity Convention’s Guiding Principles, but this is of limited legal effect. 
In contrast, those frameworks that enjoy the legally binding status of a convention are too 
narrow in their scope and suffer from being constituted in a system for which the conservation 
of biodiversity is a secondary concern. What is needed is a new protocol under the Biodiversity 
Convention that prioritises the ecological impacts of alien/invasive species, whilst at the same 
time recognises their broader socioeconomic impacts as well. 
With regard to disease, much more work needs to be done to understand the extent of the risk 
it poses to plants, the ways in which diseases spread and the most effective means of combatting 
a disease once it is established. A new programme of work under the auspices of the Biodiversity 
Convention would be an important first step, and would indicate whether international law 
needed to deal with disease as a specific driver of biodiversity loss in its own right, or could 
adequately address it as part of the law’s response to other biodiversity issues. 
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PART 4: RESPONDING TO THE WEAKNESSES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
IX 
CONSERVATION PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Actors and Factors in the Conservation of Plants: 
As this thesis is concerned with international law, its focus has been on what States are obligated 
and encouraged to do to protect plants. In practice, however, States’ role in delivering 
conservation activities is comparatively minimal. Other non-State actors are on the frontline of 
conservation, but although they are not the principal subjects of international law,1 international 
law nevertheless has an impact on their work. It is therefore important to consider the extent 
to which international law facilitates and hinders the ability of conservation practitioners to 
protect plants. In doing so, I highlight particular areas in which modest reforms could be 
introduced to address some of the more immediate issues in plant conservation law. These 
reforms alone would not achieve a reversal in the decline of plant diversity. Nevertheless, they 
may be seen as feeding into a broader framework of governance that would remedy some of 
the deeper structural flaws that have been identified in the body of international environmental 
law relevant to plants. Because of its focus on the complexity of networks, in this case between 
States, practitioners, communities and nature, resilience-thinking is particularly relevant in this 
context.2 This is a more accurate reflection of the realities of plant conservation practice than 
the more typical top-down and prescriptive framework dominated by States seen international 
environmental law. What the proposals set out in this chapter begin to do is demonstrate how 
this more responsive framework could develop from pre-existing laws and mechanisms. 
This chapter begins by examining how a number of non-States actors – NGOs, botanical 
institutions, local communities and individuals – can contribute towards the conservation of 
plants. Attention then turns to what may be considered as some of the essential components of 
successful plant conservation strategies, including scientific and technological factors, funding 
                                                          
1 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford University Press, 2012), 
chapter 4. 
2 D. Chandler, Resilience: The Governance of Complexity (Routledge, 2014), p. 38. 
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and community/public engagement. Overall, whilst it cannot be said that international law is 
failing to deliver what is needed in terms of support for conservation practitioners, changes 
could be made so that additional and better-targeted support is given. 
Finally, I consider what impact the Biodiversity Convention’s Protocol on Access and Benefit-
sharing may have on the conservation of plants. It is argued that although the Protocol addresses 
an important aspect of biodiversity conservation, its failure to distinguish between different 
users of genetic resources has resulted in it becoming potentially a very problematic instrument 
for plant conservationists. Suggestions on how the Protocol could be reformed into a more 
flexible instrument are given. 
 
Plant Conservation and Civil Society: 
The international community’s recognition of the limited direct role international law has in 
conservation is evident in the frequent reference to national implementation seen in many 
multilateral environmental agreements.3 International law does, could and should make 
important contributions, both through the setting of broad frameworks within which more 
detailed strategies can be devised and in tackling certain issues, such as international trade, that 
cannot be addressed effectively by States acting alone. However, non-State actors, including 
NGOs, botanical institutions, local communities and individuals, have equally important, if not 
more important, roles in plant conservation. Each interacts with plants in different ways, 
resulting in a range of motivations and approaches towards the conservation of plants. 
 
 Conservation NGOs and Botanical Institutions: 
At the forefront of many plant conservation projects and initiatives are conservation NGOs4 and 
botanical institutions. Plant conservation NGOs take many forms, with different remits, 
                                                          
3 For example see Article 6 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 
29 December 1993, 31 ILM 822 (1992)), Article 4 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107) and Article VIII of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) (Washington, 3 March 1973, in force 
1 July 1975, 993 UNTS 243). 
4 For the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to explore in-depth what an NGO actually is. 
However, there is a growing body of literature examining how NGOs participate in international fora and 
relate to other international actors. This is particularly pertinent to the field of international 
environmental law, which tends to be more open to direct involvement by NGOs in negotiations and other 
international meetings than, for example, international trade law. See further: P.J. Spiro, ‘Non-
Governmental Organizations and Civil Society’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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expertise and fields of operation. Some NGOs focus on specific types of plants,5 others on plants 
that grow in specific habitats6 or a specific genus.7 Others are not directly concerned with 
conservation per se but instead foster links between conservation practitioners. Botanic 
Gardens Conservation International, for example, seeks to facilitate collaboration and the 
sharing of best practice between botanical institutions and other conservation organisations.8 
Similar variety can be seen in botanical institutions, with some whose collections represent 
purely native or local flora, others, such as arboreta, that only grow certain types of plants and 
others that specialise in rare or endangered flora. Often the decision about what plants to grow 
is influenced by non-conservation factors. ‘Every botanical garden has limited resources – space, 
money, manpower, and climate – and must decide how best to use those resources’.9 Such 
considerations will also influence what conservation methods are employed. Growing actual 
specimens requires considerably more space and resources and has higher maintenance costs 
than seedbanks, but seedbanks, as will be discussed, are not without risks, and are not as 
appealing attractions for the public.10 
Looking first at NGOs, it is clear that they contribute to the conservation of plants in a number 
of ways. Educating the public is at the heart of many conservation NGOs’ agenda, and various 
methods are adopted to reach different audiences. The constitution of the Alpine Garden 
Society (AGS), for example, states: 
3.1 The Objects of the Society shall be to educate the public and its members about the 
cultivation and conservation of alpine plants. This will include: 
3.1.1 To gather and disseminate details of their cultivation and conditions under 
which they grow in nature by means of a Bulletin… and by other special 
publications 
  3.1.2 To hold shows of alpine plants 
  … 
  3.1.6 To arrange tours and visits 
  3.1.7 To organise meetings and Conferences 
                                                          
5 For example, the Global Trees Campaign, which is a joint initiative between Fauna & Flora International 
and Botanic Gardens Conservation Initiative, focusses on endangered tree species – http://www.fauna-
flora.org/initiatives/global-trees-campaign/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
6 For example, the Alpine Garden Society is dedicated to the conservation of montane flora – 
http://www.alpinegardensociety.net/. 
7 For example, the Cyclamen Society – http://www.cyclamen.org/. 
8 https://www.bgci.org/. 
9 A. Hackney Blackwell, ‘Botanical Gardens: Driving Plant Conservation Law’ (2012-2013) 5 Kentucky 
Journal of Equine, Agriculture and Natural Resources Law 1-32, 5. 
10 P.S. Ashton, ‘Conservation of Biological Diversity in Botanical Gardens’, in E.O. Wilson (ed), Biodiversity 
(National Academy Pres, 1988), p. 271-272. 
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3.1.8 To promote the formation of Local and Special Interest Groups of the 
Society...11 
Each of these appeals to a different section of the broad base that supports the AGS’ activities, 
and is reflective of the range of values that plants are perceived to have by AGS members.12  
Another important way NGOs contribute to the conservation of plants is by leading or 
sponsoring field studies. Some organisations have dedicated research committees to help 
formulate and guide projects. One NGO that is particularly active in this regard is the Cyclamen 
Society. This Society currently has an ongoing taxonomic study of the Cyclamen coum group to 
determine whether there is a single species of C. coum that simply has significant variation, or 
whether it is necessary to formally split the species. The project comprises field observations 
and DNA analysis of collected samples.13 
As well as studying certain species, NGOs can undertake more ambitious conservation projects, 
either individually or in collaboration with other partners to pool expertise and resources. One 
such project that has been recently launched is between the AGS and Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB) to conserve and rejuvenate two areas of montane flora in the RSPB’s 
Haweswater reserve.14 The upland flora of the reserve has deteriorated due primarily to 
overgrazing, but the reserve still hosts important populations of some of Britain’s rare and 
endangered flora. The project will see the creation of enclosures at the two sites to protect them 
from further grazing. Seed has been collected from certain species, which will be propagated by 
both the RSPB, through the establishment of a nursery at Haweswater, and the AGS 
membership, with the aim of repopulating the sites with native plants. Information about the 
project will be provided at the site for educational purposes.15 
Turning to botanical gardens, we see a similarly broad range of activities. Opening their gardens 
and collections to the public performs an educational function, as well provides a useful source 
of funding. Some gardens make a deliberate effort to educate the public about the value of 
plants and their conservation work. The ‘chemicals from plants’ trail in the Cambridge Botanic 
                                                          
11 http://www.alpinegardensociety.net/information/constitution/. 
12 R. Amos, ‘Just how do we assess the true value of alpines?’ (2016) 84 The Alpine Gardener 112-118. 
13 M. Denney and R. Bailey, ‘Georgia field study February 2015 – C. coum’ (2016) 40 Cyclamen: The Journal 
of the Cyclamen Society 24-33. 
14 https://www.rspb.org.uk/reserves-and-events/find-a-reserve/reserves-a-z/reserves-by-
name/h/haweswater/index.aspx (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
15 For further information about the project see the report in (2016) 84 The Alpine Gardener 359-363. 
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Garden, for example, is intended to showcase the plants in their collection that have particular 
utilitarian value.16 
Botanical gardens are also well-placed to undertake scientific research into plants and plant 
conservation. In the first place, their collections are useful sources of material for study. 
Additionally, botanical gardens provide expertise and other assistance to in and ex situ 
conservation projects, some of which are not only concerned with conservation per se but also 
the wider contribution plants can make to sustainability and sustainable development agenda. 
Cambridge Botanic Garden is currently growing a range of bamboo species to assist the 
Structural Bamboo research project being run by, inter alia, the University of Cambridge and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.17 This project is exploring the potential of bamboo as a 
low-carbon alternative in the construction sector, which accounts for approximately 40% of 
global carbon emissions.18 
Cambridge Botanic Garden is particularly well-placed to engage in this kind of work due to its 
association with Cambridge University, but other gardens are still able to undertake important 
scientific work. Kew’s Science Strategy currently consists of three strategic priorities, which are 
reflective of certain elements the Biodiversity Convention’s Global Strategy for Plant 
Conservation (GSPC).19 
 
Local Communities: 
The role of local communities in conservation has been extensively examined elsewhere,20 and 
so the discussion here is limited to two key observations. 
First, the importance of understanding the relationships between communities and their local 
plants is being increasingly recognised by conservationists. The discipline of ethnobotany is 
                                                          
16 http://www.botanic.cam.ac.uk/Botanic/Trail.aspx?p=27&ix=11&pid=2704&prcid=4&ppid=2704 (last 
accessed 01/04/2017). 
17 https://structuralbamboo.wordpress.com/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
18 http://www.botanic.cam.ac.uk/Botanic/Page.aspx?p=27&ix=2971&pid=2949&prcid=4&ppid=2949 
(last accessed 01/04/2017). 
19 Decision X/17, ‘Consolidated update of the Global Strategy for Plant Conservation 2011-2020’, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/17, 29 October 2010. 
20 For example, see J. Tuxill and G.P. Nabhan, People, Plants and Protected Areas: A Guide to In Situ 
Management (People and Plants Conservation Manual, Earthscan, 2001), chapter 3 and G.F. Maggio, 
‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving 
Biodiversity’ (1997-1998) 16 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 179-226. The importance of 
local community involvement in conservation projects is examined below. 
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devoted to studying the ways in which communities perceive, interact with and utilise plants.21 
Furthermore, there has been a paradigm shift in conservation, similar to that traced by Mace in 
ecology,22 which has seen ‘fortress’ conservation thinking give way to community-
conservation.23 Tuxill and Nabhan, for example, observe that in situ plant conservation will be 
most effective where it recognises and accommodates traditional uses, rather than prohibits 
them absolutely.24 
Second, local communities can assist in the achievement of international and national 
conservation goals. They can do this indirectly, such as by reporting poaching, although, as I 
discuss below, this is conditioned on local communities being engaged by practitioners so that 
they see the benefits of supporting the conservation project. Local communities can also directly 
assist in conservation through their own activities. On the island of São Tomé work is being done 
to encourage local communities to hunt introduced mammals, rather than native (and in many 
cases endangered) birds. Recommendations to encourage the hunting of alien species include 
raising awareness in local communities about the impacts these species are having on native 
biodiversity to incentivise hunters to target them, and enforcing legislation to remove the 
economic drivers behind the hunting of native birds. If successful, these efforts will not only 
reduce pressure on the native bird species, but the removal of the alien mammals will bring 
wider ecological benefits, including allowing native vegetation to recover.25 
 
 Individual Action: 
It is not only those who utilise plants on a daily basis to meet their essential needs that can 
engage in conservation action. Individuals in developed countries may take more proactive steps 
than merely donating to a particular cause to support conservation. Very simple measures, such 
as only purchasing plants from reputable sources that are able to provide the correct paperwork, 
means that they do not support any unsustainable (or at least illegal) harvesting activities. Many 
conservation organisations that have the (commercial) exchange of plant materials as one of 
their activities take steps to ensure that they are compliant with all legal requirements and 
                                                          
21 G.J. Martin, Ethnobotany: A Methods Manual (People and Plants Conservation Series, Earthscan, 2004). 
22 G. Mace, ‘Whose conservation?’ (2014) 345 Science 1558-1560. 
23 W.M. Adams, Against Extinction: The Story of Conservation (Earthscan, 2004), p. 111-124. 
24 Tuxill and Nabhan, (n 20) p. 21. 
25 M. Carvalho et al, ‘What motivates hunters to target exotic or endemic species on the island of São 
Tomé, Gulf of Guinea?’ (2015) 49 Oryx 278-286. See also R. Kannan et al, ‘Can local use assist in controlling 
invasive alien species in tropical forests? The case of Lantana camara in southern India’ (2016) 376 Forest 
Ecology and Management 166-173. 
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require those supplying the material to also confirm that it has been collected lawfully.26 Few 
conservation instruments require the imposition of sanctions for buying illegally-sourced plants, 
although some require States to make trading in illegally-collected plants illegal.27 
Conservation-minded individuals may also engage in direct conservation action and offer 
projects something more than mere technical or financial expertise, as the following account of 
Fred and Janet Pointons’ experiences in South Africa demonstrates. 
The Pointons first visited the Cape Floristic Region of South Africa in 2001 as tourists interested 
in exploring the plants of the region. They discovered a small area of renosterveld habitat,28 
containing a variety of rare plants, on the farm in which they were staying. Their conversations 
with the farm-owner revealed that she had no idea about the significance of what was growing 
on her land. 
Subsequent investigations back in the United Kingdom led the Pointons to the Tulbagh 
Renosterveld Project, a plan to identify, connect and protect areas of renosterveld being 
implemented by the South African National Biodiversity Institute29 and CapeNature.30 The 
project involved mapping the remaining renosterveld in the Tulbagh Valley, with the resulting 
data being used to identify priority areas for conservation. 
The Pointons were given the opportunity to join members of the project in meeting local 
landowners. One individual they met was reluctant to engage in any project being sponsored by 
the State, in part a consequence of the previous unhappy relationship many landowners had 
with conservation, and was, like the farm-owner they met on their first visit, unaware of the 
global importance of the wild plants that were growing on his land. After returning to the United 
Kingdom they wrote to the landowner encouraging him to sign a long-term conservation 
agreement, which he did so in 2008, thereby protecting a key area of renosterveld.31 
It was not the Pointons’ actions alone that led to the protection of renosterveld habitat in the 
Tulbagh Valley. The conservation project was being planned prior to their first visit in 2001 and 
would have proceeded without their involvement. They nevertheless made an important and in 
                                                          
26 For example, see: 
http://www.alpinegardensociety.net/plants/conservation/Wild+Collected+seed+in+the+AGS+seed+exch
ange/72/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
27 For example, see Article VIII(1) of CITES. 
28 Renosterveld is a habitat-type found in the Cape Floral Region of South Africa. It is characterised by rich 
soils that support a diverse range of flora and fauna. The richness of this soil also makes it valuable 
agricultural land, and much of it has been converted into crops, orchards and vineyards. 
29 http://www.sanbi.org/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
30 http://www.capenature.co.za/ (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
31 F. Pointon, ‘Grootvlei: the battle to preserve a botanical jewel’ (2016) 84 The Alpine Gardener 342-347. 
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some ways separate contribution to the conservation of renosterveld flora. Crucially, their 
actions shared many of the traits that are identified below as being essential if conservation 
action is to be successful. They engaged in some preliminary research, which although initially 
reliant on secondary data and perhaps lacking full scientific rigour, was subsequently 
supplemented by materials made available to them by the South African National Biodiversity 
Institute. They also delivered community engagement and buy-in, not only by meeting with the 
landowner but by persuading him to sign the conservation agreement. As they were not agents 
of the State, they may have offered more in this regard than representatives of the Tulbagh 
Renosterveld Project. Finally, the Pointons provided funds that might not otherwise have been 
available. They paid for local labourers to clear the site of invasive species, providing the 
labourers with work at a time of year when other employment was scarce. They have also 
provided the landowner with a digital camera so that he can record seasonal changes in the 
renosterveld habitat. These actions have furthered the community’s engagement and buy-in 
with the conservation project, enhancing its long-term prospects of success. 
 
Key Components of Successful Conservation: 
From the conservation literature, it is possible to draw out a number of key elements of 
conservation projects that are considered to be preconditions of success. These include: 
• Well-conceived, clear and quantifiable goals 
• Sound understanding of the habitat and ecology of the target species 
• Confidence in scientific practices and techniques 
• Long-term funding 
• Community/public engagement and partnerships 
• Buy-in by communities, practitioners and other stakeholders 
Each of these will be discussed in turn. A deliberate choice has been made to treat in and ex situ 
conservation simultaneously. This is for two reasons. First, many of the traits listed above are 
relevant to both, even if they differ in their specific application. Second, global conservation 
policy has, to date, arguably treated in and ex situ as distinct. The Biodiversity Convention, for 
example, views ex situ measures as ‘predominantly for the purpose of complementing in-situ 
measures’,32 although it has been suggested that this is more a consequence of economics than 
                                                          
32 Article 9. 
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scientific reasoning.33 In the more recent International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources34 this 
terminology is not repeated, but in and ex situ are still considered to be distinct methodologies 
for conservation.35 However, it is becoming increasingly clear, particularly in the conservation of 
plants, that to be effective a conservation programme requires both in and ex situ 
components.36 This allows for synergies between particular methods to be developed, for 
example the propagation of stock with genuine wild provenance (ex situ) that is subsequently 
used in reintroduction programmes (in situ), as well as facilitates the integration of the technical, 
well-financed and scientific (western) expertise of ex situ managers with the more locally-based 
experiential expertise of in situ managers. As observed above in relation to the joint 
conservation project between the AGS and RSPB, it also allows for the pooling of expertise and 
resources between different conservation actors. 
Both this thesis and numerous reports on the current status of global biodiversity37 illustrate the 
limits of international law’s ability to achieve meaningful conservation success. So far, my focus 
has been on the design flaws of individual regimes that deal with conservation in a holistic 
manner, such as the Biodiversity Convention, and specific conservation issues, namely climate 
change, trade and alien/invasive species. However, this failure can also be attributed broader 
flaws in the architecture of international environmental governance. Most international 
environmental instruments can be characterised as being top-down, prescriptive instruments,38 
yet such an approach now seems counter-intuitive. Advances in ecology increasingly show how 
interconnected the natural world is, and yet, notwithstanding the gradual development of 
ecosystem approaches,39 the law remains very reactionary and narrow, focussing more on 
                                                          
33 L.M. Warren, ‘The Role of Ex Situ Measures in the Conservation of Biodiversity’, in M. Bowman and C. 
Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (International 
Environmental Law & Policy Series / Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 142-143. 
34 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 
2001, in force 29 June 2004, text available at: www.planttreaty.org/index_en.htm. 
35 See Articles 5 and 15. 
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species that are endangered and sites that are threatened rather than cohesive ecological 
wholes. 
Incorporating resilience-thinking into the law would be one response to these advances. 
Reforming the law so that it reflects this model for governance would arguably deliver a system 
that would provide better, more responsive, protection for plants. This is because, as Chandler 
observes, resilience-thinking adopts a bottom-up approach through which it is real-world 
conditions that guide management approaches, rather than the imposition of pre-conditioned 
and artificial policy objectives.40 The success of this approach would, however, be conditioned 
on a more systematic recognition in international law of the role non-State actors play in the 
conservation of plants. Furthermore, concerns have been raised over the ability of bottom-up 
approaches to instigate the level of action needed to achieve conservation goals. Tal and Cohen, 
for example, argue that ‘Human history clearly teaches that the tragedy of the commons will 
often not be solved by consultation or by galvanizing the collective wisdom and goodwill of 
affected communities. If sustainable practices are not imposed or strongly encouraged [by a 
centralised authority], ecological collapse is often inevitable’.41 What this suggests is that a 
combination of traditional regulatory and community-based approaches is needed in 
conservation, and the following sections outline how a better balance between these may be 
achieved in international environmental law. 
It should also be noted that increasing emphasis is being placed on adaptive management 
techniques in conservation, i.e. not only learning from past projects to inform the design of new 
programmes, but using current experiences to help develop the ongoing evolution of a project.42 
Rather than being particularly new or novel, adaptive management may be regarded as a way 
of bringing together in a more holistic manner pre-existing norms and practices that are 
commonly referred to in legal and conservation literature. For example, in its operational 
guidance for the application of the ecosystem approach, the Biodiversity Convention 
encourages the use of adaptive management practices.43 Calls have also been made for adaptive 
management techniques to be incorporated into more specific measures, such as any risk 
assessment conducted in relation to the intentional introduction of a new species. In this 
context, adaptive management would take the form of periodic monitoring of both the species 
                                                          
40 Chandler, (n 2) p. 38. 
41 Tal and Cohen, (n 38). 
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being introduced and the wider ecosystem so that any changes in conditions can be addressed 
at an early stage.44  
 
 Well-Conceived, Clear and Quantifiable Goals: 
As with any endeavour, conservation projects must have well-conceived, clear and quantifiable 
goals. Note that this is not the same as the imposition of vague goals, such as the Aichi targets, 
by supranational bodies that take little account of varying local conditions and are contrary to 
resilience-thinking and adaptive management approaches to conservation. Rather, conservation 
projects require clear goals to both inform the design and implementation of the project’s 
activities as well as allow for progress to be tracked.  
An important prerequisite to the setting of appropriate goals is taxonomic accuracy. 
Conservationists need to be confident that they are conserving the species they intend to 
conserve. Access to reliable taxonomic data is arguably more important for the conservation of 
plants than it is for animals. For animals, it is usually possible to distinguish between different 
species and subspecies by sight alone. An elephant looks very different to a tiger, and an African 
elephant looks very different to an Indian elephant. Many subspecies of plants, however, are 
distinguishable only by very small characteristics, such as colouration of the flowers, size of the 
plant or particular genes. Others are separated by their geographic location alone, and so 
accurate data about where the plant grows in the wild is essential if it is to be correctly identified. 
Accurate identification is made more challenging by the constant reclassification of plants, again 
something which is not observed, at least not to the same extent, in animals.45 What is a 
subspecies today may be a species tomorrow, and what was a Leucojum yesterday is an Acis 
today.46  
Unfortunately, the science of taxonomy has historically not received the same attention or 
respect as other sciences relevant to conservation. ‘Taxonomists have been considered at best 
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as useful consultants for life scientists in that they name and classify species, at worst as mere 
collectors of things’.47 This has been attributed to the different perspective taxonomy has of 
nature compared with, for example, ecologists. Whilst ecologists view nature as an 
interconnected web of complex relationships, taxonomists tend to view nature as a collection 
of individual species that must be categorised.48 Consequently, conservation practitioners have 
often been left disappointed when working with taxonomists, as the taxonomists appeared to 
be pursuing their own research agenda with goals and methodologies that were not compatible 
with the broader conservation programme.49 
The onus of addressing this issue is on both non-taxonomists and taxonomists. Non-taxonomists 
must recognise the validity and utility in taxonomy as a discipline, as it provides the basic data 
needed to underpin any conservation strategy. For their part, taxonomists must make the data 
they collect relevant and useful to other conservationists.50 Where this is achieved, studies show 
that the resulting data can allow for more comprehensive national biodiversity reports to be 
compiled and empower local communities engaged in biodiversity monitoring.51 
This is one area in which international law is more advanced than conservation science. 
Taxonomy is central to Targets 1 and 2 of the GSPC: 
1. An online flora of all known plants. 
2. An assessment of the conservation status of all known plant species, as far as 
possible, to guide conservation action. 
Assessing the conservation status of all known plant species will be impossible without reliable 
taxonomic information, and an online flora will be meaningless if it contains outdated or 
inaccurate data. 
Once accurate taxonomic information is acquired it is possible to begin to prioritise species for 
protection. The central mechanism for assessing the conservation status of a species (Target 2 
of the GSPC) remains the IUCN Red List. As noted previously, however, the representativeness 
of the Red List, particularly in relation to plants, is questionable.52 Compiling a flora of the world’s 
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plants would go some way in remediating this problem, although the Red List would still lack the 
resources needed to keep updating the species that have been inscribed.53  
Prioritisation is also necessary when using protected areas as a method of in situ conservation 
of species and habitats. As noted previously, the areas that will be identified as most in need of 
protection will vary according to the methodology used.54 Having a set of clearly defined 
objectives will enable conservation practitioners to determine which methodology is most 
appropriate for their project. There are also other non-scientific considerations. Much of the 
world’s landmass is privately-owned, and so whether conservationists can operate on a 
particular site will depend upon the goodwill and circumstances of the landowner.55 To counter 
this, Knight and Cowling believe that conservationists should map opportunity as well as 
conservation priority. This would allow for more efficient use of conservation resources, as 
conservationists would not have to repeat prioritisation exercises in the event that the initial 
sites are unavailable.56 On the other hand, mapping social attitudes towards conservation, 
physical accessibility of sites and the availability of the necessary skilled and unskilled labour 
requires an entirely different skill-set from mapping areas of conservation priority. These skills, 
or the resources to acquire or employ people with them, may be beyond many conservation 
projects. 
The identification of clear goals is just as important in ex situ conservation as it is for in situ 
conservation. Ex situ practitioners must know what it is they wish to conserve – whole 
specimens, plants with particular characteristics, specific gene sequences etc. – and for what 
purpose. This will then inform the decision of what type of ex situ conservation should be 
pursued.57 If the objective is to conserve plants to serve as an educational visitors’ attraction, 
then the appropriate ex situ institution would be a botanical garden. If, on the other hand, the 
purpose is to store genetic codes for research and as an insurance policy in the event of a species 
disappearing from the wild, then a seed bank would suffice. 
 
 Sound Understanding of the Habitat and Ecology of the Target Species: 
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It is self-evident that conservation will only be successful if practitioners understand the habitat 
and ecology of the species being conserved. As the deliberate introduction of an alien species 
illustrates, a failure to appreciate how a species interacts with its ecosystem can result in more 
harm than good.58 Further, it is important to understand the causes of a species’ decline before 
attempting any conservation action. If, for example, a contributory factor is disease, then care 
will have to be taken to ensure that both in and ex situ populations are not exposed to 
contamination. Equally, if the cause of decline is that climate change has rendered its wild 
habitat unsuitable, then either conservation may have to be limited to ex situ activities or new 
habitat would have to be located. If the latter course of action is chosen, then, as was discussed 
in the previous chapter, appropriate risk assessments and monitoring would have to be 
undertaken before releasing the species, particularly if the site in question does not already host 
the species. Equally, there would be little point in attempting to rear a plant in conditions that 
were ecologically unsuitable in an ex situ setting. 
International environmental law’s role in this context is twofold. First, it can promote the 
research required to give practitioners a sound understanding of the ecology of a species. The 
importance of this, as well of continuously building on our understanding of the relationships 
between species and habitats, is implicitly recognised in several provisions common in 
international conservation agreements. The operational guidance to aid in the implementation 
of the Biodiversity Convention’s ecosystem approach states: 
The many components of biodiversity control the stores and flows of energy, water and 
nutrients within ecosystems, and provide resistance to major perturbations. A much 
better knowledge of ecosystem functions and structure, and the roles of the 
components of biological diversity in ecosystems, is required…59 
In terms of actual treaty provisions, Article 12(b) of the Biodiversity Convention calls on the 
Contracting Parties to ‘Promote and encourage research which contributes to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity’. More progressive articles concerning research can 
be found at the regional level. Article 15 of the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources,60 for example, states: 
The Contracting Parties shall individually or in co-operation with other Contracting 
Parties or appropriate international organizations, promote and, whenever possible, 
support scientific and technical programmes of relevance to the conservation and 
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management of natural resources, including monitoring, research, the exchange of 
technical information and the evaluation of results. 
A similar measure may be found in Article VII of the Convention on the Conservation of Nature 
in the South Pacific.61 In the case of Africa,62 although the 1968 Convention on the African 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources63 is silent on research, the revised 2003 
Convention64 not only calls on States to promote and cooperate in scientific research, but 
requires them to ‘strengthen their capabilities to carry out scientific and technological research 
in conservation, sustainable utilization and management of natural resources paying particular 
attention to ecological and socio-economic factors as well as their integration’.65 
Stronger provisions mandating that conservation-related research is undertaken, or that 
stipulate what form this research should take, are non-existent, but this is perhaps one area in 
which international law’s role is necessarily limited. Taken too far, a legal measure demanding 
specific research activity could be seen as unduly interfering with State sovereignty and could 
restrict conservationist’s ability to determine their own research agenda. Furthermore, most 
conservation practitioners would not seek to conserve a species without first gaining basic 
knowledge about its habitat and ecology. Indeed, the conservation activities per se will 
contribute to this knowledge, ideally as part of an adaptive management approach.  
Second, the law, for example through judicial decisions, can encourage States to promote 
ecosystem-level assessments of certain activities, as the Court of Arbitration did in the 
Kishenganga Arbitration, rather than ones based on narrow criteria.66 This would provide 
context-specific data that may be used to protect a species from an identified threat. Such 
mechanisms can already be seen in procedural environmental instruments. Article 3 of the EU’s 
EIA Directive, for example, requires environmental impact assessments to take into account ‘the 
interactions’ between a range of factors, including biodiversity, environmental media and the 
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climate.67 Similar obligations could be read into other instruments through a progressive 
interpretation based on developments in environmental law that reflect contemporary 
understandings of ecology. One possible candidate is the 1991 Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.68 Appendix III of the Convention lists effects 
‘causing additional loading which cannot be sustained by the carrying capacity of the 
environment’ as one of the thresholds that may indicate that the proposed activity will have 
significant environmental impacts.69 Arguably, whether this criterion is fulfilled can only be 
determined following a more holistic assessment of the likely impacts. 
Going further, the EU Habitats Directive,70 and the way in which it has been interpreted by both 
the European and national courts, provides an example of how environmental assessment 
obligations can be strengthened. In Waddenzee, for example, not only was a broad definition 
given to the type of plan or project that will fall under the Directive,71 but the nature of the 
assessment obligation in Article 6 was linked to both the conservation objectives of the 
instrument and the precautionary principle: 
Therefore, the triggering of the environmental protection mechanism [in Article 6] does 
not presume… that the plan or project considered definitely has significant effects on 
the site concerned but follows from the mere probability that such an effect attaches to 
that plan or project.72 (emphasis added) 
In the light, in particular, of the precautionary principle… such a risk exists if it cannot be 
excluded on the basis of objective information that the plan or project will have 
significant effects on the site concerned…73 
Arguably, this is a much stricter interpretation of the precautionary principle typically seen in 
international environmental law. If this approach was adopted more broadly, it could go some 
way in balancing economic development imperatives and the need to avoid and mitigate certain 
types of environmental harm. 
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More recently, in Wealden District Council, the UK Court of Appeal, dismissing an appeal against 
an earlier ruling to quash a planning inspectorate’s approval of a housing development, held 
that any proposed mitigation measures must be clearly defined and linked to the anticipated 
negative impact. In this case, broad financial undertakens linked to the general development 
scheme were insufficient, as they were not directly linked to the likely impact of nitrogen-
loading in a protected heathland.74 The Habitats Directive therefore provides an example of how 
an obligation to undertake specific mitigation action can be linked to a strict precautionary-
based environmental assessment.  
Note that there are limitations to environmental assessment, even in the more substantive form 
seen in the Habitats Directive. Holder, for example, highlights how environmental assessments, 
even those that address cumulative and system-wide impacts, are artificially restrained by other 
factors, such as property law, which may limit the geographic scope of the assessment, and the 
need to balance assessment requirements with the rights of developers not to suffer undue 
delay before being permitted to undertake the proposed activity or project.75 Nevertheless, 
there is still space within international environmental law for greater account to be taken of 
ecosystemic impacts in environmental assessments. 
 
 Confidence in Scientific Practices and Techniques: 
As well as understanding the ecology of target species, it is also important for conservation 
practitioners to be confident in their scientific methodologies. However, doubts have been 
raised over the efficacy of measures often adopted to conserve plants in both in and ex situ 
situations. Many areas important for plant diversity are not protected76 and lists of protected 
and endangered plants in multilateral conservation instruments do not reflect the IUCN Red 
List.77 Similarly, many of the plants in ex situ collections represent the particular interests of the 
institution’s scientists, local flora or simply what was easily acquired.78 Whilst all of these are 
legitimate rationales for ex situ collections, the contributions such collections make to the 
conservation of endangered flora is debatable. Additionally, all of the ex situ material of a 
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species may be kept in the same location, leaving it vulnerable should something go wrong at 
that institution.79 More concerning, material stored in seedbanks, one of the principal purposes 
of which is to ensure that a species can be reintroduced into the wild, may not be viable.80 These 
problems are compounded by the need to constantly refresh ex situ material, partly to maintain 
the genetic diversity of ex situ stock but also to ensure it can be used in a reintroduction 
programme.81 This could be problematic if there are only a few specimens left in the wild, as not 
only could the species be difficult to locate but it would also limit, at least temporarily, the 
species’ capacity to multiply in the wild. 
A range of measures can be adopted that could partially address these issues. In the case of in 
situ conservation, appropriate mapping of the best areas for conservation, taking into account 
the points raised above about prioritisation criteria and opportunity, can ensure that protection 
is given to areas hosting the greatest numbers of the target species. More complex are measures 
to engage local communities, discussed below, particularly those that frequently utilise species 
or related ecological components so that unsustainable uses can be addressed.  
In relation to ex situ conservation, Krigas advocates the storing of species (in whatever form) in 
multiple institutions, so that if one source of material is lost the plant is still represented in ex 
situ collections.82 Regarding the need to constantly replace material to ensure that there is an 
available source should a species’ reintroduction become necessary, one option would be to 
collect seed from plants in ex situ collections. This would reduce pressure on a potentially very 
limited wild population, although repeatedly using ex situ stock for this purpose means that 
eventually a seedbank would become a library of propagated, rather than wild, plants. 
Again, I doubt whether it is appropriate for international law to prescribe steps that should be 
taken to minimise the risk of practitioners adopting less-than-optimum approaches to 
conservation. States must be free to determine what resources, including land, are made 
available for conservation and practitioners must be allowed to determine their own 
conservation agenda and methodologies. Furthermore, given the difficulties in amending treaty 
instruments, even those that are subject to lower thresholds such as schedules or annexes, there 
is a danger that what is provided for in a legal instrument will quickly become obsolete as 
conservation science advances. What international law can do, however, is promote, encourage 
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and support the sharing of best practice between States and practitioners. Article 15 of the 
ASEAN Agreement, referred to above, is one example of how this might be achieved, as is the 
work being completed on protected areas under the aegis of the Biodiversity Convention’s 
protected areas cross-cutting issue.83 There is also a role for conservation NGOs to play in this 
regard, such as Botanic Gardens Conservation International, which facilitates the exchange of 
information between botanical gardens on conservation practices. 
A second area in which international law could contribute is in providing for the ongoing 
monitoring and assessment of conservation activities. Both the target species and conservation 
methodologies must be continuously assessed, preferably in accordance with adaptive 
management principles, if a conservation activity is to be successful. 
 
 Long-Term Funding: 
Conservation is not cheap, particularly if there are perpetual costs that must be met, for example 
in relation to the administration and policing of a protected area or the operation of a seed bank. 
Long-term funding is therefore essential if a conservation project is to be successful. However, 
such funding is rarely forthcoming and globally there is a serious shortfall in the money available 
for conservation. This problem is compounded by the uneven distribution of plant diversity 
between rich and poor States, with the majority of species being found in States that are less 
able to fund conservation.  
Conservation funding comes from a number of sources. Individuals contribute significant sums 
of money each year in the form of membership subscriptions for conservation organisations, 
entrance fees to zoos, botanical gardens and other institutions and donations for specific causes 
or projects. At the international level, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has provided 
billions of dollars since its establishment in 1991 and is now the principal instrument for 
conservation funding in developing States.84 Studies have shown how the GEF has contributed 
to progress on a range of environmental issues in developing States, including in slowing the loss 
of biodiversity.85 However, the considerable funds raised and otherwise sourced by the GEF are 
still insufficient to meet the needs of global conservation efforts. Furthermore, even though the 
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GEF is now the financial mechanism for five conventions,86 the funding it receives remains at a 
similar level to when it supported only two treaty regimes.87 In other words, additional, equally 
legitimate, demands are being placed on the already limited money available for biodiversity 
conservation. 
Arguably, few reforms are needed in terms of funding arrangements in international law. It is 
simply the case that more funds need to be made available, either via the GEF or other sources. 
 
 Community and Public Engagement: 
It is often stated that in situ conservation, and indeed any environmental endeavour, will not be 
successful unless practitioners can engage with the local community. Brockington refers to this 
as the principle of local support, and bases it on the premise that a community that does not 
support a protected area, for example, will protest against it, not cooperate with park managers 
and other authorities and may seek to actively undermine the area’s conservation objectives.88  
However, questions have been raised over the extent to which the success of a protected area 
or other in situ conservation project is conditioned on engaging local communities: 
The local communities who oppose the existence and policies of their neighbouring 
protected areas tend to be politically weak rural groups. They can be opposed to 
powerful alliances of central and local governments, the police, park guards and 
paramilitary units, and national and international NGOs raising money and awareness 
for the cause of protected areas. These are contests that the rural groups may be ill-
equipped to win. Asserting the necessity of their cooperation ignores the realities of 
power. Some local groups can be ignored.89 
Holmes identifies a range of circumstances in which a local community’s opposition will be 
irrelevant to the operation of a protected area. First, in certain States local residents may fear 
the legalised use of violence by park guards or other authorities if they attempt to resist.90 
Second, measures that purport to involve local communities in decision-making processes may 
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be carefully choreographed, for example by selecting those who can attend, so that the process 
results in ‘correct’ results for the authorities.91 Third, where a State or other authority can create 
a false narrative, such as that the area being designated has always been empty of human 
habitation, it can be very difficult for a local community to challenge that narrative.92 Where 
these circumstances exist, conservation activities can still proceed because local opposition 
cannot be translated into an effective challenge to those activities. One solution could be to 
reform relevant administrative institutions so that local communities are not effectively 
excluded from decisions about their local environment.93 In certain States there may be broader 
political obstacles to such reforms, however, independent of any flaws in the design or 
implementation of a specific conservation strategy.  
Notwithstanding the validity of the points raised by Brockington and Holmes, engaging local 
communities must still be considered an important component of a successful conservation 
strategy or project. In the first instance, even if they lack the means to change the location or 
policies of a protected area, a hostile local community can still take some steps that undermines 
the park’s operation. They may, for example, not report poachers to the authorities. More 
importantly, engaging local communities is about more than the success of a conservation 
project. Engaging with local communities so that they are aware of what is happening in their 
environment, and providing meaningful opportunities for them to participate in those decisions, 
has been linked to the delivery of environmental justice for these communities.94 
It is the development and recognition of these relationships within and between different social 
groups and plants that form the basis of a resilience-approach to conservation. ‘From the 
perspective of resilience-thinking, the governance of complexity therefore – of necessity – needs 
to reject the artifice of imposing goals and direction on the world and instead seeks to find its 
goals in the processes, practices and communicative interactions of the world itself’.95 
International law could play an important role in this regard, as well as in enhancing the 
likelihood that a conservation project will receive public support. A number of instruments call 
on States to provide for meaningful public participation in environmental decision-making. An 
                                                          
91 ibid, 75. 
92 ibid, 75. 
93 S.T. McAllister, ‘Community-Based Conservation: Restructuring Institutions to Involve Local 
Communities in a Meaningful Way’ (1999) 10 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy 195-225. 
94 J. Razzaque, ‘Participatory rights in natural resource management: the role of communities in South 
Asia’, in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
95 Chandler, (n 2) p. 37. 
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obvious example is the Aarhus Convention,96 which although primarily a treaty operating in 
Europe has nevertheless had a broader impact on global procedural environmental rights.97 
Although arguably one of the most comprehensive procedural regimes in international 
environmental law, there is still scope for Aarhus to be reformed so as to better support the 
more network-based, bottom-up approach advocated by proponents of resilience-thinking 
models of governance. For example, measures for indigenous peoples, similar to those applied 
by the World Bank,98 could create specific protections and opportunities for communities that 
are both potentially more vulnerable than other groups in society, and that may also be best 
placed to offer practical insights into the conservation status and methodologies of particular 
species. 
In contrast to Aarhus, the Biodiversity Convention has relatively poor public participation 
provisions. Article 14 merely calls on States, ‘where appropriate’, to provide for public 
participation in environmental impact assessments. This may be another consequence of the 
framework nature of the Biodiversity Convention, and more detailed provisions have been 
provided in its protocols. Article 23 of the Biosafety Protocol99 requires States to ‘consult the 
public in the decision-making process regarding living modified organisms and [to] make the 
results of such decisions available to the public’.100 More should be done, however, so that it is 
the results of these processes that direct conservation action. As I discuss further in the next 
section, providing for the effective participation of local communities in decision-making 
procedures can enhance the evidence-base for decisions, and deliver environmental justice for 
those communities. 
For conservation organisations, it is not only important to engage with communities living 
adjacent to their conservation activities, but the wider public as well. As noted above, the public 
is an important source of funding for both in and ex situ conservation. Furthermore, if 
government-funding of conservation is to be maintained and, hopefully, increased, it must be 
seen by the public as a legitimate use of those funds. There are a variety of tools conservationists 
can use to engage the public. Marketing campaigns can be an effective way to reach a large 
                                                          
96 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus) 25 June 1998, in force 30 October 2001, 38 ILM 517 (1999). 
97 J. Razzaque, ‘Human rights to a clean environment: procedural rights’, in Fitzmaurice, Ong and 
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99 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 29 January 2000, 
in force 11 September 2003, 39 ILM 1027. 
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audience and raise funds,101 although if poorly targeted there is a risk that these campaigns can 
be an inefficient use of limited resources. Another tool, which may form part of a marketing 
campaign, is the creation of a conservation narrative, such as the need to raise funds to create 
and maintain the last remaining habitat of a particular species. Efforts must be made to ensure 
such narratives are accurate however. This will avoid the risk of local communities being 
disenfranchised by a false narrative, identified by Holmes.102 Furthermore, a false narrative, 
however effective in the short-term, may do long-term damage to environmental causes. Early 
apocalyptic predictions on climate change has arguably led to a fatigue in the public about 
climate change discourse,103 and desensitised them to more immediate environmental crises.104   
Not all conservation treaties contain obligations relating to public education, and those that do 
vary in quality. Article 13 of the Biodiversity Convention requires States to ‘Promote and 
encourage understanding of the importance of, and the measures required for, the conservation 
of biological diversity, as well as its propagation through media, and the inclusion of these topics 
in educational programmes’.105 Article 13 has been elaborated in a number of Decisions by the 
Conference of the Parties, and in 2006 a number of priority activities were identified to enhance 
the implementation of the educational agenda.106 In particular, the Convention’s Executive 
Secretary was tasked with developing key messages for the Parties to communicate to domestic 
audiences, including the importance of biodiversity and the work of the Biodiversity 
Convention.107 At the regional level, Article 16 of the ASEAN Agreement is interesting as it 
requires information about how conservation measures relate to sustainable development 
objectives to be circulated. This could go some way in building local support for conservation 
activities as it could demonstrate how conservation can bring long-term socioeconomic benefits 
to a community. 
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A simple reform that could potentially deliver major benefits for conservation would be to 
include an obligation to educate and otherwise raise public awareness of conservation issues in 
all environmental instruments. These could be tailored to reflect the remits of individual 
treaties, so, for example, States party to CITES could be required to raise awareness about the 
impacts of international trade on wildlife and what steps individuals can take to ensure that they 
are purchasing from legitimate suppliers. The role of the Biodiversity Convention and other 
generic conservation agreements would then to be highlight the connections between different 
environmental challenges and how action to tackle one issue impacts (both positively and 
negatively) on another. 
 
 Buy-In by Communities, Practitioners and Other Stakeholders: 
Engaging local communities and the wider public should be considered a minimum threshold for 
conservation projects. Passive support or acquiescence to an in situ conservation project by the 
local community will not sustain it when external resources, be these from the State or other 
entity, are reduced or withdrawn. Its long-term success depends on going beyond this and 
ensuring that local communities, practitioners and other key stakeholders ‘buy-in’ to, i.e. have 
a stake in or otherwise feel part of, the project. Community buy-in can also deliver short-term 
economic benefits for the communities themselves. In the Chatham Islands of New Zealand, for 
example, buying into efforts to reinvigorate the local economy by developing a tourism industry 
allowed locals to influence the decisions being made by policymakers and operators to best 
reflect local needs and priorities.108 
One way communities can buy-in to a project is through participatory monitoring mechanisms. 
In short, local communities are trained in skills and techniques that enable them to monitor their 
local wildlife and contribute directly to conservation work, thereby allowing them to ‘own’ part 
of the process.109 Again it is possible to see links with environmental justice literature. In Canada, 
training indigenous communities to be able to test for and monitor levels of pollutants in their 
environment has provided them the means to gather the scientific data that is essential to 
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establishing legitimate environmental claims in mainstream administrative and judicial 
processes.110 
It is the incorporation of knowledge of this kind that would form the basis of both resilience- 
and adaptive management approaches to conservation. It would reveal actual realities that 
would in turn feed into the setting of conservation goals and the monitoring of progress towards 
their goals. It is here, however, that a possible conflict between resilience-thinking and what 
would be the most efficient way to utilise this knowledge in international law arises. Under a 
resilience-thinking model, ‘There is no directing centre or controller, no agent who possesses 
superior knowledge or information’.111 However, many supranational conservation regimes, 
including the Biodiversity Convention and CITES, have established bodies that collect, collate 
and disseminate information about best practice that may be considered to be ‘superior’ to the 
knowledge possessed by any single actor. However, it should be considered superior because it 
represents a sum of experience that may confirm or refute the utility of a particular approach 
to conservation, rather than because the institution sharing that knowledge among other actors 
inhabits a particular position in an artificial hierarchy of actors. 
Participatory monitoring has also been identified as potentially a useful tool in the national 
implementation of the Biodiversity Convention. ‘Participatory approaches to biodiversity 
assessment and monitoring could provide, and in numerous countries are providing, important 
inputs to national identification and monitoring efforts, and to evaluation of the effectiveness 
of measures taken, by contributing detailed knowledge of specific species, habitats or 
ecosystems and monitoring changes over time’.112  Recommendations113 have been made to 
increase and improve the support given to developing States when collating and implementing 
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans,114 although challenges remain, with lack of 
human and financial resources often cited as the reason for delay or failure to submit reports.115 
For ex situ conservation, there is no need to ensure that local communities buy-in to a 
conservation programme, beyond what was noted in relation to public engagement above. 
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There is, however, a need to ensure that practitioners buy-in to a project so that its long-term 
operation can be guaranteed. Collections of certain plants that have national or international 
significance may, once the original (presumably enthusiastic) experts who championed the 
collection have moved on, be left to deteriorate or simply dismantled if they come to be viewed 
as a drain on the host institution’s limited resources.116 This issue can be difficult to address. 
Whilst the provision of funds and training can be encouraged and facilitated by legal 
mechanisms so that there are experts capable of working on a conservation project, there is 
little law- and policymakers can do if these experts are simply not interested in working on a 
project about a given species. Education may go some way in inspiring this enthusiasm, but is 
still dependent on the individual having some latent interest. 
Beyond the promotion of education, the principal role international law can play in terms of buy-
in is through capacity-building. This needs to be at both the State level, so that developing States 
can train experts in the identification and conservation of native flora, and at the local level so 
that communities can engage in schemes such as participatory monitoring. 
 
Making International Law Work for Conservation – The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing: 
The Nagoya Protocol addresses a legitimate and important issue relevant to the conservation of 
biodiversity.117 In certain respects it may be considered as an agreement primarily about plants, 
as it is plants that constitute the richest source of genetic material. The Protocol seeks to ensure 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits resulting from the utilisation of natural resources with 
the State of origin and any local or indigenous community to which the resources belonged.118 
Like almost all of the instruments discussed in this work, the Protocol shows a particular 
sensitivity to State sovereignty, both in the conditioning of access to a State’s genetic resources 
on its prior informed consent and in the references to national law when addressing the rights 
of local and indigenous communities.119  
                                                          
116 P.H. Raven, ‘Research in botanical gardens’ (1981) 102 Botanische Jarbücher fur Systematik, 
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alien/invasive species would have more noticeable positive impact on the status of global biodiversity.  
118 Articles 1 and 5. 
119 Articles 6(1), 6(2) and 7. 
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A number of provisions in the Protocol may be read as encouraging States to harmonise 
domestic procedures and requirements for accessing natural resources, thereby reducing the 
administrative burden on those wishing to access resources in multiple jurisdictions. Article 
6(3)(g) provides examples of what should be included in the ‘mutually agreed’ terms of access 
and Article 17(3), which addresses the monitoring of the utilisation of genetic resources, refers 
to an ‘internationally recognised certificate of compliance’ that would serve as evidence that 
resources have been accessed lawfully. 
In certain regards, the Protocol is a positive instrument in the sense that it incorporates 
mechanisms common in international environmental law, such as prior informed consent, and, 
subject to national law, seeks to protect the interests of local and indigenous communities in 
their natural resources. However, no instrument illustrates as clearly the discrepancies between 
the legal and political perception of an issue and the real world, day-to-day operations of 
conservation practitioners. The critical flaw in the Nagoya Protocol is that it fails to distinguish 
between the parties intending to access genetic resources. A multinational pharmaceutical 
company whose sole intention is to exploit a particular species of plant for commercial gain is 
treated exactly the same as a small botanic garden that wishes to collect samples to assist in the 
conservation of a species. Work is being done to assist entities such as botanic gardens in 
complying with national laws that implement the Nagoya Protocol. The Royal Horticultural 
Society has established a Working Group on the Nagoya Protocol including representatives from, 
inter alia, plant NGOs, collection-holders and nurseries,120 and Botanic Gardens Conservation 
International is compiling information to assist botanic gardens with the implementation of the 
Protocol’s requirements.121 However, lack of both resources and legal expertise will be a 
significant hurdle for many conservation practitioners.  
The Nagoya Protocol should therefore be reformed to make it a more flexible instrument. Rather 
than requiring botanic gardens and other conservationists to reach formal agreements based on 
the mutually agreed terms set out in Article 6, the Nagoya Protocol could instead only require 
that they gain the simple consent of the relevant national authority. This would be a much lower 
burden and more reflective of the non-commercial nature of these bodies’ utilisation of the 
resource. Consideration should also be given to the nature of the benefits that different entities 
should be expected to provide to the State and community of origin. The Protocol’s Annex 
contains a non-exhaustive list of the type of benefits that could be given in return for access to 
                                                          
120 https://www.rhs.org.uk/science/articles/nagoya-protocol-update-september-2015 (last accessed 
01/04/2017). 
121 https://www.bgci.org/policy/abs_links (last accessed 01/04/2017). 
211 
 
 
 
a genetic resource, but gives no guidance on the circumstances in which each would be suitable. 
Many botanical gardens and other research institutes will lack the funds to be able to make 
direct monetary payments in return for access. They could, however, offer to collaborate with 
researchers in the State of origin and undertake to train local people so that they can assist with 
future work. 
Reforms such as this would greatly reduce the burden Nagoya imposes on conservation bodies 
but still retain the legitimate safeguards Nagoya seeks to place on the utilisation of natural 
resources by external parties. First, the consent element remains, and would be conditioned on 
the access being for purely non-commercial purposes and an undertaking to provide appropriate 
benefits to the State of origin and any local or indigenous community. Second, the application 
of this lower threshold or exception could be limited to botanic gardens, research institutes and 
other conservation organisations, i.e. non-commercial bodies. This would ensure that a 
pharmaceutical company that is engaged in preliminary research, with no short-term intention 
to commercially exploit a species’ genetic resources, is still subject to the full requirements of 
the Nagoya Protocol.  
The Nagoya Protocol does not by any means render plant conservation by external actors 
impossible. It is nevertheless a highly problematic instrument. The danger is that, in the absence 
of any other legally binding global plant conservation agreement of general application,122 it will 
evolve to become the principal plant agreement but do so in such a way that is hostile to the 
very institutions that have the means and motivation to ensure the survival of the world’s 
endangered plants. 
 
Conclusions: 
International law performs a number of functions relating to conservation practice, including 
providing funds, facilitating the sharing of best practice and capacity-building activities relating 
to public education and States’ ability to implement conservation measures at the national level. 
Reforms can be made to international law so that it is better able to fulfil these roles. In many 
cases these are not so fundamentally necessary that plant conservation will not be able to 
function properly if they are not enacted. However, they would facilitate the more efficient use 
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of limited resources and could improve the likelihood of the international community meeting 
their global plant biodiversity targets. 
A much more important area for reform is the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing. 
As it is currently conceived, the Protocol cannot distinguish between different users of genetic 
material, even though the intentions and resources of botanical gardens and others 
conservation bodies differ considerably from commercial entities. A more flexible approach is 
required so that the Protocol does not frustrate the ability of conservationists to research and 
protect endangered flora, and so that the benefits that they are rightly required to deliver to the 
State and community of origin are a better reflection of what conservationists have to offer. 
All these reforms, however, whilst important, are arguably insufficient to engineer a reverse in 
the continuing decline of biodiversity. For this to be achieved, we need a new approach to 
international environmental governance, which draws on real-world experiences of those 
involved in the conservation of plants, including those that must utilise them to meet their 
subsistence needs, and to guide conservation activities. Resilience-thinking is such an approach, 
and one that may be of significant benefit to plants if it was incorporated into the Biodiversity 
Convention.  
Ironically, it is the weaknesses for which the Biodiversity Convention has been condemned both 
here and elsewhere that make it suitable for a resilience-thinking approach. Because it contains 
only vague obligations, with States being given significant discretion about how to fulfil these, it 
is closer to a multi-level governance structure than other agreements. Some reform would still 
be necessary. Stronger provisions would need to be introduced so that the processes through 
which the experiential knowledge of practitioners and other actors could be delivered up to a 
supranational body and then back down to other stakeholders. These provisions would include 
those highlighted above as central to resilience-thinking and adaptive management, including 
risk assessments, post-activity monitoring, participatory biodiversity assessment and 
participation in environmental decision-making. Achieving a suitably robust regime would be 
challenging. As already noted, implementation faces practical and political difficulties, and the 
reforms I am advocating here would go much further than any pre-existing procedural 
environmental agreement. That they could be introduced through a new protocol to the 
Biodiversity Convention, and would therefore avoid the reopening of negotiations over the 
treaty itself, would address some of these concerns, but not all of them. 
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CONCLUSION: HUMANITY’S FAILURE TO PROTECT PLANTS 
 
Plants are the cornerstone of all life on Earth, both terrestrial and marine. They provide the air 
we breathe and food we eat, are essential components of modern medicine, provide shelter and 
fuel for people around the world and regulate the planet’s life-support systems. And yet the 
impacts of human activities on plants, and how we seek to mitigate these, is often neglected in 
legal literature. In this thesis, I have sought to redress this bias against plants by offering a 
contemporary and comprehensive analysis of how plants are protected in international 
environmental law. In doing so, I have offered new insights into the relationships between 
conservation law and conservation practice, and suggested reforms to address some of the more 
immediate issues. I have also used the challenges peculiar to the conservation of plants to 
provide different perspectives on long-standing debates in international environmental law, 
including the tensions between anthropocentric and ecological valuations of nature and how 
these manifest in the law, how States’ sovereign rights to exploit natural resources are being 
reinterpreted in light of their evolving environmental obligations and the design and operation 
of international legal instruments. 
At its heart, this thesis has been about whether international law offers effective protection to 
plants. The simple answer to that question is: no. Why this is the case relates to the three key 
themes set out in the introduction: the anthropocentric values of nature are prioritised over its 
ecological values, States’ zealous protection of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources and the inability of the law to keep pace with conservation science and 
ecology. These have left international environmental law incapable of responding to the 
challenges of plant conservation. 
The extent to which anthropocentrism dominates the law became clear in chapter one. Five 
interpretations of value were identified, but the overwhelming focus in international 
conservation law and policy is the instrumental values of nature. A body of law that is more 
ecologically-grounded is never going to be achieved whilst perpetuating this exploitation 
remains the primary rationale for conservation law.    
A case in point was provided in chapter two, where the principal global conservation instrument, 
the Biodiversity Convention,1 was found to be woefully inadequate. The treaty itself perpetuates 
unsustainable practices by subordinating conservation agenda to the narrow self-interests of 
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States. Furthermore, whilst the non-binding programmes, particularly the Updated Global 
Strategy for Plant Conservation,2 set out useful guidance for States in terms of the actions 
necessary to protect plants, their impact on the conservation status of plants has been 
negligible. A dogmatic reliance on global targets in the Biodiversity Convention regime means 
that there is too much focus on the processes of conservation rather than its outcomes. The 
same criticisms can be levied against the forest instruments discussed in that chapter. They are 
non-binding and prioritise States’ sovereign rights to exploit forests’ instrumental values over 
the protection of forests’ ecological functions. 
The weaknesses of the global conservation instruments would arguably not be as big an issue if 
there existed an effective system of regional conservation agreements. There does not. On three 
measures of effectiveness – geographic scope, treaty construction and the design of 
conservation mechanisms – regional conservation treaties fall short. Important areas of plant 
diversity are not covered by a regional conservation instrument, with reasons for this including 
geopolitical instability and lack of political will. As with the Biodiversity Convention, many of the 
obligations in these instruments are phrased in soft or discretionary language, and there are few 
provisions on non-compliance and enforcement. The forms of protected areas set out in the 
instruments are generally outdated and incapable of responding to contemporary conservation 
challenges. They often fail to explicitly differentiate between the needs of plants and the needs 
of animals, creating a false sense that ‘one size fits all’ when it comes to conservation policy. 
More concerning is their complete lack of ecological representativeness, evident in the 
comparisons between the lists of protected and endangered species in the instruments and the 
IUCN’s Red List. The consequences of these issues became clear in the study of the list of 
protected plant species in Appendix II of the Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats,3 which concluded that any improvements in the conservation 
status of listed species were despite, not because of, the Convention. This suggests that 
international conservation law, at least that which operates at a regional level, is of limited value 
when it comes to delivering actual conservation success.  
In contrast, there have been positive developments in the polar regions. Through the 
Environment Protocol4 the Antarctic Treaty System, which had in practice initially excluded 
plants from its remit, has evolved to become a more ecologically-aware regime that is of equal 
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4 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, in force 14 
January 1998, 30 ILM 1461 (1991). 
215 
 
 
 
and specific benefit to plants. In the Arctic, no treaty exists and arguably no treaty should exist. 
Instead, cooperation, largely driven by scientists, has seen the protection of Arctic flora become 
an important subject under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.5  
The issue of sovereignty is particularly pertinent to marine plants. Not only do States have a 
sovereign interest in protecting their rights to exploit marine natural resources, but also in 
ensuring that environmental protection does not undermine the freedom of the high seas. This 
is apparent in the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.6 Arguably a better model of protection 
can be found in the Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity.7 This offers 
robust protection to marine flora both in relation to specific species but also the wider marine 
ecosystem. 
Finally, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance8 is an example of the more 
responsive instrument that I believe is necessary to address the discrepancies between 
conservation science and conservation law. The explicit reference in this regime to the IUCN Red 
List means that it is not reliant on the constant amending of treaties and their subsidiary 
instruments to remain current. Where this Convention falls down is in the lack of a robust system 
to address non-compliance. 
Turning to some of the key drivers of plant diversity loss, the picture is mixed. Climate change 
remains the biggest challenge in plant conservation, and this is unlikely to change whilst there 
continues to be a mismatch between global conservation and climate change policies. A more 
flexible system of law that focusses on adaptation in nature rather than preservation of nature 
is needed. In relation to mountains, one of the most vulnerable plant biomes, a major concern 
is the apparent lack of useful data. This is despite the gathering of data being the focus of 
mountain conservation efforts over the past few decades.  
The relationship between plants and climate change is more complex than just the threat aspect. 
Because of their unique position in ecological cycles, plants play an important role in tackling 
climate change, and the REDD and Clean Development Mechanisms established under the UN 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change9 seek to facilitate this. These instruments are not 
perfect, and more needs to be done to ensure that they protect plant diversity rather than 
encourage the mass planting of those species that absorb the most carbon dioxide. However, 
they offer important incentives for the protection of plants, and do so in a manner that 
recognises both the instrumental and ecological values of plants. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it is in the international trade regimes that more suitable legal protection 
for plants is found. Following the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Appellate Body’s decision in 
United States – Shrimp,10 States can lawfully restrict trade for the purpose of protecting plants. 
The situation is not ideal, however. As the scenarios set out in chapter seven show, the chapeau 
of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade11 could be a significant obstacle to 
any State wishing to go beyond an international consensus that is expressed through a 
conservation treaty. A more thorough analysis of the nature of any relevant conservation 
instrument, specifically whether it contains supranational procedures or leaves national 
implementation to the discretion of States, could address this problem. 
In comparison to the other conservation instruments that I have examined, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora12 (CITES) benefits from robust 
provisions on national implementation and enforcement. CITES has also developed intelligent 
responses to specific challenges relating to its remit, with the listing of like-species under 
Appendix II being particularly important for plants. As noted in chapter seven, CITES should be 
a model to guide the future development of other conservation regimes. 
Regarding the international response to alien/invasive species, there are again positive and 
negative aspects. The Biodiversity Convention’s Guiding Principles13 are a comprehensive 
system through which a biological invasion can be prevented or mitigated. Strengthening these 
by recasting them as a new protocol to the Convention could go a long way to both assisting the 
international community with its conservation goals and challenging perceptions that the 
Biodiversity Convention is a hollow instrument. The 1997 International Plant Protection 
                                                          
9 New York, 9 May 1992, in force 24 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107. 
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(UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VI/23), 2002, Annex. 
217 
 
 
 
Convention,14 in comparison, is highly problematic. Under this treaty, action, both preventative 
and mitigatory, can only be taken against a plant pest or disease if it has, or will have, an 
economic impact. This severely limits the scope of the Convention and is contrary to the 
approach taken by the WTO Appellate Body in relation to the restriction of trade for 
environmental purposes. 
The issue of disease highlights the disconnect between international conservation law and 
conservation science. Increasing work is being done by conservationists and scientists about the 
threat disease poses to plants, and how best to mitigate this. Yet neither the Biodiversity 
Convention nor its non-binding programmes even mention disease as a cause of plant diversity 
loss. Given that the warming climate is a driver of disease, and that the international 
community’s efforts to prevent climate change are less than sufficient, this is a potentially 
dangerous oversight. 
All of this raises the question of what needs to change? In chapter nine, I set out a range of 
potential reforms that would make international law a better tool for conservation practitioners. 
Even if all these were achieved however, they would arguably be insufficient to remedy the 
deeper, structural flaws in international law, resulting from the domination of anthropocentrism 
and sovereignty, that has left it incapable of preventing the continual loss of plant diversity. 
Arguably, much more extensive reform is needed, not just to the law but the political and 
societal infrastructure that underpins it. It has not been possible to explore ecocentric 
alternatives to current forms of legal protection for plants in this work. However, one proposal 
warrants discussion here, that of Stone’s global commons guardian. 
In 1972, Stone famously asked ‘should trees have standing?’, and proposed a model through 
which natural entities could be given legal rights.15 At the core of his hypothesis is the guardian 
concept, i.e. a legal person that would act on behalf of a natural entity in matters affecting it. In 
the most recent iteration of his work, Stone discusses the potential for a global commons 
guardian to represent and enforce the rights of the natural world in international negotiations 
and before international courts and tribunals.16 
                                                          
14 In force 2 October 2005, amending the 1951 Convention (Rome, 6 December 1951, in force 3 April 1952, 
150 UNTS 67, as revised by the FAO Conference in 1979). 
15 C. Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45 Southern 
California Law Review 450-501. 
16 C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality and the Environment (3rd edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 130-132. To an extent, international organisations, notably UNEP, and international NGOs 
already perform such functions. One of the key differences in Stone’s proposals is that the role of these 
actors in representing the environment, and the necessary powers for them to be able to do so, would be 
formally recognised in international instruments. 
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Stone sees a global commons guardian as representing those elements of nature that are found 
outside the jurisdiction of States. As such, it is effectively a guardian for the high seas, and to a 
certain extent the atmosphere, and therefore of limited practical value for plants.17 However, 
notwithstanding the near-insurmountable obstacle of the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, there arguably exists in international law space in which resources found 
within State boundaries may be subject to a form of commons guardianship. 
First, the preamble to the Biodiversity Convention states that the conservation of biodiversity ‘is 
a common concern of humankind’. It is important to note that the phrase ‘common concern’ 
was used due to the political opposition to using ‘common heritage of mankind’, which has a 
much greater legal significance,18 and there is little evidence to suggest that this position has 
changed. However, ‘common concern’ has been interpreted as recognising that all States have 
an interest in the conservation of biodiversity, and that their sovereignty over natural resources 
must be exercised in a manner that is compatible with their international environmental 
obligations.19 I would go further than this and say that because the Biodiversity Convention’s 
preamble recognises that biodiversity conservation is a common concern of humankind, not just 
the international community (i.e. States), it demonstrates States’ acceptance that in addition to 
their formal legal rights over their natural resources, there is a broader global community which 
feels a sense of metaphysical interest in the wonders of the natural world. It is this that would 
justify the designation of biodiversity as a global commons, the protection of which should be 
vested in a global commons guardian. 
Secondly, in certain very narrow circumstances States have already suspended the rights 
afforded to them over biodiversity by permanent sovereignty.20 The listing of a species in the 
CITES appendices imposes certain obligations on States and limits their rights to engage in the 
international trade of those species.21 A much broader application of this basic approach, for 
example imposing obligations regarding species listed as endangered by the IUCN Red List, could 
                                                          
17 ibid, p. 135-137. 
18 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, (3rd edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 129. 
19 ibid, p. 130. 
20 Suspended in the sense that States have the right to withdraw from the international conventions which 
impact on their sovereignty. 
21 See Articles III, IV and V.  
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be one way to implement a guardianship model for plants and other natural entities typically 
found within the jurisdiction of States.22  
Such ideas are controversial and run contrary to the currently accepted understandings of 
permanent sovereignty, even those that recognise an element of sustainable use within that 
norm.23 Others, notably advocates of wild law,24 go much further than simply granting legal 
rights to natural entities and argue for the complete ecologising of social and political 
structures.25 The extent to which such ideas are practicable is debatable but, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the increasingly parlous state of nature, and that plants may be seen as actively 
participating in human society, demand that such radical proposals are given serious 
consideration.26  
The Fourth Biodiversity Outlook27 is presented as a mid-term assessment of the Biodiversity 
Convention Contracting Parties’ progress towards the 2020 Aichi Biodiversity targets.28 I would 
argue, however, that it should have been seen as a recognition of failure. Of the fifty-six sub-
targets, insufficient progress had been made in relation to thirty-three of them if they were to 
be achieved by 2020, little or no progress had been made on ten, including keeping exploitation 
of the natural world to within safe ecological limits,29 and States had moved further away from 
achieving five sub-targets, including those relating to habitat degradation30 and enhancing the 
conservation status of threatened species.31 Without renewed efforts to dramatically alter our 
relationship with the natural world, it was clear that the 2020 Targets were not going to be 
achieved. A new approach, based on strict and legally enforceable conservation obligations, 
should have been adopted.   
More recent reports provide further evidence that we have already failed to meet the Aichi 
Targets. Kew’s State of the World’s Plants Report reveals that over a fifth of all known plant 
                                                          
22 This would, however, be contingent on the reforms to the Red List already proposed in chapter 3. In 
particular, greater technical and financial support would have to be given to ensure the Red List was as 
representative and accurate as possible. 
23 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 168.  
24 C. Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (2nd edition, Green Books, 2011). 
25 L. Westra, ‘Governance for Integrity? A Distant but Necessary Goal’, in P. Burdon (ed), Exploring Wild 
Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield Press, 2011). 
26 R. Amos, ‘Reassessing the Role of Plants in Society’ (2017) International Journal of Law in Context DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552317000040. 
27 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Montreal, 2014). 
28 Decision X/2, ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, 29 October 2010, Annex. 
29 A component of target 4. 
30 A component of target 5. 
31 A component of target 12. 
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species are at risk of extinction,32 with key areas of plant diversity disappearing.33 The latest 
Living Planet Index states that ‘In a business-as-usual scenario, [the] downward trend in species 
populations continues into the future’.34 Although this report is currently limited to vertebrate 
species, its implications for the wider natural world are clear. 
The consequences of this catalogue of failure remain largely unknown but are potentially 
catastrophic. For those who wish to protect the wonders of the natural world so that future 
generations may enjoy the pleasure of sharing the planet with them, every extinction must be 
considered too high a price to pay for humanity’s increasingly and unnecessarily hedonistic 
lifestyle. And for those that see plants as merely ‘things’ to be utilised for the benefit of humans, 
at some point the ecological costs of our unsustainable and unprecedented exploitation will 
outweigh any short-term advantages. The reports listed above are not just highlighting the 
international community’s failure to meet arbitrary and political conservation targets. They are 
tracking our systematic undermining of the Earth’s ecological integrity. At some point, our 
planet’s life-support systems will collapse. 
To return to the first question posed in this work. Why a thesis about plants? Because plants 
matter. And we are failing them. 
 
                                                          
32 RBG Kew, ‘The State of the World’s Plants Report – 2016’ (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 2016), p. 59. 
33 ibid, p. 26. 
34 WWF/ZSL, Living Planet Report 2016: Risk and resilience in a new era (WWF International, 2016), p. 12. 
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APPENDIX 1 
RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE REGIONAL CONSERVATION INSTRUMETS 
 
1940 Western Hemisphere Convention (19/35 ratifications)  
International Organisation: The Organization of American States 
STATE RATIFIED 
Antigua and Barbuta  
Argentina Y 
Barbados  
Belize  
Bolivia  
Brazil Y 
Canada  
Chile Y 
Columbia  
Costa Rica Y 
Cuba  
Dominica  
Dominican Republic Y 
Ecuador Y 
El Salvador Y 
Grenada  
Guatemala Y 
Guyana  
Haiti Y 
Honduras  
Jamaica  
Mexico Y 
Nicaragua Y 
Panama Y 
Paraguay Y 
Peru Y 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  
Saint Lucia  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  
Suriname Y 
The Bahamas  
Trinidad and Tobago Y 
United States Y 
Uruguay Y 
Venezuela Y 
 
States too small to appear on the maps: Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and, The Bahamas Trinidad and Tobago 
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1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (31/54 
ratifications)  
International Organisation: The African Union 
STATE RATIFIED 
Algeria Y 
Angola  
Benin  
Botswana  
Burkina Faso Y 
Burundi  
Cabo Verdi  
Cameroon Y 
Central African Republic Y 
Chad  
Comoros Y 
Congo Y 
Cote d’Ivoire Y 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Y 
Djibouti Y 
Egypt Y 
Equatorial Guinea  
Eritrea  
Ethiopia  
Gabon Y 
Gambia  
Ghana Y 
Guinea Y 
Guinea-Bissau  
Kenya Y 
Lesotho  
Liberia Y 
Libya  
Madagascar Y 
Malawi Y 
Mali Y 
Mauritania  
Mauritius  
Mozambique Y 
Namibia  
Niger Y 
Nigeria Y 
Rwanda Y 
Saharawi  
Sao Tome and Principe  
Senegal Y 
Seychelles Y 
Sierra Leone  
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Somali  
South Africa  
South Sudan  
Sudan Y 
Swaziland Y 
Tanzania Y 
Togo Y 
Tunisia Y 
Uganda Y 
Zambia Y 
Zimbabwe  
 
States too small to appear on the maps: Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe 
and Seychelles 
 
1976 Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific (5/26 ratifications) 
International Organisation: The Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
STATE RATIFIED 
American Samoa  
Australia Y 
Cook Islands Y 
Federated States of Micronesia  
Fiji Y 
France Y 
French Polynesia  
Guam  
Kiribati  
Marshall Islands  
Nauru  
New Caledonia  
New Zealand   
Niue  
Northern Mariana Islands  
Palau  
Papua New Guinea  
Samoa Y 
Solomon Islands  
Tokelau  
Tonga  
Tuvalu  
United Kingdom  
United States  
Vanuatu  
Wallis and Futuna  
 
253 
 
 
 
States too small to appear on the maps: American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Wallis and Futuna. 
 
1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (45/47 
ratifications)  
International Organisation: The Council of Europe 
STATE RATIFIED 
Albania Y 
Andorra Y 
Armenia Y 
Austria Y 
Azerbaijan Y 
Belgium Y 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Y 
Bulgaria Y 
Croatia Y 
Cyprus Y 
Czech Republic Y 
Denmark Y 
Estonia Y 
Finland Y 
France Y 
Georgia Y 
Germany Y 
Greece Y 
Hungary Y 
Iceland Y 
Ireland Y 
Italy Y 
Latvia Y 
Lichtenstein Y 
Lithuania Y 
Luxembourg Y 
Macedonia Y 
Malta Y 
Moldova Y 
Monaco Y 
Montenegro Y 
Netherlands Y 
Norway Y 
Poland Y 
Portugal Y 
Romania Y 
Russia  
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San Marino  
Serbia Y 
Slovakia Y 
Slovenia Y 
Spain Y 
Sweden Y 
Switzerland Y 
Turkey Y 
Ukraine Y 
United Kingdom Y 
 
States too small to appear on the maps: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco 
and San Marino. 
The lighter blue indicates ratifications from non-Council of Europe States: Belarus, Burkina Faso, 
Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. When these and the European Union are included the total 
number of ratifications is fifty-one. 
The five observer States have been excluded. These are: Canada, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Mexico 
and the United States. 
 
 The 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (3/10 
ratifications) 
International Organisation: The Association of South East Asian Nations 
STATE RATIFIED 
Brunei  
Cambodia  
Indonesia Y 
Lao  
Malaysia  
Myanmar  
Philippines Y 
Singapore  
Thailand Y 
Vietnam  
All States are visible on the maps. 
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APPENDIX 2 
1979 BERN CONVENTION / IUCN RED LIST DATA TABLES 
 
Methodological Notes: 
The search function on the IUCN Red List website1 was used to search for each species listed in 
Appendix I of the Bern Convention. Individual species were searched to ensure that they were 
all identified as in some cases a species’ genus, for example species listed as Liliaceae by the 
Appendix, has been reclassified. The conservation status and population trend of species, as 
defined by the IUCN, were recorded and three sets of data collected: 
1. The total number of species classified in each IUCN conservation status category 
2. The total number of species with increasing, stable, decreasing, unknown and outdated 
population trends 
3. The population trends of all species classified in each IUCN conservation status 
Plants listed in Appendix I were then removed from a search for all European flora on the Red 
List, and the same three sets of data were collected. All data were correct as of November 2016. 
The percentage calculations were as follows:  
Chart 1 100(X/1046) 
Chart 2 100(X/423) 
Chart 3 100 (X/419) 
Chart 4 100(X/1042) 
Chart 5a 100(X/17) 
Chart 5b 100(X/100) 
Chart 5c 100(X/167) 
Chart 5d 100(X/128) 
Chart 5e 100(X/4) 
Chart 6a 100(X/28) 
Chart 6b 100(X/426) 
Chart 6c 100(X/197) 
Chart 6d 100(X/339) 
Chart 6e 100(X/52) 
 
Percentages were rounded to two decimal places. 
Data Tables: 
Chart 1: IUCN classification of species not included in the Bern Convention 
                                                          
1 www.iucnredlist.org/ (last accessed 01/04/2017).  
256 
 
 
 
Extinct (EX) 3 0.29% 
Extinct in Wild (EW) 1 0.1% 
Regionally Extinct (RE) 0 0 
Critically Endangered (CR) 62 5.93% 
Endangered (EN) 64 6.12% 
Vulnerable (VU) 68 6.5% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 6 0.57% 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 70 (64+6) 6.69% 
Data Deficient (DD) 117 11.19% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 655 
(643+12) 
62.8% 
 Total = 1046  
 
Chart 2: IUCN classification of all species listed in Appendix I of Bern 
   Incl. NE 
Extinct (EX) 1 0.24% 0.14% 
Extinct in Wild (EW) 3 0.71% 0.43% 
Regionally Extinct (RE) 0 0 0 
Critically Endangered (CR) 92 21.75% 13.12% 
Endangered (EN) 96 22.7% 13.69% 
Vulnerable (VU) 86 20.33% 12.27% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 39 (36+3) 9.22% 5.56% 
Date Deficient (DD) 54 12.77% 7.7% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 52 (51+1) 12.29% 7.42% 
 Total = 423   
Not Evaluated (NE) 278*  39.66% 
 Total = 701   
* To aid with comparisons NE is not included in the chart. The percentages of each conservation 
status when NE is included is provided here for information. 
 
Chart 3: Population trends of species included in Appendix I of the Bern Convention and 
IUCN Red List 
Increasing 20 4.77% 
Stable 100 23.87% 
Decreasing 167 39.86% 
Unknown 128 30.55% 
Needs Updating 4 0.95% 
 Total = 419*  
* Excludes the one species listed as EX and three listed as EW 
 
Chart 4: Population trends of species not included in Appendix I of the Bern Convention 
Increasing 28 2.69% 
Stable 426 40.88% 
Decreasing 197 18.91% 
Unknown 335 32.15% 
Needs Updating 56 5.37% 
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 Total = 1042*  
* Excludes the three species listed as EX and one as EW 
 
Chart 5a: Conservation status of species with an increasing population included in Appendix 
I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 3 17.65% 
Endangered (EN) 1 5.88% 
Vulnerable (VU) 8 47.06% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 4 23.53% 
Data Deficient (DD) 1 5.88% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 3 17.65% 
 Total = 17  
 
Chart 5b: Conservation status of species with a stable population included in Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 18 18% 
Endangered (EN) 14 14% 
Vulnerable (VU) 23 23% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 11 11% 
Data Deficient (DD) 9 9% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 25 25% 
 Total = 100  
 
Chart 5c: Conservation status of species with a decreasing population included in Appendix 
I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 52 31.14% 
Endangered (EN) 58 34.73% 
Vulnerable (VU) 24 14.37% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 8 4.79% 
Data Deficient (DD) 12 7.19% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 13 7.78% 
 Total = 167  
 
Chart 5d: Conservation status of species with an unknown population included in Appendix 
I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 19 14.84% 
Endangered (EN) 23 17.97% 
Vulnerable (VU) 30 23.44% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 13 10.16% 
Data Deficient (DD) 32 25% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 11 8.59% 
 Total = 128  
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Chart 5e: Conservation status of species with a population trend that needs updating 
included in Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 0 0 
Endangered (EN) 0 0 
Vulnerable (VU) 1 25% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 3 75% 
Data Deficient (DD) 0 0 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 0 0 
 Total = 4  
 
Chart 6a: Conservation status of species with an increasing population not included in 
Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 0 0 
Endangered (EN) 0 0 
Vulnerable (VU) 0 0 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 1 3.57% 
Data Deficient (DD) 0 0 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 27 96.43% 
 Total = 28  
 
Chart 6b: Conservation status of species with a stable population not included in Appendix 
I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 7 1.64% 
Endangered (EN) 7 1.64% 
Vulnerable (VU) 12 2.82% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 14 3.29% 
Data Deficient (DD) 8 1.88% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 378 88.73% 
 Total = 426  
 
Chart 6c: Conservation status of species with a decreasing population not included in 
Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 33 16.75% 
Endangered (EN) 43 21.83% 
Vulnerable (VU) 27 13.71% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 26 13.2% 
Data Deficient (DD) 14 7.11% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 54 27.41% 
 Total = 197  
 
Chart 6d: Conservation status of species with an unknown population not included in 
Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 16 4.72% 
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Endangered (EN) 12 3.54% 
Vulnerable (VU) 13 3.83% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 0 0 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 23 6.78% 
Data Deficient (DD) 93 27.43% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 182 53.69% 
 Total = 339  
 
Chart 6e: Conservation status of species with a population status that needs updating not 
included in Appendix I 
Critically Endangered (CR) 6 11.54% 
Endangered (EN) 2 3.85% 
Vulnerable (VU) 16 30.77% 
Lower Risk – conservation dependent (LR/cd) 6 11.54% 
Near Threatened (NT) or Lower Risk – near threatened (LR/nt) 6 11.54% 
Data Deficient (DD) 2 3.85% 
Least Concern (LC) or Lower Risk – least concern 14 26.92% 
 Total = 52  
 
 
 
 
